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Political Affairs

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Party Urged to Avoid Interfering in Economic Reform

18000581 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by N. Travkin, deputy director of the Main Administration for Construction in Moscow Oblast, under the rubric "Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference Speak": "Let Economic Operations Proceed Without Commands: The Fate of Restructuring Is Being Decided at Work Stations"; accompanied by photograph of author]

[Text] Society's political system, which is based on "cogs," gives each of us the right to say, regarding any failure that occurs: "But what could I have done? Nothing depended on me. I'm a little person." The nature of the openness at the 19th Party Conference is taking away this trump card. Propose, debate, and attempt to prove. But in the debate one's view, all the same, should be directed not so much to the past as to the present and the future.

At the conference we looked at the ultimate question in the reform of the political system: the unification of party and soviet rule.

In order to answer it, let us analyze the brief history of restructuring from the standpoint of party agencies' role in implementing the reform. Where have the party agencies done their job, and where haven't they? And if not, why not? Can it be that in the course of such evaluations we will find the necessary solution?

In the three years of restructuring a substantial gap has developed between glasnost and democratization, on the one hand, and progress in economic reform, on the other. If this gap does not start to be noticeably reduced, and if democratic processes are not, in the literal sense of the word, backed up by complete and universal cost accounting, we will be giving a serious chance to the strengthening of mistrust and nihilism in labor collectives. Even today voices saying that everything is all empty talk, and that nothing is actually changing in life, can be heard rather distinctly. And this does not just pertain to store counters; usually, in fact, it pertains not to store counters, but to the possibility of working independently. Without harassment, and without endless commands. To feel that you are really a proprietor, an individual, and not a pawn in someone's game.

One reform, the political and ideological reform, has to a significant degree become divorced from the other, economic reform. Yet at the outset of restructuring the course of the economic reform was seen more clearly than that of the political reform. Back in April 1985 M. S. Gorbachev said that no one knows the economy's untapped potential better than the labor collectives themselves, and that therefore the main thing in the concept of restructuring was to move forward more

boldly along the path of expanding the rights and independence of enterprises, and strive more boldly to introduce cost accounting. At that time we had only taken the first steps in democratization. The boundaries of glasnost were not clear. Do you remember what a response at the 27th Congress was evoked by the PRAVDA article "Purification"? Today that sort of article would not seem so controversial as it did then.

So, where has the distortion occurred that has allowed the "politics of words" to become so divorced from the "politics of deeds." The fate of restructuring is decided at the work station—that is unambiguous. We have always said that. In order for restructuring not to remain a slogan, we must really create the conditions for highly productive work at every work station. In my view, the creation of such conditions is in fact the main thing in the reform of economic management.

What has brought about the slowing of the economic reform? After all, both strategies were developed and being carried out by the same headquarters—the CPSU Central Committee. The same one. But the strategy of openness, glasnost and democratization turned out to be under the direct and practical influence of the Central Committee. That, incidentally, indicates once again that political and ideological functions belong inherently to the party. But in the economic reform, the Central Committee and the enterprise labor collectives turned out to be separated by the ministries, departments and other economic-management and administrative agencies. And it has proved impossible to break through this thick layer, since the party agencies through which the Central Committee implements its policy have themselves proved entangled in economic-management concerns and have grown together, as it were, with the economic-management agencies in their tasks. That is why they have been unable, in most cases, to abandon tried-and-true command methods. In words, they have called for cost accounting and independence, but in deeds they have forced plainly unrealistic tasks into plans. They have attributed this to concern for the interests of an oblast, a rayon or a branch. We economic managers, they say, have not grown up enough to be concerned with those interests. We are too politically immature.

The party agencies have become involuntary participants in command diktat in the economy—that is the first tribute that the party is paying for its getting carried away with narrowly economic affairs. That is why structural reforms in economic management are proceeding with difficulty. Not the radical reduction of superfluous levels, but their reshuffling and renaming. We get rid of the intermediate levels, and they through whom will we command, and who will we hold accountable?

As an example of a new superfluous bureaucratic level, I can cite the State Production Association No 2 of the Main Administration for Construction in Moscow Oblast, of which I am in charge as deputy director of the

main administration. Even the primary organization's party meeting was compelled to admit the superfluity of our existence. At the conference M. Ulyanov said that the bureaucrat is a kind of abominable snowman, that there are a lot of tracks and everything around is trampled, but no one has seen him alive. Here, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, you are getting the opportunity. Take a look. You can even feel me with your hands. I am not the only and by far not the last example. We could supply the all the zoos in the world with such "abominable snowmen." For hard currency. But both the main administration and the oblast party committee are entranced by the industry's increased rates of development with the appearance of the intermediate level, and the possibility of keeping closer and stricter watch over the trusts. That is, even now the effect of prodding in the back is still working. It is a short-term and undependable effect. But why can't the party agency make up its mind to break that structure? Because it bears primary responsibility for indices in construction. The reluctance to lose—or, more accurately, the fear of losing—management levels under its power is the **second** tribute that the party is paying for its habit of goading.

But in places where elements of the economic mechanism have been put into operation, administrative pressures no longer work and are meeting with defeat. At the end of last year in Podolsk the fate of a prestigious facility for the oblast, a maternity home, was being decided. The atmosphere at that facility was heated up by everyone and in every way thinkable. It failed to be completed! Why? After all, formerly such "special-purpose tasks" were accomplished very simply. Commands to pull people and resources off other facilities were carried out, and afterwards whoever gave the command would close his eyes to the overexpenditure of wages. They weren't his! Under the collective contract, wages are determined by economic means. And naturally, every time the oblast bosses leave, a trust manager is forced to choose: I can carry out the command and forcibly shift people to the facility, but where will I get the wages for the whole trust? After all, now he has to answer in actual fact to the trust collective, and not to the "higher-ups." So you cannot command the economy according to the principle of the mayor from the town of Glupov, who governed with the words, "I'll ruin you," and "I won't tolerate it." Moreover, under the conditions of cost accounting, the word "ruin" loses its quotation marks.

All this confirms the conclusion that the centralized administrative system is not working. It is no longer possible, through it, to manage economic processes. That means we must speed up work to help in the development of economic, especially horizontal, ties. That is probably the main place where party agencies should apply their efforts in guiding the economy. But frequently the campaign to reorganize structures has been replaced by an illusory reduction of staffs. Well so, fellas, is it hard to feed us? Okay, we'll ease up on you. We'll cut by 30 percent and, in some places, a bit more. But only to the limit that we don't lose our control of you.

Yet supposedly the whole intention was for this to be accomplished in a revolutionary fashion, from below. It is not you who are making a concession to us in reducing yourselves by 30 percent, but we, the enterprise workers, who are telling you how many of you must be kept for the good of the undertaking. There was a Central Committee directive, and there was (and is) determination on the part of the lower levels. But the headquarters in charge of organizing this undertaking, which the party agencies should have become, did not do their job everywhere. Why? Why aren't the party agencies working boldly to break up this overly centralized system? It is because they have become a part of it, an inseparable and decisive part. That is the **third** tribute that is being paid for the overburdening of party agencies with economic-management work.

Now, in my opinion, we have become convinced that the bureaucracy can only be defeated from below—by cutting off its source of nourishment. It will not cut off this source itself from above. Nor will success come from within—selfish caste interests are proving stronger than the interests of the people and the state. Isn't this why the transitional period is being dragged out in time?

We talk about the future bankruptcy of incompetent enterprises as a natural process. No one, we say, will be left without work. But as soon as reduction of bureaucratic functionaries began, a wave arose: "But where will they go, the poor people, if they haven't been taught to do anything useful? Can that be their fault?" No. Let us also examine the question of managerial structures from the standpoint of bankruptcy. What of concrete value can you offer production, besides giving orders? Nothing? Then do not reduce but disband. That is precisely the view that was expressed at the conference by V. Kabaidze in a somewhat grotesque form, which immediately upset many people.

So, why don't the party agencies get angry at the economic and administrative bureaucracy? It is because, in working side by side, they have become closely linked to it. That is what made possible the appearance of corruption and unscrupulousness in some party ranks. That is the **fourth** tribute being paid for the confusion of party and economic-management work.

All this is contributing to the prolongation of the transitional period in the economy. And the main cost, I dare say, may be the loss of the best personnel. Who is sticking their necks out, debating and arguing? Those concerned and trusting people who believe in the Law on the State Enterprise and in independence, who believe in restructuring. And they are being put in their places, lumped together, and sometimes taken down a peg. And the ones who yesterday would salute on every occasion and today are living tranquilly—they aren't turning up. But they are not the ones the party is counting on in restructuring.

And that is the **fifth**, and probably the biggest tribute. It is preventing that which the party is called on to grow—personnel—from growing.

The discussion before the conference was seemingly persuasive on the point that party committees should abandon direct commanding of the economy. And we proclaimed in the Theses: They should! But when? Now the following reasoning is enjoying currency: In the murky transitional time, it is said, the party committees cannot let go of the economic-management levers, otherwise there will be failure. After all, those people down below will start to "err," and who will reconcile them and set them straight? Only the party agencies. So, we will establish a little order and then turn power over to the soviets, and we ourselves will direct you politically and ideologically. I am convinced that if this step can be taken starting tomorrow, then it must be done tomorrow. Economic managers are ready for independence. Such readiness is also needed on the part of the party agencies. Otherwise many economic managers will ask themselves the question, as they leave a session of the party committee or a briefing in its branch departments: "Can it be that I really do fail to understand something about specific local circumstances? Can it be that the fate of the rayon's animal husbandry will really be decided by those 30 workers who must be allocated free dried grass along the roadside for mowing? And wouldn't it be better to turn this fate over to the livestock raisers themselves? Yet then one would have to go to them and try to persuade them and stir them up. And there is no one who can pay them frequent visits. In the first place, everyone is busy trying to pull out the plan. And cost accounting and various forms of contracts have become an optional concern for party agencies. In the second place, we do not know how, because we have elected not commissars and not political workers, but the best economic managers to the party agencies. No, it is easier for the committee to whip them into it. They've got everything at hand." In general, the economic manager today is reflecting on things. But if he himself were put in the job of the imperious secretary tomorrow, he would act in the same fashion. After all, in the final analysis the Central Committee holds the first secretary of the obkom or raykom accountable for milk.

It seems to me that if we want radical improvements in the economy, the party's abandonment of day-to-day commands and operational concerns is an essential condition. The concept of cost accounting is being applied more to enterprises than to territories and administrative rayons. But let us agree: it will make little sense if the peasant in the field and worker at the machine tool start counting kopecks, while the bureaucrat in the ispokom places his hope in the state budget and what is given to him. Furthermore, the democratization of the soviets will not take place unless they are put on a cost-accounting basis. The interests of the branch and the territory, when they intersect, should produce not sparks but mutual benefit.

Enterprises are financing themselves and developing and, simultaneously, using part of their revenues to finance and develop the local infrastructure. This money, provided on the basis of normatives, is where the interest of the soviet will lie. It will try to use this money in an intelligent fashion. This money will force the deputies to take a closer look at the extensive rayon bureaucracy, as well. Do all the rayon consumers' cooperatives, raytopy and other offices need to be maintained? Or can something be replaced by self-government? In that case, the place of labor collectives' councils—the chief support and basis of the soviets of people's deputies—in the political system is also clearly defined.

But this whole system will remain dead if it lacks the party's organizing and directing work. Take a look at the working people's complaints. The absolute majority of them can be resolved at the local level, in labor collectives, in the rayon, or in the oblast. But they are often not resolved. There is no one to organize the permanent work of the soviets. They do not have sufficient authority. Faith in party agencies continues to be greater.

But even that is not enough. One cannot fail to note that the labor collectives' councils are already manifesting tendencies to pursue group and narrowly departmental interests that are contrary to the interests of the territory. Therefore, the development of new thinking is necessary there, too, on the part of workers, executives and the soviets. Who will work to develop that new thinking? The presidiums of the soviets, through the labor collectives' councils? The party, through its primary organizations, and through Communists on the soviets and in the labor collectives themselves? The conference decided that it is the party that should become the unifying factor for these efforts.

Nowhere else, in my view, is dependency so extremely widespread as it is in territorial and regional development. Begging has become part of our blood. To do so we use any forum, starting with Pioneers' gatherings and ending with deputy and party forums. But what encourages this begging? The visit by a member of the government to a region and, in the aftermath, if not a decree then, at the least, a decision on additional assistance.

But where do additional bits come from in our five-year plan, which the State Planning Committee assures us has been put together in the strictest, most intensive fashion? Can it be that we are robbing Peter to pay Paul? And isn't this where the chain of imbalances begins? The obkom first secretary pays a visit to the rayon, and he bestows a cow barn or a kindergarten; a raykom secretary visits a village, and the village gets an auto repair shop out of turn. You just have to know how to squeeze out a tear. But these things are not additional, do not come from reserves. They are all at the expense of another village or another rayon.

But is there a possibility of abandoning the chain of charitable gifts and imbalances? There is. If the person who promises is also held accountable for the fulfillment of the promise. The burden of responsibility borne by the head of the soviet must be added to the secretary's right. Which is what the party conference's decision provides for.

We all felt what tremendous importance the conference had for the country, society as a whole, and the party. It was indeed a critical turning point. But it has even greater importance for each of the 5,000 delegates. For me those days were a greater political school than my entire previous life in the party. The open, trenchant exchange of views, the debates, the comparison of positions and viewpoints. My first inner impulse was categorically opposed to combining the first executives of the party organization and the soviet in the same person. And I expressed that position in the commission for drafting the resolution. And if the general secretary of the party Central Committee had "besieged" me, that conviction within me would have only grown stronger. But I was not besieged and invited to listen to reasoning. I was given the political opportunity to "mature."

Today I am profoundly convinced that if we want to free the party for work with people, and if we want for the soviets to really start working and not to remain only on paper, we must combine the executive functions of the party organization and the soviet in the same person. And the guarantees against dictatorial practices lie in the triple filter of the people's confidence through which such an executive must pass: to become a deputy, to become a secretary, and to become chairman of the presidium of the soviet. And in each case, on a competitive basis.

A lot of good words have been spoken. Equally good deeds are needed.

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Moscow Communists Surveyed on Restructuring of Party Work

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in Russian No 6, Jun 88 (signed to press 26 May 88)
pp 33-41

[Article by Candidates of Philosophical Sciences Yu.B. Vostrikov and A.A. Khokhlov, and Candidate of Economic Sciences V.A. Yatskov: "Moscow Communists on the Course and Methods of Restructuring Party Work (Based on Sociological Research Results)"]

[Text] The situation in which the party operates as a whole and that of every party committee and organization is characterized by the radical and dynamic nature of the changes taking place, and by the profound differentiations in public opinion.

Perestroyka, to the extent that it takes in all spheres of social relationships and all social groups, stimulates diversity in social life and dynamism in social class, national and other relationships; and it presents society with ideas which are, in fact, capable of bringing the people closer together. Genuine renovation is assured by way of a profound grasp of the urgent needs of contemporary Soviet society and by considering the entire spectrum of human possibilities, aspirations and interests; it forms a taste for theory among the cadres, and the ability to master Lenin's methodologies for analysis of social processes. The times demand of society, as Gorbachev stressed while speaking in Uzbekistan, "greater in-depth investigation of both the present and the past; and chiefly, building the future on the basis of lessons learned and genuine knowledge."¹

In this connection regular study of public opinion among both communists and non-party people is becoming very important for practical party work. It is important to bring out its leading trends, and the dynamics of the views of various social groups and individual persons, on a timely basis. The preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference have given new impetus to stimulating the public's ideas, and activating the quest for more promising paths to perestroyka.

On the threshold of the conference, the Moscow Higher Party School conducted sociological research in the capital on problems of restructuring party-political work in the working collectives. Interview were conducted with 4,113 communists and non-party persons at 62 enterprises, institutions and organizations.²

One of the research tasks was to find out the attitude of the communists toward the suggestions presented to the 19th Party Conference. They were chosen from materials from party meetings, plenums, and individual speeches published in the press: there were 109 suggestions in all. Analysis of the data received is not intended for generalization or universal application. It touches on only certain aspects of the problem of strengthening party prestige, and strengthening and deepening intra-party democracy: strengthening the party's ties with the masses, and building the prestige of the party organizations; perfecting the mechanism for appointment by election, accountability, and the ability to remove the leading organs and cadres; restructuring the composition of the party apparatus and the functions of its officials; developing the activeness of the communists and improving the qualitative composition of the party ranks; and, expanding glasnost in the activity of party organizations.

Under conditions of perestroyka it is becoming especially clear that party prestige cannot rest on the merits of the past, no matter how great they were. The innovative nature of the changes which have commenced, and the non-standard nature of the present socio-economic

and general political situation force every party organization to prove again and again its capability to be at the head of the masses, and to earn their trust and respect through their everyday deeds.

For Lenin, the soundness of the party's role as the vanguard of society was chiefly associated with its state of organization and internal discipline, which is tested and strengthened, "first of all in the consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and its devotion to the revolution; its support, its self-sacrifice, and its heroism. Secondly, in its ability to associate with, to draw near to and, to a certain extent to blend, if you will, with the widest possible mass of the workers. Thirdly, in the correctness of the political leadership carried out by this vanguard; in the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, under conditions that the widest possible masses would be convinced *through their own experience* of that correctness."³ Under contemporary conditions, the urgency of all three directions for strengthening party prestige remains; but their persistent reiteration of the task to achieve the organic unity of the party and the masses is increasingly important. "If a minority is unable to lead the masses and closely associate with them," said Lenin in his speech to the delegates of the Second Congress of the Communist International, "then it is not a party, and on the whole is not worth much of anything."⁴

To what extent does Lenin's requirement apply to the work of Moscow party organizations? The results of the research testify to the lack of uniformity of public opinion on this count. To their credit, the party organizations can cite the fact that more than 60 percent of the members of the collectives consistently take an interest in their affairs. Consequently, they are not indifferent to the lives of the communists and to their search for more effective methods of perestroika. A considerable portion of the non-party workers (over 45 percent) indicated that there are communists in the collective whose opinions are for them, authoritative.

Owing to a complex of measures taken by the party leadership in the country and activation of party-political work, perestroika is gradually becoming a genuine fact of life in the working collectives. From one-third to two-thirds of the respondents cited the following as characteristic signs of significant innovation in production and social life at enterprises and institutions: the transition to economic accountability, the ability to pay one's way without self payback, self-financing, and reorganization and modernization of production; the introduction of new wage rates and salaries; the functioning of a soviet in the working collective; and attestation of workers.

However, a majority of the non-party workers and communists are not satisfied with the main thing—the state of perestroika at their enterprises and institutions. About 30 percent of the communists and 16 percent of the non-party workers rated its course positively. Over

57 percent of the party members and about 67 percent of the non-party workers acknowledged that it is rather too early to evaluate the changes or there is no need to do so.

The fact that the prestige of the party organizations is not high enough among the non-party workers is explained by the poor results of measures taken by the party. More than half of those surveyed noted that the influence of party organizations in the working collectives has not increased since the 27th CPSU Congress. About 60 percent believe that the serious shortcomings which existed in their working collectives two years ago not only have not been eliminated, but just as before all they do is talk about them.

One can also reach conclusions on the prestige of communists in their working collectives on the basis of analysis of the remarks and advice given by members of the working collectives with respect to improvements in the work of the party organization. Five hundred people responded. Most of their expressed wishes (36 percent) dealt with the fact that the party organizations and the communists should be closer to the people, and should associate more closely with them, taking their interests into consideration and taking note of their opinions, and not just supervising; one in four is disturbed by what they perceive to be the tottering prestige of communists and party organizations as a whole; and another 12 percent propose expanding glasnost, and improving the flow of information on the life of the party and the problems it is resolving. Non-party workers believe that the leaders and the pioneers of perestroika are for the most part the administration. And they give second place to the party committee (or party bureau) in this ranking; moreover, with a significant gap (27 percent and 18 percent, respectively).

Communists are taking a self-critical approach to their own activities. Most of them (85 percent) believe that the time has come to restructure party life. Among the negative phenomena which have accumulated they cite the most widespread as: careerism, indifference and hypocrisy; bureaucratism, arrogance, servility, demagoguery, and bourgeois ideals. At the same time 40 percent of the communists do not yet see real changes, associated with improvements in intra-party relations; 29 percent of party members do not consider themselves participants in perestroika; and another 12 percent of them have not yet determined their attitude toward it. Communists have stated that they believe the reasons for such a state of affairs can be attributed to their own passivity; to the still widespread administrative-command style of leadership; to poor implementation of democratic principles in party organization; to a lack of proper glasnost; to the incompetence of certain communist administrators, and to formalism in the work of the party committee (or bureau).

And what, in the opinion of those surveyed, are the ways for further strengthening the ties between the party and the masses, and for increasing the prestige of party committees and organizations?

In accordance with the policy for democratization of social life, forms of direct dialog between the party and the masses are becoming more numerous. Principally this dialog is carried out by means of nationwide discussion of the most important documents, in the course of which the political course of the party is clarified, and the draft plans and programs are enriched by the new ideas and critical comments of the workers. But public opinion has already matured to the extent that it understands the need for more radical measures. More than half of the communists surveyed (54 percent) believe it is necessary to resurrect the tradition of holding non-party conferences. Representatives of all sectors of Soviet society could take part in them, both actually operating social organizations, and informal associations. Many people believe that it would make sense to have the first secretaries of party committees and chairmen of the ispolkoms of the Soviets of People's Deputies deliver reports at such conferences. Only 13 percent of the communists were opposed to this, and a like amount declined to comment.

The tradition of holding conferences and meetings for non-party workers was begun in the 1920's (and that is when the terms "non-party conference" and "broad conference" appeared). The Bolsheviks considered them a most important forum for winning the trust of the broad popular masses. Lenin prepared a draft of the letter, "On Relations with Non-Party Workers," which indicated that given thoughtful and businesslike preparation, non-party conferences "can assist in drawing the Communists and non-party workers closer together, alleviate the struggle with bureaucracy, and provide an opportunity to nominate new workers."⁵ In contemporary conditions such conferences, as the survey indicates, would permit coming into direct contact with the representatives of various social groups on key directions of improving party leadership, and being more effective in the consideration of changes and stratification of public opinion. Moreover, these conferences could energize the activity of social organizations, and one could analyze their real contribution to the solution of current problems.

Incidentally, an absolute majority of CPSU members makes no connection between the development of democracy in the administration of society, and the mechanical growth of the number of social organizations. Moreover, 86 percent of them believe that it is extremely important to disband those voluntary societies and social organizations which are incapable of independently resolving the problems facing them, and merely create the appearance that they are essential.

Among the most important measures for assuring more complete study of public opinion among the broad masses of communists and non-party workers, and public recognition (or rejection) of the expedience of adopting this or that political decision, the respondents cited holding party referenda on urgent questions. Seventy-three percent were in agreement with this proposal. It

was proposed to make wide use of this form in the practical work of local party committees as well, especially when the subject concerns problems which touch upon the vital interests of broad sectors of the public.

...

Many proposals addressed to the party conference concerned improving the **mechanism for appointment by election, accountability, and the rate of replacement of leading organs and cadres.** For example, the majority of the communists surveyed believe that the makeup of the elected leading party organs is not renewed as intensively as it should be. They see in this the reason for stagnation in the leadership, violation of the natural process of its replacement, the weakening of party organization work, and compromises with the shortcomings that exist.

To eliminate these negative phenomena more than half the respondents propose holding elections to renew the makeup of the party organs by no less than half, and not by one-third as is the case now. About 80 percent spoke out for introducing age limitations for remaining in leadership positions: for those at union and republic level—up to age 65; for oblast and kray level posts, until age 62 or 63; and at the rayon level, up to 60 years of age. At the same time almost three-fourths of those responding supported a proposal for limiting the terms of office to 10 years for CPSU Central Committee Secretaries; for secretaries of union republic CP Central Committees, from 8-10 years; for kraykoms and obkoms, 7-9 years; and for okrugkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, from 5-7 years.

In the opinion of most of the respondents **the procedure for organizing the leading party organs must be examined.** Many communists desire to resolve cadre questions and other important questions of party life directly, and not only through their representatives. Almost 60 percent of them give preference to direct election of party committee secretaries and members through secret balloting on a contested basis.

The overwhelming majority (71 percent) of communists would like to change the practice of organizing party committees in such a manner, that nomination of candidates for party raykoms and gorkoms is not done at the conference, but beforehand, by the primary party organizations, and on a contested basis. And the same goes for the make-up of the CPSU obkom—at rayon conferences, etc. Moreover, every candidate should be given a mandate. Nearly 60 percent of those surveyed agree that a rule should be established in accordance with which a member of the corresponding party committee would present principal decisions advanced by his party organization and not by himself personally, and that they be adopted in its name and after taking counsel with it. Over 70 percent of the communists and a like number of

party workers spoke out in favor of granting the organizations the right to recall the members of the higher party organs, whom they nominated, when circumstances require, prior to the expiration of their term in office.

A considerable number of proposals concern the necessity for thorough research into the businesslike and political qualities of the candidates, prior to electing them to the party committee. Over two-thirds of the respondents believe it expedient to begin discussion of these candidatures a month prior to the elections; and three-fourths insist on the need for pre-election meetings between the candidates and the communists.

The communists believe that a more democratic procedure for elections would be to include all proposed candidatures on a list for secret balloting; whereas, the numerical composition of the electoral body should be limited in advance. Those who have garnered the greater part of the votes (80 percent approval) should be considered elected. Moreover, in order that the very fact of striking off the name from a ballot does not produce a negative reaction among the election organizers (which still happens quite often), the words "for" and "against" should be placed on the ballot opposite every name.

In the opinion of about half of the communists surveyed, democracy would be strengthened by doing away with the practice of co-optation of party committee secretaries. And on those occasions when it is nevertheless considered expedient to propose a candidature which is not from the membership of the party committee, they propose approving the appointment in an acting capacity for a period up to six months, with mandatory subsequent examination of the question at an extraordinary conference or congress. In the opinion of 83 percent of the communists, it would be more democratic to appoint (or elect) for the party apparatus only those workers who have received the appropriate recommendation from the party meeting at the collective where they work.

The following proposal was addressed to the 19th All-Union Party Conference by a number of communists: "Establish in the party, beginning at the primary party organizations, inspection and auditing organs, to be elected at meetings, conferences and congresses. Raise their status to the level of an supervisory party organ." Thirty-six percent voted "for" and 23 percent "against," while 13 percent "abstained" and the remainder believe that this proposal needs more work. As we see, public opinion is not yet ready for such novelties; perhaps because of the fact that after Lenin's death, his idea for an independent organ of control over the activity of the central committee and other party committees was, in practice, gradually reduced to a perfunctory activity.

Along with more effective participation in the formation of elected party organs and the apparatus, party members believe it necessary to **improve the practice of accountability** of these organs, in order to increase the possibility

of collective discussion and solution of the most important questions of party life. In the opinion of the majority, it would be expedient to introduce accountability to the elected party organs in working collectives twice a year, and between conferences at the party raykom, gorkom and obkom level. At the same time, in the opinion of 72 percent of those surveyed, the activity of the leading organs must be evaluated, and when necessary, their membership (either totally or partially) should stand for election again.

Seventy-two percent of the communists believe that the periods for holding traditional reporting and election meetings should be switched from August-October to January-March (after the start of the economic year). And in order to increase the responsibility of communists in leadership positions, their mandatory reports should be put before their own party organizations.

The majority of those surveyed believe that the **development of collective leadership** in party committees is to a large extent being held back by the predominance of the administrative-command style. In order to uproot it, many communists propose eliminating the regulation of the quantitative and qualitative make-up of the party committee by means of directives from on high, and to organize it in accordance with local peculiarities. This opinion is shared by 81 percent of the communists.

Party committees (or buros) at the local level do not always have a clear-cut political program of actions for the election period. More than half of those communists surveyed propose making it mandatory for them to work out such a program and to have it approved at plenums and party meetings. The latter, of course, presupposes the responsibility of the leading collegia for the complete realization of the planned measures. In the event of a major breakdown or an obvious failure, the communists will have a genuine opportunity to present specific demands both to individual members of the collegium, and to the leading organ as a whole.

Among the measures proposed to promote increased responsibility for the work of party committees (or party buros), 60 percent of the party members have proposed changing the evaluation of their work from a two-category to a three-category system (unsatisfactory, satisfactory, and good); while one-sixths of those surveyed proposed making a rule for the dispersion (and even dispersion of the entire party organization) in those collectives where economic indicators are chronically in decline; the latter proposal was, however, rejected by the majority of those surveyed because of its radical nature.

Also noted was the fact that workers and kolkhoz members elected to the buro and to party committees are in the majority there, and do not set the tone of their work. And many of them do not have an opportunity to participate in these organs on an equal basis with full-time party officials: they must work at their jobs too; therefore they have only a limited amount of time for

thoughtful analysis of questions; moreover—under conditions of self-financing and economic accountability this problem becomes even more acute. Sixty-nine percent of the communists propose stipulating in the appropriate documents the necessity for allocating part of the work time of party activists for engaging in their public duties.

...

The problem of finding a rational structure for the party apparatus and a more clear-cut definition of the functions of party workers is still acute.

Division of functions is a most important Leninist requirement in the struggle for rationalization and scientific organization of labor for the members of the leading organs and the workers on their apparatus. Analysis of the Rules of the CPSU is of great interest from this point of view. Sixty-six basic functions for party committees and primary party organizations are recorded in them: nine of them belong to the CPSU Central Committee, 19 are joint functions for the union republic CP central committees, and for party kraykom, obkom, okruzhkom, gorkom and raykom committees, there is one special function for union republic CP central committees, five for the CP central committees of republics, kraykom and obkoms and three for okruzhkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, and there are 29 functions for primary party organizations.

Analysis of these functions reveals their lack of agreement on the vertical plane. Take, for example, party ideological and educational work: of 14 corresponding functions, the Rules of the CPSU allocates eight to primary party organizations, six to local organizations, and to the CPSU Central Committee, not a single one (See Rules 35, 42 and 58). This in spite of the fact that the CPSU Central Committee obviously conducts an enormous amount of ideological and educational work, and possess all the necessary means to do so.

At the same time the primary party organizations, and they alone, are charged by the Rules to carry out the struggle "against any manifestations of bourgeois ideology, revisionism and dogmatism, and obsolete views and feelings" (Rule 58); it is doubtful, however, that the primary party organizations alone could cope with this task.

In the same manner, the Rules allocate the functions of party committees and organizations for selecting, posting and educating cadres. Only one of the rules is stipulated for the CPSU Central Committee (Rule 35): the selection and posting of leading cadres (And it is not clear which ones. If this embraces the entire circle of workers, then this is no less than micro-management, and it is not at all clear why other functions of cadre work are not laid out). Broader responsibilities have been imputed to republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city and

rayon organizations (Rule 41d): "Conducting party policy and educating the cadres in the spirit of communist idealism, moral purity, and a high degree of responsibility to the party and the people for the matters entrusted to them." But party committees at this level have, as everyone knows, their own nomenklatura; consequently they are also involved in the appointment of cadres. A generally streamlined formulation is given with respect to the primary party organization (Rule 58) which states that it "actively participates in the conduct of the party's cadre policy;" but, the specific responsibility and specific directions of cadre work by party organizations are not indicated, particularly in consideration of the extensive application of electing leaders and forming soviets at working collectives, nor is the specific nature of major party organizations considered, and so on.

The Rules do not stipulate division of functions on the vertical plane among the party obkom, gorkom and raykom. In practice they quite often duplicate one another. This problem is especially pressing for oblast and republic centers.

It would appear that it makes sense, and this is supported by the majority of those surveyed, to do some fundamental editing work on the Rules of the CPSU. A conference could form a working commission, formulate the principal directions of forthcoming changes, and determine the procedure for preparing and discussion draft changes to the Rules in anticipation of inserting them at the 28th CPSU Congress.

Proposals were addressed to the 19th All Union Party Conference on improving the structure of the party apparatus, and in particular for eliminating industrial branch departments. At the same time, the results of the survey testify that far from all communists adhere to this opinion. The idea to abolish the industrial branch departments was supported by 40 percent of the respondents (At the same time the consistency of the approach to the matter was noted: among the workers, 40 percent supported it; and among party workers, 44 percent). Apparently past experience is having its own influence (The contemporary structure took shape in the late 1930's, and later growth took place, especially in the 1970's, when the influence of industrial branch departments increased); there is also a stereotyped impression of the role of the local party committee as the most efficient organ in the system of territorial management.

Judging from the survey, communists are awaiting cardinal decisions on the restructuring of the party apparatus. About 80 percent of those surveyed (and almost 60 percent of the workers) believe that it is of practical importance to work out a clause on the party apparatus, and on that basis designate more precisely the function of every worker. Seventy-six percent of the respondents believe that giving the local party committees the right to independently define their structure and staff, within the limits of the established wage fund, would promote increasing the effectiveness of the party apparatus.

The communists paid special attention to the role of the secretary of the party organization. They noted that the development of self-management is connected with strengthening the political influence of the communists in the working collectives, but the introduction of economic accountability limits the amount of time the secretary has to carry out his social responsibilities. Therefore it was proposed that the post of full-time party organization secretary be introduced to those party organizations which have more than 100 communists. This measure was supported by about 70 percent of those surveyed. Increasing the wage rate for party organization secretaries could be done, apparently, by means of reducing the party apparatus at the higher level. Over 70 percent of the communists believe it is necessary to supplement the Rules of the CPSU with a section on the status and functions of secretaries of primary and shop party organizations and the party group organizer.

Communists are disturbed by the problem of the defenselessness of party organization secretaries (especially those who are not full-timers) faced with the possibility of pressure on the part of administrators of enterprises and organizations. And such instances are, apparently, quite common, since 62 percent of the party members have been demanding that raykoms and gorkoms provide such protection, over a period of even two or three years after the re-election of secretaries. Seventy-nine percent of the communists believe it necessary to establish a rule, in accordance with which secretaries of shop party organizations and their deputies may not be fired or subjected to any kind of reprimand on the part of the administration without the consent of the party bureau.

Working out cadre policy and supervising the selection, posting and education of workers in the most important sectors of the national economy and in the socio-political sphere has been and remains a most important function of the party. The survey testifies that no turning point has yet been reached in this sector.

Thus, among the directions and activities of party organizations requiring restructuring on a priority basis, cadre work was cited most often (57 percent) among the communists surveyed. Half of the communists noted that, as in the past, enterprises and institutions are allowing people to remain in supervisory positions who are guilty of serious shortcomings and failures in their work, which are known to the entire collective. To the statement that questions of progression in one's job are decided democratically at enterprises and institutions, only 11 percent of members of working collectives surveyed responded with confidence. The massive number of suggestions addressed to the 19th Party Congress on such questions, which are on the whole clear and hardly require further resolution, but which are not carried out consistently in real life, are oblique testimony to shortcomings in cadre work. Once again, for example, they are speaking of the introduction of mandatory accounting

reports by supervisors in front of their party organizations and collectives (81 percent of the communists surveyed supported this); of the need for establishing a reserve for supervisory posts through appointment by election, and bringing people up from the reserves publicly (78 percent). Consequently, a truly effective mechanism for cadre work is needed, one that has been adapted to the new conditions.

Half of the communists surveyed supported a proposal on the necessity to work out special-purpose, comprehensive "Kadry" Programs for all party committees. At present, such programs are being tried in a number of party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, as an experiment. At the same time, the important thing is not to allow such programs to become an end in themselves (as quite often used to happen in the first half of the 1980's), but that they be supported by consistent organizational, educational and methodological work.

Public opinion is concerned over the fact that the apparatus of ministries and departments is slow to take up restructuring of their work in the new manner. In order to energize their activities and strengthen their ties with the working collectives, it was proposed to create a soviet of directors and a soviet of party committee secretaries in every branch of the national economy (Forty-seven percent of the respondents supported this proposal). About 60 percent shared the opinion that the apparatus of the ministries and departments should be formed along the lines and recommendations of the party committees and soviets of the working collectives.

A portion of the proposals was connected with **improving the system for paying wages to party officials**. In consideration of the fact that primary party organizations in production collectives exert real influence on fulfillment of plans and socialist obligations, 58 percent of the communists suggest that, under conditions of economic accountability, deductions from profits received by the results of management should be used to provide material incentive to party workers and activists. For party organization secretaries, it was suggested to introduce premium pay and make it possible to receive personal increases for their labor (63 percent favored). For part-time secretaries of primary and shop party organizations, as well as for party group organizers working under conditions of self-financing, it was proposed to designate a percentage of the party membership dues remaining in the party organizations to make up for the work time spent on party business.

In the opinion of 62 percent of the communists, the procedure of distributing wages scales and staff among CPSU raykoms should be changed in the near future, making this distribution depend not only on the number of communists in the rayon party organization (as at present), it should also take into consideration the population of the rayon and the specific nature of the primary party organizations as well. In addition, 68 percent of full-time party officials and 47 percent of all

communists believe it is necessary to introduce differentiated positions and wage scales for instructors on the apparat (Instructor-Organizer, Senior Instructor, Instructor) depending upon the qualification and the functions actually performed. The overwhelming majority (82.5 percent) believe it necessary, in general, to allow a portion of the party dues to remain at the disposal of the party organizations for their internal needs (preparing visual agitation aids, offices for party work, and so on).

The output of workers on the party apparat and the elected aktivs could be much greater if they were to be freed from routine statistical and accounting work. The solution is to introduce modern office equipment, including placing the flow information on an automated basis. Today, especially at industrial enterprises, party committees are notoriously backward in terms of computerization of their activities. In this regard, 72 percent of those surveyed insist upon immediately providing the supervisory organs with modern office equipment, and gradually transferring all party office work to computers.

...

The success of the democratization of intraparty life is closely associated with the degree of activeness of ordinary communists. The years of stagnation have done their work: a considerable number of party workers have become silent—yes-men, who agree with everything in advance, support everything, approve everything and are altogether indifferent to everything. **The problem of increasing the activeness of CPSU members and improving the staffing of party ranks has become acute.** Let us say, would it be sensible to continue those important advantages which are enjoyed today in connection with receiving Komsomol members into the party? More than 70 percent of those entering the CPSU do so by means of the Komsomol. Until now this practice has not raised any doubts. And truly, where if not in the Komsomol, is the party reserve formed? However, 62 percent of the communists believe it necessary to change this situation. In their opinion it limits the possibility of reinforcing the party ranks with people of a more mature age (from 30 years and older), who have passed through the fine school of life, and have earned respect in their working collectives.

An equal number of those surveyed believe it necessary to re-examine the practice of selecting people for the party by virtue of their social origin. The question is one of—in connection with changes in the nature of work, the increasing level of its technical equipment and intellectualization—offering the scientific-technical intelligentsiya the right to enter the party on an equal basis with workers. It is characteristic that not only did the majority of the workers surveyed speak in favor of this suggestion (53 percent), but also the majority of the full-time party workers (66 percent). Only 8.0 percent of the respondents were openly opposed.

In recent years the party has been making an effort to develop democratic forms of selecting and receiving members into its ranks. The task is at hand and for more actively involving the working collectives at all stages of the selection, evaluation and debate over those who desire to become candidates and members of the CPSU. The Rules specifically stipulate that reception into the party is conducted, as a rule, at open meetings. However, practical experience shows that such measures are clearly inadequate in terms of changing non-party workers from theatrical extras into interested participants in the selection of new members for the CPSU. According to the research data, 46 percent of those surveyed were unable to describe those received into the party from their collectives over the past two years. Consequently, almost half the members of the collectives remain on the sidelines in this matter. The solution, in the opinion of 58 percent of the communists surveyed, can be found in offering the working collectives the right to recommend their own members for reception in the party, as it is acceptable to do for the Komsomol.

There is great educational significance, according to two-thirds of the communists, in handing out party cards and candidate membership cards at open party meetings in the primary party organizations, and not at the CPSU Raskom.

Along with this, the question of deciding reception into the party by means of secret ballot was raised. However, the majority of the communists (52 percent) did not support this suggestion. Nor did the following initiative receive the approval of the majority: to permit, in party organizations with a smaller membership, giving recommendations to communists with less than 5 years experience, and at the same time increasing the number of those recommended.

The qualitative make-up of the party is facilitated not only by the practice of accepting new members into its ranks, but also by purging these ranks of people who have not lived up to their trust. Fifty-two percent of the communists believe that it is very important and necessary under contemporary conditions to conduct a purge of the party, moreover, in the Leninist sense, and not in the form of replacing the party cards before they expire, with an official hearing by CPSU members.

The purity of the party ranks also depends upon the practice of examining the personal affairs of communists. In the opinion of 86 percent of the party members, examination of these affairs must necessarily begin in party groups and shop party organizations, that is, at the very cell where a person does his immediate work, and not at a general party meeting of the entire collective as is now ordinarily done. At the same time 71 percent of the communists believe it expedient to examine these affairs at open party meetings, which is not yet being done in practice.

An absolute majority (79 percent) of the communists indicated the necessity of a more careful approach to resolving the question of the party membership of persons subjected to criminal prosecution—not to remove them from the party prior to the decision of the court. This was brought about by the fact that the law-enforcement organs still commit a considerable number of mistakes; moreover, the nature of the violations varies.

The problem of accounting for CPSU members, especially pensioners, also requires attention. Half of those surveyed believe it is necessary and very important to place all non-working communist pensioners on the party rolls at their place of residence. This rule, recorded in the Rules of the CPSU, in their opinion, increases the activeness of territorial party organizations. At the same time this measure will support the effectiveness of their work with the public, and especially the young people, at their place of residence. Certain persons proposed establishing dual accounting for CPSU members: at the working collectives and at their place of residence. But this suggestion was rejected by the majority (53 percent).

We find interesting the additional thoughts of certain communists, expressed while completing the the questionnaire, on the subject of leaving the ranks of the CPSU. At present a communist may abandon the party by only one means—by being excluded for some kind of offense. However, there are persons who which to voluntarily leave the CPSU (by declaration), but without negative social repercussions for them. For this purpose, it was suggested that an appropriate procedure be worked out. This question is especially significant for pensioners and other people who are unable by virtue of the state of their health or other reasons, to take part in the work of their party organization.

Analysis of the results of the questionnaire survey also shows that the passiveness or activeness of communists depends directly upon the **affirmation and development of glasnost and criticism in the working collectives and on the degree to which they are kept informed.**

Answering the question, whether or not the principles of glasnost and criticism have been affirmed in the life of your collective, about seven percent answered yes; 47 percent believe that there are certain changes, but it is too early to speak of the soundness of these principles; 28 percent noted that there is a lot of criticism, but not much comes of it; 17 percent believe that quite often criticism turns into demagoguery; and nine percent expressed the opinion that glasnost and criticism are lacking, just as before. Thus, the majority of the communists surveyed lack confidence in the soundness of these principles in practice. But what are the reasons for such a lack of confidence?

First of all the reason lies in the lack of information, in the opinion of the majority of the communists. In particular, it is a matter of such questions as the work of the primary and shop party organizations of an enterprise, department, or brigade; on the resolutions adopted at party meetings, and the course of their execution; on the work of social organizations, and the activity of the Soviets of the working collectives; and so on. About 45 percent noted that the opinion of ordinary communists on many questions are clearly not given sufficient consideration.

Secondly, the primary party organizations are not playing a significant role in defending the interests and rights of the ordinary communists—this was noted by more than half of the communists surveyed.

Thirdly, as before, instances of persecution for criticism are endemic. About 60 percent of the respondents noted that a communist who openly speaks out with just criticism is not protected—or is hardly ever protected—from unpleasant consequences. More than 70 percent bluntly stated that they have been eye-witnesses to persecution for criticism in recent times. Of course one cannot discard the psychological factor either. The weight of the past with its inertia of indifference, and the mechanism of group pressure on "those who dare to criticize," are still operative today. And we will hardly be able to remove it all at once.

A great deal of work lies ahead in connection with formulating the political consciousness and active positions of the communists. And there are constructive suggestions on this account: to publish in the press the results of public opinion polls—90 percent are in favor; to make public the actual reasons for the dismissal of leading party and government officials—94 percent; when bestowing the highest government awards, to consider public opinion—82 percent; to conduct sociological surveys among party members on future and current problems of perestroika and acceleration, especially prior to congresses, plenums, and conferences, and to inform the communists on the results of the surveys—78 percent; to revive the practice of discussing secret letters from the CPSU Central Committee at party organizations on problems subject to sharp debate—79 percent; to obligate candidates for deputies of Soviets to present their programs to the electors before the election—76 percent; and, to inform the party organizations of the appropriate branches of the national economy, on the part of the party committees of ministries and departments, of the punishment of communist leaders for neglecting their work—78 percent.

Over 60 percent of the communists surveyed believe it is necessary to make full disclosure in the press of the materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenums. It is true that the expedience of this measure is not as simple as it seems at first glance. Lenin, for example, believed it

necessary, when the matter concerned the most controversial and contradictory problems, to make a distinction between what is said at the congress, for example, and what is said in front of the workers. In his concluding remarks on the question of party unity at the 10th Congress, he said: "The Party does not vacillate in that which it does; but in any case it will not speak at a workers' meeting about what Comrade Kamenskii said—about what he had a right to say—in front of the party congress."⁶ The latter does not mean that one must remain silent about disagreements and about the essence of the arguments. "Discussion Pamphlets" were already being published by the decision of the 9th All-Russian Conference of the RKP(b) (September 1920), and publication of special anthologies was envisaged, for the purpose of detailed exchange of opinion among party members. Later, however, on the insistence of J.V. Stalin, this means of communication among communists was abolished. In his concluding remarks at the 14th Party Congress (1925), he stated: "We are opposed to a special discussion pamphlet... We must not get carried away with discussion. We—the party—are ruling the country. Do not forget that."⁷

But the need for such information has always existed, and it is felt all the more today. Thus, about 47 percent of the communists spoke out for arranging for the publication of special bulletins which would fully report on the materials of CPSU Central Committee Plenums.

The reaction to the proposal for entering a clause in the Rules of the CPSU on intra-party pluralism of opinions as a condition for self-development and democratization of the party was somewhat surprising: 37 percent considered it very important; 29 percent had difficulty answering; 20 percent thought it less important; and 11 percent believe the proposal requires further work: thus, the proposal should not be adopted.

In our view, such a distribution of opinion requires a certain amount of clarification. First of all, there is the rather large proportion that had difficulty evaluating this proposal at all. Evidently, for many of the communists surveyed, this term is first of all not clear, and secondly one must take into consideration the stereotyped thinking that has taken shape. The fact of the matter is, that for a very long time this concept has either lacked a positive connotation in the political lexicon, or was a synonym for factionalism or opposition—that is, it essentially contained a negative connotation. Incidentally, the concept of intraparty (and socialist) pluralism, in essence signifies primarily diversity of viewpoints, the contrasting of opinions and positions—in which case it is possible to adopt only collective solutions. Intraparty pluralism presupposes the freedom for intraparty criticism and democratic methods of discussion on all important questions of intraparty life. It is precisely such an understanding that is in consonance with Lenin's instructions on deepening and developing intraparty democracy as the condition for the party's self-development.

Another proposal, "To restore the practice of introducing several variants of resolutions at party meetings, in order that the one adopted on their basis would not appear to be perfunctory; to make it a practice to hold competitions among the communists for working out the best variant for solving the problems facing them," was supported by only 37 percent; 28 percent rejected it; 7.0 percent abstained; and 27 percent decided to give it more thought.

Thus, the methods directed toward developing alternative approaches have hardly received the support of the majority of communists. In this connection perhaps, more serious attention should be paid to the ideological work of party organizations, in order to organize more democratic thinking—an integral part of the lofty political culture of the communists.

...

The political course of the CPSU for spreading democracy far and wide, in all spheres of the life of our society and the party itself is, it goes without saying, supported by the majority of communists and non-party workers. On the eve of the 19th All Union Party Conference, public opinion is oriented on the search for effective ways of solving our imminent problems, and is characterized by a high degree of interest and activity, and by innovative approaches and non-traditional judgments.

At the same time—and this is supported by the results of our research—the restructuring of party work, especially in the primary organizations, is fraught with great difficulties and with sharp disagreements and problems. Constructive propositions and ways to carry them out have come of age in public opinion as well, even though they do not always receive universal support.

The prestige of the party and each of its organizations is a dynamically-changing phenomenon. The real prestige of the capital party organizations studied is on the whole not all that high, which is explained primarily by the low success rate of the measures they have worked out, by the low level of energy directed toward perestroika by a significant proportion of the communists on election commissions; and by the lower level of prestige of party committees and buros in comparison with the administrative organs of control in the working collectives.

Among the measures directed toward improving the situation, communists and non-party workers propose varying the forms of direct dialog between party committees and the masses (conducting referenda, holding non-party conferences, introducing regular party conferences), and striving to achieve a situation in which the study and use of feedback is the common practice among party committees (systematic study of public opinion, publishing the results of its analysis and the measures worked out on its basis, and publication of discussion pamphlets and bulletins by the CPSU Central Committee).

Communists in the capital who participated in the survey are also concerned about questions of improving the system of selecting and receiving members into the party, and by the purity of the party ranks. The majority is concerned about the fact that many party members still remain aloof from the struggle for perestroika in their party organizations and working collectives, and that they are playing a waiting game, and are not displaying energy and initiative. However, in our view, they are making numerous suggestions for strengthening the party ranks, on problems of both regulating the social make-up of the party, and increasing the responsibility of the entire working collective for recommending candidates for the party.

The majority of the communists surveyed believe that the most influential factor for increasing their energy is the spread and deepening of glasnost. Obviously, many of the communists' proposals should be carried out immediately: such as, questions of party cadre policy, the work of party election organs and their apparatus, and systematically informing the communists on the activity of party committees and on the most important decisions in intra-party and state life.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 10 April 1988.
2. The research was prepared and conducted by V.N. Amelin, L.F. Beronikov, Yu.B. Vostrikov, V.I. Galakhov, V.A. Oznobkin, G.I. Osadchaya, Yu. Tyo, A.A. Khokhlov, T.N. Yudina, and V.A. Yatskov (research supervisor).
3. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoe sobranie sochineniy" [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 41, p 7.
4. Ibid, p 239.
5. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., Vol 43, p 391.
6. Ibid, p. 110 (At that time A.Z. Kamenskiy was RSFSR Deputy Narkom on Nationalities, and spoke out against Lenin's draft resolution, "On Party Unity," at the 10th Party Congress).
7. J.V. Stalin, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 7, p 390.

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[Unattributed report: "A Tried and Tested Detachment of the CPSU: The Ukrainian Communist Party in Figures"]

[Text] It is the 70th anniversary of the First Congress of the CP(b)U, which concluded the process of uniting the bolshevik organizations throughout the Ukraine and formed the Communist Party of the Ukraine as a constituent and integral part of the RKP(b). Created on the basis of Leninist ideological, organizational and tactical principles, the Communist Party of the Ukraine is one of the powerful, tried and tested detachments of the CPSU. "It was always and is today," noted M.S. Gorbachev at a meeting of the aktiv of the republic party organization, "in the first ranks of the struggle of the party and the people for our goals and communist ideals, and it undoubtedly will also be in the future."

The statistical data published below characterize the quantitative and qualitative changes in the composition and structure of the Ukrainian CP, the alignment of communists in decisive sectors of the national economy, the network of party organizations and the composition of the elective party aktiv. They also reflect the dynamics of the numerical growth of primary party organizations and the work they do to train and increase the qualifications of personnel, and give a graphic presentation of the most important forms of propaganda and agitation and also of ideological activists.

I. Composition of the Ukrainian CP and the Growth of Its Ranks

The numerical growth of the ranks of the Ukrainian CP is indicated by the data in Table I.

Table 1. Numerical Growth of Ranks of the Ukrainian CP
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

Year	CPSU Members	CPSU Candidate Members	Total Communists
1918 (July)	4,364	didnotexist	4,364
1928	137,684	59,068	196,752
1938	199,653	84,499	284,152
1948	528,254	120,903	649,157
1958	980,560	89,910	1,070,470
1968	2,033,792	105,008	2,138,800
1978	2,655,366	93,902	2,749,268
1988	3,178,046	99,049	3,277,095

The Communist Party of the Ukraine includes the Kiev city party organization and 25 oblast party organizations. Changes in their numerical strength are characterized by data in Table 2.

**Table 2. Changes in Numerical Strength of Party Organizations
(as of 1 January of the respective year)**

Name of Party Organization	CPSU Members and Candidate Members		
	1948	1968	1988
Vinnitsa	30,758	73,631	110,503
Volyn	6,302	35,508	56,480
Voroshilovgrad	43,367	149,556	208,124
Dnepropetrovsk	50,813	178,907	273,848
Dontesk	68,298	242,254	357,007
Drogobych	7,760	-	-
Zhitomir	19,628	56,965	83,201
Transcarpathian	7,892	28,729	49,083
Zaporozhye	26,713	95,179	142,898
Ivano-Frankovsk	7,083	34,168	56,639
Izmail	4,801	-	-
Kiev City	-	-	236,123
Kiev Oblast	81,826	204,131	112,567
Kirovograd	18,390	55,751	77,483
Crimean	23,240	94,443	160,707
Lvov	20,257	81,254	129,613
Nikolayev	13,563	53,597	82,260
Odessa	38,051	115,665	171,779
Poltava	34,447	77,911	121,585
Rovno	6,453	36,881	61,274
Sumy	29,541	63,210	90,526
Ternopol	6,312	31,120	49,491
Kharkov	64,428	162,669	241,939
Kherson	11,857	51,533	80,917
Khmelnitskiy	18,885	54,704	82,901
Cherkassy	-	64,651	98,945
Chernigov	22,888	65,183	95,068
Chernovtsy	8,844	31,200	46,134

Notes: The Crimean Oblast Party Organization became a part of the Ukrainian CP in 1954. In that year, in connection with the formation of Cherkassy Oblast (to which part of the areas of Kiev, Kirovograd, Vinnitsa and Poltava oblasts was transferred), the Cherkassy Oblast Party Organization was organized.

Izmail Oblast was abolished in 1954; its territory was transferred to Odessa Oblast. Communists of the Izmail Organization became part of the Odessa Oblast Party Organization.

Drogobych Oblast was eliminated in 1959; its territory was transferred to Lvov Oblast. Communists of the Drogobych Party organization became part of the Lvov Oblast Party Organization.

The Kiev City Party Organization was separated from the oblast party organization in 1975 and made directly subordinate to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

Admission into the CPSU

The CPSU attaches paramount importance to the fact that selecting new party replacements ensures a further improvement in its composition and helps intensify the party's guiding influence on all aspects of Soviet society. A most important criterion for admission into the party ranks is a person's attitude toward perestroika, glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, and the process of intensifying democracy, and practical participation in their implementation. The CPSU Central Committee considers it particularly important to observe strictly the individual approach in all stages of the selection to the party and to study deeply and comprehensively the moral qualities and political and professional qualifications of those expressing a desire to link ideologically and organizationally their fate to the party.

Table 3 gives a graphic presentation of admission into the CPSU by the republic party organization.

Table 3. Admission into CPSU by Republic Organization

Period	Accepted as CPSU candidate members	Accepted as CPSU members
1946-1951	149,149	167,541
1952-1955	138,372	165,286
1956-1961	460,925	439,830
1962-1965	412,598	439,958
1966-1970	406,460	466,870
1971-1975	350,647	383,293
1976-1980	424,858	430,399
1981-1985	450,146	455,470
1986	91,917	94,983
1987	87,465	88,854

By taking in leading representatives of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and Soviet intelligentsia, the party strengthens its influence in various sectors of communist construction.

Table 4. Composition of CPSU Candidate Members Admitted by Occupation
(in percentage of total number admitted)

Occupation	1958-1967	1968-1977	1978-1987
Total	100	100	100
Including:			
workers	42.4	55.5	58.0
kolkhoz workers	21.9	16.6	14.5
engineering and technical workers, agronomists, zootechnicians, teachers, physicians and other specialists of the national economy	24.9	22.6	23.5
administrative and managerial workers	9.8	4.1	2.2
students	1.0	1.2	1.8

During admission into the party, a program thesis is consistently carried out so that workers occupy the leading place in the social composition of the CPSU. More than four-fifths of the workers admitted as CPSU candidate members of the republic party organization work in enterprises of industry and transportation, in construction and in agriculture. The data for the last decade attest to this.

Table 5. Admission of Workers as CPSU Candidate Members by Individual Sectors of the National Economy 1978-1987
(in percentage of total number admitted)

Total workers admitted as candidate members	100
Sectors in which they work:	
industry	56.3
transportation	9.3
communications	1.6
construction	9.9
sovkhozes	7.7
trade and public catering	6.5
other sectors	8.7

The growth of many kolkhoz party organizations is due to tractor, combine and other machinery operators (36.7 percent of the total number admitted into the CPSU as candidate members), livestock breeders (26.6 percent), agronomists, zootechnicians, engineers and other specialists (23.2 percent).

The Communist Party constantly sees to it that its ranks are continually replenished with leading representatives of the people's intelligentsia. Among the main categories of intelligentsia admitted into the CPSU as candidate members between 1978 and 1987, 39.3 percent were engineering and technical workers, 17.8 percent were teachers of comprehensive secondary schools and instructors and masters of vocational schools. Much attention is given to admitting specialists employed in the leading lines of scientific and technical progress, people engaged in cultural activities, art and literature, and workers on the ideological front.

The party ranks are continually being replenished with women. Representing an influential force of the socialist society, they actively participate in political life and in restructuring, and do much to strengthen the ideals and values of our system. Women comprised 38.8 percent of the candidate member admitted into the CPSU in 1987.

The Komsomol is rightly considered an active assistant and reliable reserve of the CPSU. It is a multimillion-strong socio-political organization uniting the leading part of Soviet youth.

Table 6. Number of Komsomol Members Admitted into the CPSU as Candidate Members

Year	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number Admitted as Candidate Members
1947	10,662	34.4
1957	27,099	41.2
1967	30,786	32.9
1977	60,679	73.2
1987	61,328	70.1

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a fighting, tried and tested vanguard of the Soviet people, uniting on a voluntary basis the leading and most conscientious part of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia of the USSR.

All the work for ensuring the preferential position in the composition of the party for workers, replenishing it with the best kolkhoz workers and representatives of the intelligentsia, and educating young communists is carried out by party committees and primary party organizations in strict accord with guidelines of the 27th CPSU Congress, program requirements and requirements of the party rules, based on Leninist principles of CPSU membership.

**Table 7. Social Composition of the Ukrainian CP
(as of 1 January of the respective year)**

Year	Workers		Peasants (Kolkhoz Workers)		White Collar Workers	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
1948	221,988	34.2	102,525	15.8	324,644	50.0
1958	353,807	33.1	189,600	17.7	527,063	49.2
1968	844,667	39.5	384,516	18.0	909,617	42.5
1978	1,186,427	43.2	445,544	16.2	1,117,297	40.6
1988	1,506,137	46.0	486,469	14.8	1,284,489	39.2

It is apparent from the data cited that during the last 40 years the number of workers in the Ukrainian CP increased by more than 1,284,000, and their percentage in the republic party organization rose from 34.2 to 46.0 percent. Today, workers and kolkhoz workers in the Ukrainian CP comprise 60.8 percent compared to 50 percent in 1948.

Significant changes have taken place in the composition of communist white collar workers by occupation. This is indicated by the data in Table 8.

**Table 8. Composition of Communist White Collar Workers by Occupation
(as of 1 January of the respective year, in percentage)**

Occupation	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Total Communist White Collar Workers	100	100	100	100	100
Including:					
Managers of rayon, city, oblast and republic institutions, organizations and structural subdivisions	18.1	8.7	4.7	5.0	5.2
Engineering and technical workers, agricultural specialists	22.2	24.5	39.8	45.1	46.3
Heads of enterprises in industry, transportation, communications, construction, sovkhozes and their assistants	3.9	4.6	3.1	3.3	3.3
Workers in science, education, public health, literature and art	15.8	20.5	23.7	23.7	23.3
Workers in trade, public catering, supply and sales enterprises	9.2	5.2	5.9	4.4	3.9

The steady increase in the level of education and culture of Soviet people and their professional level is naturally reflected in the qualitative composition of the party, which is confirmed by the data in Table 9.

**Table 9. General Educational Level of Republic Party Organization Communists
(as of 1 January of the respective year)**

	1927	1939	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Total Communists	168,087	339,594	649,157	1,070,470	2,138,800	2,749,268	3,277,095
Education level:							
higher	1,320	19,178	63,005	134,205	391,131	735,319	1,098,480
percent	0.8	5.7	9.7	12.5	18.3	26.7	33.5
incomplete higher	-	7,913	24,118	38,871	59,122	60,225	62,247
percent	-	2.3	3.7	3.6	2.8	2.2	1.9
secondary	13,782	28,197	138,497	253,748	782,304	1,252,808	1,619,927
percent	8.3	8.3	21.3	23.7	36.6	45.6	49.4
incomplete secondary	-	43,624	179,875	346,518	563,670	453,426	339,138
percent	-	12.8	27.7	32.4	26.3	16.5	10.4
primary	106,658	174,227	213,950	278,164	342,573	247,490	157,303
percent	63.4	51.3	33.0	26.0	16.0	9.0	4.8
no primary education	46,237	66,455	29,712	18,964	-	-	-
percent	27.5	19.6	4.6	1.8	-	-	-

The number of specialists with higher and secondary special education in the Ukrainian CP, like the CPSU as a whole, is continually growing.

Table 10. Number of Specialists in the Ukrainian CP with Higher and Secondary Special Education
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

Year	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number of Communists
1948	147,670	22.8
1958	313,786	29.3
1968	840,120	39.3
1978	1,457,263	53.0
1988	2,006,184	61.2

The Ukrainian CP has a large contingent of scholars—candidates and doctors of sciences—which is indicated by the data in Table 11.

Number of Communists Having Academic Degrees
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

Year	Doctors of Sciences	Candidates of Sciences
1950	256	1,799
1958	556	5,156
1968	1,279	11,740
1978	3,231	26,523
1988	4,552	36,800

Today, the initiative-filled and creative role of Soviet women is clearly demonstrated in all sectors of the national economy—production, the social sphere, science, culture, education. Their industriousness and talent, knowledge and active civic position, high degree of organization and discipline help carry out the revolutionary tasks of social and economic development of the country advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress. The increase in the number of women in the Communist Party of the Ukraine is shown by Table 12.

Table 12. Increase in Number of Women in the Communist Party of the Ukraine
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

Year	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number of Communists
1928	21,655	11.0
1938	38,647	13.6
1948	97,015	14.9
1958	187,518	17.5
1968	402,971	18.8
1978	629,530	22.9
1988	916,106	28.0

In its activities, the party proceeds from the fact that consistent implementation of the Leninist national policy and all possible strengthening of friendship of peoples are a component part of improving socialism and a path tried and tested by social practice toward further prosperity of our multinational socialist motherland. The Communist Party is the most vivid example of the inviolable friendship and fraternity of the workers of our country and the unity of all the Soviet people.

The international nature of the CPSU is confirmed by the data on the nationality composition of the Communist Party of the Ukraine shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Nationality Composition of the Communist Party of the Ukraine
(as of 1 January 1988)

	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number of Communists
Total CPSU members and candidate members	3,277,095	100
Including:		
Ukrainians	2,195,858	67.0
Russians	894,272	27.3
Other peoples and nationalities	186,965	5.7

On the whole, the Communist Party of the Ukraine unites representatives of more than 100 peoples and nationalities.

The composition of the CPSU vividly reflects the revolutionary continuity of generations. The young generation of communists comprises a significant part of the party. Presently, more than 493,000, or 15 percent, of the communists in the Ukrainian CP are under age 30.

On the whole, the age structure of the communists of the republic organization and their length of service in the party are characterized by the data in Tables 14 and 15.

Table 14. Age Structure of CPSU Members and Candidate Members
(as of 1 January 1988)

	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number of Communists
Total Number of Communists	3,277,095	100
Ages:		
25 and under	151,892	4.6
26-30	341,195	10.4
31-40	748,628	22.8
41-50	729,442	22.3
51-60	675,217	20.6
over 60	630,721	19.3

**Table 15. Structure of CPSU Membership by Length of Service
(as of 1 January 1988)**

	Absolute Figures	Percentage of Total Number of CPSU Members
Total CPSU members	3,178,046	100
Length of party service:		
5 years or less	453,381	14.3
6-10 years	436,752	13.7
11-20 years	764,453	24.1
21-30 years	914,091	28.8
31-40 years	303,313	9.7
41-50 years	277,846	8.7
over 50 years	23,210	0.7

By the start of this year, the Communist Party of the Ukraine numbered 23,210 communists with more than 50 years of service. Three of them joined the party before 1917, 34 in 1917, 733 in 1918-1923, and 317 during the Lenin enrollment (1924). More than 90 percent of the membership of the republic party organization (2,976,039) have joined the party within the past 40 years.

The party committees and primary party organizations of the republic devote much attention to correct placement of party forces and to increasing the vanguard role of communists. Changes in the placement of communists by sectors of the economy are reflected in Table 16.

**Table 16. Placement of Communists by Sectors of the Economy
(as of 1 January 1988, in percent)**

	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Total number of communists employed in the national economy	100	100	100	100	100
Sectors in which employed:					
Material Production Sectors	67.5	70.3	75.4	75.5	74.8
Including:					
industry and construction	26.1	30.1	38.5	40.5	41.1
transportation and communications	9.4	9.5	9.1	8.5	7.7
agriculture	21.8	23.7	22.5	20.9	20.0
trade, public catering, procurement, supply of materials and machinery, and sales	8.5	5.7	4.4	4.5	4.7
other material production sectors	1.7	1.3	0.9	1.1	1.3
Non-production Sectors	32.5	29.7	24.6	24.5	25.2
Including:					
science, education, public health and culture	12.0	14.5	15.2	15.3	15.2
bodies of state and economic administration, party and social organizations	19.5	14.1	8.2	7.5	8.0
housing, municipal services and consumer services	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.0

It is apparent from the data cited that now about three-fourths of the communists employed in the republic's economy work in the material production sphere.

The number of communists working in industry, construction, transportation and agriculture increases from year to year, which is indicated by the data in Table 17.

**Table 17. Number of Communists Working in Industry, Construction, Transportation and Agriculture
(as of 1 January of the respective year)**

Sector	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Industry	143,415	252,414	622,413	795,459	939,348
Construction	12,363	34,380	121,211	176,609	187,455
Transportation	49,458	82,089	159,537	180,172	172,252
Agriculture	130,611	225,761	434,930	502,373	546,959
Including:					
at sovkhozes	10,888	21,014	76,857	105,655	115,274
at kolkhozes	96,761	155,200	317,918	340,791	380,338

About one-third of the party's members and candidate members employed in the republic's national economy work in industry. In the last 10 years, the number of communists in this sector of the socialist economy has increased by 143,800, or 18.1 percent.

Party organizations carry out purposeful work to strengthen the party ranks in sectors of industry having decisive importance for accelerating scientific and technical progress and efficient use of the country's scientific and technical and production potential. Thus, whereas

in the time that has passed since the 27th CPSU Congress the number of communists in the republic in industry as a whole has increased by 2.5 percent, this percentage is considerably higher in instrument building, tractor and agricultural machine building, heavy and

transport machine building, and electronics, gas and other sectors of industry.

In the last 10 years, the number of communists in construction has increased by 6,800, or 3.9 percent, and in transportation by 2,000, or 1.2 percent.

Table 18. Placement of Communists in Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz Production
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	Absolute Figures 446,446	1978 Percentage of Total Number of Communists 100	Absolute Figures 495,612	1988 Percentage of Total Number of Communists 100
Total number of communists working in kolkhozes and sovkhozes				
Of these:				
working as tractor operators, combine operators, drivers, and other agricultural machine operators	141,197	31.6	155,653	31.4
working in livestock breeding	72,554	16.3	82,803	16.7
working in field crop farming, vegetable farming and horticulture	67,578	15.1	49,189	9.9
working as agronomists, zootechnicians, veterinarians, and other agricultural specialists	55,125	12.3	68,582	13.8

As can be seen from Table 18, the number of communists working at kolkhozes and sovkhozes has increased by more than 49,000 in the last 10 years, and the number working as tractor operators, combine operators, drivers and other machine operators has increased by 14,400.

In the republic, as in the entire country, the number of communists working at enterprises and in organizations of housing, municipal services and consumer services, trade and public catering is continually increasing. The comparative data in Table 19 attests to the increase in the number of communists in these sectors.

Number of Communists Working in Housing, Municipal Services, Consumer Services, Trade and Public Catering
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1968	1978	1988
In housing, municipal services, and consumer services	22,629	40,236	55,042
In trade and public catering	66,410	86,715	106,354

In the process of turning science into a direct productive force and developing the system of public education, public health, culture and art, the number of communists working in these spheres is increasing. This is indicated by the data in Table 20.

Table 20. Number of Communists Working in Public Education, Public Health, Culture and Art
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1958	1968	1978	1988
In scientific institutions	9,118	48,624	74,550	89,160
In higher and secondary special educational institutions	22,706	42,817	60,321	70,963
In secondary, 8-year and primary general education schools	48,539	102,344	108,751	109,710
In public health	30,270	59,855	69,547	80,141
In culture and art	18,360	21,749	22,049	24,193

The data in Table 20 show that in just the last 10 years the number of communists in the republic's scientific institutions has increased by 14,600, by 10,600 in higher

and secondary special educational institutions, by 1,000 in general education schools, by 10,600 in public health, and by 2,100 in the sphere of culture and art.

II. Primary Party Organizations

The primary party organizations are the main link in the struggle for restructuring and for acceleration, where

party policy is realized through the efforts of millions of communists and linked with the daily life, affairs and concerns of the working people. They are the basis of the party, its most important links.

Table 21. Network of Primary Party Organizations
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1948		1968		1978		1988	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
Total primary party organizations	44,187	100	57,759	100	64,500	100	71,312	100
Including:								
at enterprises of industry, transportation, communications, and construction	8,199	18.6	16,272	28.2	18,745	29.1	20,571	28.9
at sovkhozes (including party organizations of poultry plants, fruit nurseries, and horse-breeding farms)	783	1.8	1,494	2.6	2,066	3.2	2,265	3.2
at kolkhoses	11,895	26.9	9,634	16.7	7,097	11.0	7,711	10.8
at educational, scientific, cultural and educational, and medical institutions	3,843	8.7	13,282	23.0	16,752	26.0	18,154	25.4
at institutions, organizations and economic bodies (from central to regional)	10,785	24.4	9,967	17.2	11,242	17.4	12,894	18.1
at enterprises of trade and public catering	1,550	3.5	2,660	4.6	2,940	4.5	3,034	4.2
rural territorial, under housing administrations, and others	7,132	16.1	4,450	7.7	5,658	8.8	6,683	9.4

The total number of primary party organizations has increased by 6,812 in the last 10 years, and at enterprises of industry, transportation, communications and construction it has increased by 1,826.

Primary party organizations are becoming larger. The classification of party organizations by size is shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Classification of Party Organizations by Size
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1948		1968		1978		1988	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
Total primary party organizations	44,187	100	57,759	100	64,500	100	71,312	100
Those with:								
under 15 people	34,642	78.4	21,378	37.0	23,891	37.0	25,273	35.4
15-49 people	8,339	18.9	27,398	47.4	27,471	42.6	30,501	42.8
50-100 people	776	1.7	6,296	10.9	9,091	14.1	10,454	14.7
over 100 people	430	1.0	2,687	4.7	4,047	6.3	5,084	7.1

The republic's party organizations are also becoming increasingly larger by the average number of communists in them.

Table 23. Average Number of Communists in the Republic's Party Organizations
(as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Industrial enterprises	25	38	80	97	105
Construction projects	27	25	36	38	38
Sovkhozes	14	27	59	62	65
Kolkhozes	8	14	40	55	56

The structure of primary party organizations is also changing, and the number of shop party organizations

and party groups in them is also increasing. This is shown by the data in Table 24.

Table 24. Structure of Primary Party Organizations and the Number of Shop Party Organizations and Party Groups in Them (as of 1 January of the respective year)

Year	Number of Primary Party Organizations	Number of Shop Party Organizations		Number of Party Groups
		Total	Those Having Rights of Primary Party Organization	
1927	4,421		nodata	nodata
1938	17,373		nodata	nodata
1941	30,610	4,038		6,572
1948	44,187	2,984	1,318	4,305
1958	52,983	12,169	924	14,743
1968	57,759	41,090	3,914	77,469
1978	64,500	61,573	26,197	112,463
1988	71,312	74,051	42,937	134,908
			52,820	

The transition to new methods of economic management and implementation principles of self-management in labor collectives are making it necessary to improve further the structure and increase the level of work of party organizations in production associations. Some 166 unified party organizations have been created in the republic's industry and in production and research-and-production associations. Communists of part of the enterprises included in associations are registered in 211 party organizations; 3,957 party organizations of enterprises included in production associations are independent. There are 188 active councils of secretaries of production association party organizations. Agriculture has 540 party organizations of meat-packing enterprises (organizations).

III. Leading Party Bodies. Composition of Party Cadres.

The CPSU and all its organizations, operating on the basis of absolute observance of Leninist principles, par-

ticularly democratic centralism and collective leadership, are developing and expanding intraparty democracy and striving to increase the personal responsibility of each communist for carrying out his duties and party assignments.

Oblast, city, and rayon party organizations and their committees carry out all the work to implement party policy and carry out the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ukrainian CP Central Committee within the oblasts, cities and rayons. The CPSU Central Committee requires that each party committee, as a organ of political leadership, act as a generator and conductor of new ideas and an organizer of interaction between all forces, and be able correctly to place them, and to foresee and take into account the consequences of decisions being made. Table 25 characterizes the development of the network of Ukrainian CP oblast, city and rayon committees.

Table 25. Development of Network of Ukrainian CP Oblast, City and Rayon Committees (as of 1 January of the respective year)

	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Committees					
Obkoms	25	26	25	25	25
Gorkoms	82	84	112	129	138
City raykoms	82	83	83	120	123
Rural raykoms	764	736	460	446	442

In 1975, the Kiev City Party Organization was separated from the oblast organization and subordinated directly to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. The Kiev Gorkom has the rights of an obkom.

The number of city raykoms as of 1 January 1958 and 1968 includes one party committee having full rights of a raykom; the number as of 1 January 1978 and 1988 include two.

In the last 10 years, 9 gorkoms have been created in the republic by decisions of the CPSU Central Committee to intensify party influence in places. Three gorkoms were formed in a number of rapidly developing cities. In connection with the development of industry and construction, some rural raykoms were changed to gorkoms.

The circle of the elective party aktiv has expanded considerably. The increase in the number of communists elected to leading party bodies is shown by Table 26.

Table 26. Number of Communists Elected to Leading Party Bodies

	1971	1977	1985-1986
Party committee and party Buro members, secretaries and deputy secretaries of shop party organizations, and party group organizers	283,927	354,545	445,059
Party committee and party Buro members, secretaries and deputy secretaries of primary party organizations	307,850	364,406	371,640
Gorkom and raykom members and candidate members, members of corresponding auditing commissions	59,715	62,739	65,221
Obkom and Ukrainian CP Central Committee members and candidate members, members of the corresponding auditing commissions	4,354	4,667	4,843
Total CPSU members elected to leading bodies of the Ukrainian CP	655,846	786,357	886,763

Workers and kolkhoz farmers hold a prominent place in the composition of the elective party aktiv, as indicated by the data in Table 27.

Table 27. Workers and Kolkhoz Farmers in Composition of Elective Party Aktiv

	1977		1985-1986	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
Party committee and party Buro members, secretaries and deputy secretaries of shop party organizations	114,577	46.9	155,169	49.8
Party committee and party Buro members, secretaries and deputy secretaries of primary party organizations	97,756	30.0	129,487	34.8
Raykom and gorkom members and candidate members, members of corresponding auditing commission	27,340	43.6	31,415	48.2
Obkom and Ukrainian CP Central Committee members and candidate members, members of corresponding auditing commissions	1,385	29.7	1,696	35.0

During the report-back election campaign preceding the 27th CPSU Congress, a total of 317,767 workers and kolkhoz farmers were elected to party bodies, or 35.8 percent of the total number elected (compared to 32.5 percent in 1980-1981). In virtually all raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms, workers or kolkhoz farmers are members of the Buros of these committees and of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

Women are actively involved in the work of elective party bodies. Table 28 characterizes the number of them in party Buros and committees of primary party organizations, raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, and the corresponding auditing commissions.

Table 28. Number of Women in Party Buros and Committees of Primary Party Organizations, Raykoms, Obkoms, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and Corresponding Auditing Commissions

	1977		1985-1986	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, and Buro and party committee members of shop party organizations	45,358	18.6	79,283	25.5
Secretaries of primary party organizations	21,766	34.0	28,487	40.2
Party committee and Buro members of primary party organizations	64,737	23.3	92,270	29.4

Table 28. Number of Women in Party Bzros and Committees of Primary Party Organizations, Raykoms, Obkoms, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and Corresponding Auditing Commissions

	1977		1985-1986	
	Absolute Figures	Percent	Absolute Figures	Percent
Party raykom and gorkom members and candidate members, members of corresponding auditing commissions	18,182	29.0	22,161	34.0
Obkom and Ukrainian CP Central Committee members and candidate members, members of corresponding auditing commissions	1,051	22.5	1,285	26.5

The party sees to it that communists working in various sectors of the national economy, institutions of science and culture, and state and social organizations are widely

represented in leading bodies. The composition by occupation of members and candidate members in obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and members of auditing commissions elected at party conferences in 1985-1986 is characterized by the data in Table 29.

Table 29. Composition by Occupation of Members and Candidate Members of Obkoms, Gorkoms and Raykoms and Members of Auditing Commissions
(in percent)

Total elected as members and candidate members of obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and members of auditing commissions	100
Of those:	
workers and kolhoz farmers	47.4
heads of enterprises of industry, transportation, communications and construction, and sovkhos directors	6.8
engineering and technical workers and agricultural specialists	4.7
party workers	18.2
workers of soviet bodies	9.4
workers in science, education, culture and public health	5.5
other workers	8.0
women	33.6

Increasing the level of party leadership is inseparably linked to improving the selection, placement and education of cadres. It was pointed out at the 27th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums that the leadership in party organizations at the present stage—a stage of development of large-scale practical deeds—should have the most active supporters

of social reforms, people who are principled, understand the demands of the times, are genuine "work superintendents" of perestroika, and willing to spare no effort for its success. There is a particularly strict demand on those communists who have been entrusted to head the party organizations. Changes in the composition by education of the secretaries of the republic's primary party organizations are indicated by the data in Table 30.

Table 30. Education Level of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations of the Republic
(as of 1 January of the respective year, in percent)

Education Level	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Higher education	11.4	14.3	34.9	57.8	67.2
Incomplete higher education	-	7.6	5.8	3.4	2.8
Secondary education	28.0	32.3	48.4	38.8	30.0
Incomplete secondary education	28.9	31.8	10.4	-	-
Primary education	31.7	14.0	0.5	-	-

According to data as of 1 January 1948, the secretaries of primary party organizations who had an incomplete higher education were included with those who had a secondary education.

Table 31 shows the qualitative changes that took place in the composition of party obkom, gorkom and raykom secretaries.

Table 31. Education Level of Party Obkom, Gorkom and Raykom Secretaries
(as of 1 January of the respective year, in percent)

Educational Level	1948	1958	1968	1978	1988
Obkom secretaries:					
higher education	53.8	90.0	100	100	100
incomplete higher education	9.4	6.7	-	-	-
secondary education	26.5	2.3	-	-	-
incomplete secondary education	6.0	0.8	-	-	-
primary education	4.3	-	-	-	-
Gorkom and raykom secretaries:					
higher education	17.3	46.1	95.7	100	100
incomplete higher education	8.8	40.7	3.3	-	-
secondary education	42.6	12.5	1.0	-	-
incomplete secondary education	19.5	0.7	-	-	-
primary education	11.8	-	-	-	-

Of all the secretaries of the obkoms and the Kiev Gorkom of the Ukrainian CP, 64.9 percent have a party-political education (compared to 29.6 percent in 1978); 52.2 percent of all party gorkom and raykom secretaries have a party-political education (compared to 44.9 percent in 1978).

Specialists of the national economy who are being nominated for party work are politically mature, competent and able to organize collective work and inspire people through personal example. The data in Table 32 show the increase in the number of specialists of industry and agriculture with a higher and special secondary education who are secretaries of obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms of the Ukrainian CP.

Table 32. Number of Specialists of Industry and Agriculture Comprising Secretaries of Party Obkoms, Gorkoms and Raykoms of the Ukrainian CP Having a Higher or Special Secondary Education
(as of 1 January of the respective year, in percent)

	1958	1968	1978	1988
Secretaries of obkoms and Kiev Gorkom	42.5	67.8	76.0	86.3
Secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms	18.0	49.4	65.6	72.2

As was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, every party organization should be headed by a leader who is closely tied to the masses, ideologically staunch, thinks with initiative, and is energetic. The Communist Party devotes daily attention to educating its cadres and increasing their theoretical level and practical skills.

Data in Table 33 show the training of cadres and the number of communists who have completed higher party educational institutions and continually operating refresher courses and seminars for party and soviet workers.

Table 33. Training of Party Cadres

Network of Party Educational Institutions in the Republic as of 1 Jan 88	Number Who Completed in the Years					
	1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986	1987	
Academy of Social Sciences under CPSU Central Committee	-	66	119	136	29	27
Higher Party School under CPSU Central Committee	-	104	54	-	-	-
Higher Party Correspondence School under CPSU Central Committee	-	2,769	947	-	-	-
Higher Party School under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and Odessa Higher Party School	2	1,39	4,077	3,227	428	460

Table 33. Training of Party Cadres

	Network of Party Educational Institutions in the Republic as of 1 Jan 88	Number Who Completed in the Years				
		1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986	1987
Institute for Refresher Training of Leading Party, Soviet and Ideological Cadres of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee	-	-	929	812	112	245
Interrepublic Refresher Courses for Party and Soviet Workers at the Higher Party School under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee	1	-	6,946	9,000	2,215	-
Department for Refresher Training of Party, Soviet and Ideological Cadres of the Higher Party School under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee	-	-	-	-	-	2,896
Refresher Courses for Party, Soviet and Ideological Cadres of Obkoms and the Kiev Gorkom of the Ukrainian CP	26	-	29,828	36,000	12,492	13,980
Courses continually operating until 1976 for refresher training for party and soviet workers	-	39,821	-	-	-	-
Continually operating seminars for part-time secretaries of primary party organizations (based on refresher courses of obkoms and Kiev Gorkom of the Ukrainian CP	26	57,227	51,594	61,000	13,602	16,164

IV. System of Political and Economic Training of Workers

Ideological work is an integral part of the multifaceted activities of the Communist Party. Its key task is to shape the consciousness of millions of workers and to change their mentality and thinking in the spirit of the innovative approaches of the 27th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums. The role of political training and economic education of workers

in carrying this out is growing immeasurably. The workers are an effective lever of revolutionary renovation of our society and contribute to forming an integral Marxist-Leninist world outlook and to developing in people the ability to evaluate social phenomena from precise class and internationalist positions.

The data in Table 34 give an idea of the forms of Marxist-Leninist education and the number of students of party training as of the beginning of the 1987/1988 training year.

Table 34. Forms of Marxist-Leninist Education and Number of Students

Forms of Training	Number of Schools, Seminars, Universities	Number of Students	Number Who Are Communists
Schools of young communists	1,814	79,382	79,382
Political schools, schools on fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism	48,859	1,063,652	688,757
Schools of scientific communism	15,162	324,818	213,430
Schools, seminars of ideological aktiv	1,252	199,468	168,277
Theoretical and methodological seminars	17,097	375,048	202,530
Universities of Marxism-Leninism	26	62,457	58,865
Individual independent study of Marxist-Leninist theory	-	328,524	308,492
New forms of instruction created during the course of perestroika	2,257	58,836	24,451
Total	87,212	2,587,402	1,838,893

Economic training is a most important part of political education and refresher training of cadres. Its purpose is to mold modern economic thinking, socialist enterprise

and efficiency, and to increase the competence of workers. Beginning with the 1987/1988 training year, universal economic education has been developed in all places. One can judge the development of the system of economic education of workers in the republic by the data in Table 35.

Table 35. System of Economic Education of Workers in the Republic

Forms of Training	1981/1982 Training Year		1987/1988 Training Year	
	Number of Schools, Seminars	Number of Students (thousands)	Number of Schools, Seminars	Number of Students (thousands)
Schools of communist labor	116,071	2,894.7	174,137	4,436
Schools of specific economics and economic seminars	99,807	2,646	48,095	1,067
Other forms	-	665.7	31,533	1,168.2
Total	215,878	6,206.4	253,765	6,671.2

In accordance with the requests of the 27th Party Congress, subsequent Central Committee plenums and the CPSU Central Committee resolution published in the press on 26 September 1987, the system of political and economic training is being restructured and the quality

and effectiveness of classes are being radically improved. The data in Table 36 give an idea of the new forms of political and economic training emerging in the republic during the course of perestroyka.

**Table 36. New Forms of Political and Economic Training
(as of the beginning of the 1987/1988 training year)**

Forms of Training	Number of Schools	Number of Students	Number Who Are Communists
Comprehensive schools for political, economic and vocational training of workers of mass professions of agriculture	6,686	247,717	27,168
Schools of socialist economic management	21,799	505,435	22,693
Technical and economic seminars	122	2,366	247
Creative groups of quality, modernization and economics	18	220	71
People's universities	2,908	412,477	8,659
Total	31,533	1,168,115	58,838

Party organizations of the republic devote much attention to the selection, placement and education of propaganda cadres. The data in Table 37 characterize their quantitative and qualitative composition as of 1 October 1987.

Table 37. Quantitative and Qualitative Composition of Propaganda Cadres

	Party Training	Economic Education	Komsomol Political Training	Mass Forms of Political Training
Total	102,385	264,085	58,314	45,927
Communists	102,385	180,742	56,737	37,096
Communists with higher or incomplete higher education	101,771	205,338	56,322	44,105
Communists with academic degrees or titles	5,116	1,476	426	471
Among propagandists:				
Party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol workers	8,172	4,212	3,959	843
Heads of enterprises and institutions	40,848	98,683	23,346	24,392

The material and technical base of political and economic training is becoming stronger. Today, the republic

has the House of Political Education of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, 34 obkom and gorkom houses of

political education, and 1,089 gorkom and raykom political study rooms under the party committees of primary party organizations.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine—a fighting contingent of the Leninist Party—is strictly following the policy of revolutionary creation outlined by the CPSU Central Committee. As the data presented show, it has at its disposal the political, intellectual, organizational and cadre potential for practical implementation of the strategic policy for accelerating socio-economic development, restructuring and qualitative reform of all spheres of social life.

This material was prepared by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department, Propaganda and Agitation Department, and Institute of Party History—a branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee.

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12567

UkSSR CP CC Advises Transcarpathian Obkom on Nationalities Issues

18000585 Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
12 Jul 88 p 1

[Unattributed report entitled: "Contribute More Actively to the Development of Inter-Nationality Relations"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has examined the question "On the Work of the Transcarpathian Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party in Implementing the Instructions of the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in the Area of Inter-Nationality Relations and the International and Patriotic Indoctrination of the Population." The decree adopted points out that the party obkom is taking practical steps to improve inter-nationality relations and the patriotic and international indoctrination of the population in combination with restructuring all areas of social, economic and cultural life and forming the socialist consciousness of the workers. While doing this, party, soviet and economic agencies and public organizations are guided in this important work by party directives and objective social criteria; and they are taking into consideration the national cultural requirements of the Ukrainian, Russian and Hungarian population and the representatives of other nationalities that live in the oblast.

Transcarpathia has acquired experience in the effective use of mass work forms to publicize the idea of friendship between USSR peoples, the participation of leading party and soviet workers in political work among the population, and cross-border cooperation with party organizations and labor collectives in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungarian People's Republic, Polish People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania.

At the same time, the party obkom, gorkoms and raykoms are carrying out the restructuring in this section without sufficient consistency and persistence and are not always taking into consideration the new processes in inter-nationality relations which are arising under the conditions of democratization and glasnost. In particular, the required attention is not being paid everywhere to instilling in people a sense of responsibility for the solving of public tasks and for the timely and high quality fulfilling of contract commitments.

The language peculiarities of the population are not always taken into account when conducting public and political measures and in business correspondence, visual agitation, ads, and information exchanges—especially in the cities of Uzhgorod and Mukachevo and Beregovskiy and Vinogradovskiy rayons. The level of teaching and studying the native, as well as the Russian, language and the language practices in the staffs of party, soviet, public, and economic agencies and of leading cadres need improving, especially in the village.

The political training and economic enlightenment system, lecture propaganda, the mass information media, and the activity of cultural institutions are not sufficiently aimed at forming the people's international consciousness and standards of inter-nationality intercourse. The development of the social, cultural and domestic areas requires a great deal of attention, including in those rayons where individual nationality groups live.

Part of the cadres have not eliminated their ideas about the lack of problems in nationality processes and have not overcome an uncritical attitude toward work results in this area of public life. Serious shortcomings exist in organizing the fulfillment of the 11 August 1987 Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee decree on nationality relations matters and the international and patriotic indoctrination of the population. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Culture, Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Education, Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health, and Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses Printing Plants, and the Book Trade are not providing sufficient help to the oblast.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has required the party obkom, gorkoms and raykoms to eliminate the shortcomings revealed and to take more concrete and effective steps to restructure all ideological and political work in accordance with the requirements of the 27th party congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. When doing this, it is recommended that special stress be placed on explaining Leninist norms, the principles of the CPSU nationality policy, the idea of friendship between USSR peoples, and the processes in internationalizing all areas of public life; and on instilling respect for the dignity, honor, culture, language, and history of all USSR nations and nationalities and for the distinctive features in their living structure—and that this be done with a consideration for the multinational make-up of the population.

Party committees and ideological cadres are called upon to study more carefully the processes and trends that are occurring in the area of nationality relations, evaluate the situation realistically, and solve the urgent questions in a timely fashion, in a spirit of glasnost and high principles, and from internationalist positions. The need to oppose displays of both national nihilism and national narrow-mindedness more actively and the attempts of the subversive centers of the West to arouse national enmity between peoples, are pointed out

It is recommended that party committees insure the active participation of representatives from all nationalities living in the oblast in the management of production and social affairs and their proper representation on the staffs of elective agencies and management bodies. In accordance with the recommendations of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, it is recognized that the establishment of commissions on patriotic and international indoctrination and inter-nationality relations matters in

the oblispolkom and rayispolkoms of rayons with compact national groups living there and the widespread involvement of the creative intelligentsia, scientists and teachers in the solving of tasks to improve inter-nationality relations, are necessary.

It is recommended that the development of a long-term cultural enlightenment program for the individual national population groups and of measures for the full and equal cultivation of national cultures among the representatives of all nationalities living in the oblast and for the preservation of their originality, be accelerated. It is important that these matters be resolved by the joint efforts of representatives from all nationality groups in the population and in organic unity with the requirements for the social and economic development of the oblast, republic and country.

The need for consistently implementing the principles of national language-Russian bilingualism and the displaying of great concern for the active functioning of the Ukrainian and other national languages in various areas of public and cultural life is underscored. Additional measures to insure a fundamental improvement in the level of teaching and studying the Russian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, and Moldavian languages, especially in rural schools, and for the wider expansion of faculty forms for the study of national languages by pupils and adults, are required.

An improvement in the training of leading party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol, economic, and ideological personnel on questions connected with the theory and practices of nationality relations and the international and patriotic indoctrination of the population, is also proposed. The study of these problems will be set up at all links in political training and seminar and course retraining.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has recommended that the ministries and departments study a number of urgent questions concerned with the social and cultural development of the oblast and provide the necessary help to it. In particular, the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Education must assist in supplying the oblast's schools with textbooks, instructional methods references and training aids; increasing the circulation output of "Biblioteki uchitelya russkogo yazyka i literatury natsionalnoy shkoly" [Collection for the Russian Language and Literature Teacher in National Schools] and the preparation and publication of "Bibleoteki uchitelya ukrainskogo yazyka i literatury" [Collection for the Ukrainian Language and Literature Teacher].

The USSR Ministry of Culture must examine the question of establishing a Uzhgorod architectural and cultural museum preserve of local lore with an ethnographic branch, providing help in strengthening its material and

technical base, supplying the oblast's cultural and art institutions with personnel, and publishing collections of repertoires in the languages of the nationality groups for amateur collectives.

The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences must provide help to the oblast in realizing the general plan for building the group of structures for Uzhgorod University, improving its material technical base, and solving all questions relating to the organization of the Hungarian studies center along with the Transcarpathian party obkom. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade are examining the question of issuing "Uzhgorod State University Scientific Notes" and the collection "Soviet Hungarian Studies Questions."

08802

Supreme Soviet's Voss Writes on Nationalities Relations

18000545 Moscow SOVETY NARODNYKH

DEPUTATOV in Russian No 6, Jun 88 (signed to press 26 May 88) pp 20-29

[Article by A. Voss, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council on Nationalities: "A Lively Question for Living Life"]

[Text] In his book, "Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and for the Entire World," M. S. Gorbachev called the alliance of socialist nations a unique formation. The party proceeds from the belief that the continued implementation of Leninist national policy and universal strengthening of the friendship of peoples make up a component part of developing socialism, as well as a means toward the might of our multinational Homeland which has been proven by social practice.

The most important factors in the continued internationalization of the entire life of the USSR nations and peoples are: strengthening the integrity of the country's economy as a single national-economic complex; growth of the level of generalization of production; expansion of the economic ties beyond the framework of the republics, and the integrated and highly effective development of each region. These directions for the current economic development of the country were defined by the 27th CPSU Congress as the primary tasks for further improving the distribution of production forces and for developing the national economy of all the union republics on the basis of intensification of the social division of labor.

Large-scale target integrated programs persistently demand the unified efforts of the workers of many nationalities, since they can be developed only on an inter-ethnic, all-union basis. This serves as the economic

foundation for further strengthening the unity of the Soviet multinational state and for giving ever greater all-Soviet international content to the national forms of the Soviet state.

At the same time, extreme care and tact are required in all that concerns national interests or national sentiments of the people. It is important to ensure the most active participation of workers of all nations and peoples in solving the various problems of our socialist society.

In the national relations we must clearly see yesterday, today, and just as definitely—the prospects for development. Today, when the locomotive of perestroika is gaining speed, when the process of expansion of democracy and public self-government is being activated, when the principles of social justice are being confirmed, we must solve the emerging problems on the only acceptable basis—in the interests of each nation and people, their continued flourishing and rapprochement, and in the interests of all of society.

Such a basis, or in other words an integration of interests, is provided by the USSR Constitution and secured by the practice of socialist construction. The continuity of state-legal establishments in the sphere of national relations stems from the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia", which proclaimed equality and sovereignty of the country's peoples, their right to self-determination, up to and including secession, and the abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges, as well as limitations.

The unswerving adherence to these principles and their implementation in deed made it possible in the post-October period to unify the resources and efforts of the Soviet peoples, to ensure radical socio-economic changes, and to achieve remarkable success in cultural construction. The socialist internationalism which is inherent to the Soviet people was the "secret" weapon which helped to defeat the enemy in the years of the Great Patriotic War, and then to restore the demolished national economy in a short time. The idea of national and inter-ethnic unity was always present in Soviet constitutions. It is present also in the USSR Constitution of 1977 and the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics which were adopted in accordance with it. These Basic Laws define the national-state structure and give concentrated expression to the most important and significant changes which have taken place in the economic, socio-political and spiritual life of Soviet society.

The USSR Constitution defined strong political-legal foundations for the continued flourishing and rapprochement of the country's nations and peoples and for the successful implementation of Leninist national policy. It gave a strong impetus to the processes associated with the development and intensification of the internationalist essence of the Socialist state.

The statutes of the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics dealing with the national-state structure have been concretized in a number of USSR and union republic legislative acts. Among them are the decrees of the Supreme Soviet, the laws on elections, the statutes on permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet, the laws on the Councils of Ministers, on the public discussion of important questions of state life, etc. These union republics having autonomous oblasts have adopted laws dealing with these autonomous oblasts. The RSFSR has adopted a law dealing with all the autonomous okrugs, defining their legal status as one of the forms of Soviet autonomy.

The development of Soviet union and national statehood in the current period presupposes the continued development of the forms of their interaction, the intensification of efforts at fulfilling the tasks facing the Soviet people, and the maximal utilization of the creative potential of socialism.

...

The socialist transformations of national relations and the affirmation of the friendship and fraternity of peoples are the great accomplishments of socialism, of which we speak with pride. Along with this, a characteristic trait of our time is the sharp reaction of the community to the negative phenomena which have not yet been overcome in the sphere of national relations, and the active discussion of questions which have arisen and problems which have not yet been solved.

Having refuted the thesis on the lack of problems in the national processes and having demonstrated that here too the progressive is beating a path through the contradictions, the 27th Party Congress created conditions for the continued implementation of a national policy which is founded on scientific analysis and which meets current demands.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the work of the Kazakh republic party organization on the inter-ethnic and patriotic education of the workers," states: "Today, when the revolutionary processes of renovation encompass all aspects of the life of society, the timely solution of the emerging problems in the sphere of national relations takes on most important significance." This presupposes a deep assimilation of the Leninist heritage, an ability to evaluate the dynamics of national processes with a fresh glance, free of the pre-formed stereotypes, to view these processes as a combination of economic, social-class, and spiritual relations which define the mutual ties of the peoples.

The party feels obligated to see the real picture and the prospects for development of national relations. We have presumptuously maintained for a long time, much too long, that there are no more problems in the national processes. Meanwhile, the problems accumulated and grew, and could not help but make themselves known.

The negative phenomena and deformations which we are currently struggling against have also become apparent in the sphere of national relations.

With the growth of education and culture, with modernization of the economy, each people have formed their own intelligentsia. Their national self-consciousness has increased and their natural interest in their historical roots has developed. However, it also happens that a certain portion of the people have strayed to nationalism. National narrow-mindedness, national rivalry and conceit have become apparent. Every now and then, tendencies toward localism and national isolationism come to the surface. Nationalism leads to incidents similar to those which occurred in Alma-Ata in December of 1986. They are an example of what kind of downfalls may occur in ideological work if it is performed superficially, formally, and without consideration for local conditions.

Where, might we ask, do the unhealthy attitudes come from, when the truly inviolable friendship of all the peoples of the Land of the Soviets has been strongly forged throughout the years? The fact is that stagnant negative phenomena and elements of social corrosion could not help but be expressed in the sphere of national relations. These are the violation of Soviet laws and Leninist principles of cadre policy, omissions in educational work, and a complacent attitude toward such phenomena.

It is evident that national interests and national self-consciousness are realities of our everyday life. And, if we do not inject class consciousness into these phenomena and do not manifest international responsibility, it is easy to fall into the over-exaggeration of the national. There is, however, a sure means against nationalism and chauvinism—to maintain the class positions of equality of the workers of all nations. This is what Lenin teaches: national interests must be defended not from the positions of generalization of the peoples, but, on the contrary—from the standpoint of international fraternity of the workers.

In this plane, the creation of a commission to examine the problems of the Crimean Tatars which was headed by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman A. A. Gromyko was of great importance. The Soviet people perceived this as the intent by our agencies to comprehensively study the question with consideration of the interests of all peoples, and to make a decision which reflects the traditions of friendship of USSR peoples.

Against the background of the developing democratization, certain ideologically immature and sometimes even clearly anti-socialistic elements are trying to "show themselves." It is they who "organize" certain events, as for example those which took place in August of last year in the Prebaltic region. Their actions play into the hands of the forces hostile to socialism which are striving to play the "Prebaltic card" for their own selfish purposes.

Fanning nationalist sentiments and trying to drive a wedge between the peoples, western propaganda ascribes the achievements of formation of statehood in the Prebaltic republics to bourgeois movements. It does so by using certain events in the life of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia taken out of historical context. Although no one ever gave him such powers, U.S. President Ronald Reagan suggested this idea to the Prebaltic peoples in his proclamation of 11 February 1988. However, these provocations did not receive any support on the part of the population in the Prebaltic republics, nor will not receive any!

In the words of Lenin, the interests of proletarian solidarity demand "that we never take a formal attitude toward the national question..." We should understand this also in the sense that there is not and cannot be a final solution given once and for all to one of the most complex problems of mankind—the national problem.

Unfortunately, some local leaders have exhibited just such a formal and non-party approach to the solution of questions associated with inter-national relations. They have not shown the proper responsibility in dealing with this important matter. There have been cases when misunderstandings arose from time to time between neighboring rayons or oblasts of various republics, and even between the republics themselves. Sometimes these turned into arguments which grew into lawsuits and other undesirable incidents. However, the leaders of the party and Soviet organs, instead of forestalling and extinguishing the passions, often evaded principle decisions.

The events in Nagornyy Karabakh once again convincingly prove that the desire of one people cannot be satisfied without consideration for the interests of other peoples. "It is bitter and painful to watch," wrote reader A. Garibov to the newspaper IZVESTIYA, "how people, having cast all matters aside, engage in division of territories as if they lived in different countries. Is this what the Azerbaijani Azizbekov and the Armenian Shaumyan, friends and fellow workers who gave their lives for the establishment of Soviet rule in the Transcaucasus, dreamed about?"

Yes, we must understand that the disruption of our unity and the shifting of attention from socio-economic questions to national claims can do great harm to perestroika. The most complex questions of inter-ethnic relations must be resolved only within the framework of democratic principles and laws, without allowing even the slightest detriment to inter-national cohesion of the Soviet peoples and without giving up serious questions of national fates to the powers of elements and emotions.

The events in Nagornyy Karabakh have shown that the main thing now is to continue the implementation of Leninist principles of national policy and to strengthen the friendship of the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples in the Soviet Transcaucasus and in the entire country.

Any exacerbation of the situation could set us back from those great achievements in the friendship of peoples which our country has attained in the 70 years of its existence.

The CPSU Central Committee recommended that the Central Committees of the Azerbaijan and Armenian communist parties develop a set of long-term measures for improving the inter-ethnic education of the workers and for resolving questions dealing with the social, economic, domestic, scientific, cultural, linguistic and other aspects of the interrelations of these republics on the basis of the Leninist principles of internationalism.

The meaning of Leninist national policy is that each person and each nation may develop freely, that each people may satisfy their needs in all the spheres of socio-political life, in their own language and culture, and in their customs and beliefs. This was stated in the address of CPSU Central Committee Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev to the workers and to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia in connection with the events taking place in Nagornyy Karabakh and around it.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution entitled "On measures associated with the appeals of the union republics regarding the events in Nagornyy Karabakh and in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR" expressed deep concern for this dramatic situation, which did harm to the peoples of these republics and caused overall detriment to the continued strengthening of the friendship of USSR peoples as a single union multinational state. [The resolution] deemed inadmissible all attempts at solving complex national-territorial questions by means of pressure exerted on the organs of state power and in an atmosphere of charged emotions and passions, as well as by means of creating various independent formations speaking out in favor of redrawing the national-state and national-administrative boundaries secured in the USSR Constitution. This might lead to unpredictable consequences. The Soviets of People's Deputies of both republics were informed of the need for radically improving mass-political and educational work among the population in the spirit of the firmness of Leninist principles of national policy, and the friendship and cohesion of the fraternal peoples of the USSR.

The reasons which gave rise to such excesses are currently being subjected to an in-depth and comprehensive analysis. They have become possible primarily due to the weakened attention to questions of inter-ethnic relations, as a result of the appeals of irresponsible persons, as well as the passive wait-and-see position of the party and Soviet organs. It was through the fault of the former leadership of the Nagornyy Karabakh party obkom that artificial difficulties were created. These had to do with cultural exchange, provision of fictional literature and school textbooks in the native language, and other

aspects of the multi-faceted and traditional ties of the oblast's workers with their fraternal Armenia. These problems could have and should have been resolved in an efficient manner.

At the present time, extensive work is being performed in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which is directed toward seeing that each resident of the oblast gains a deep understanding of the marginal clarity and precision of the party positions, so that the hour of prudent and sober decisions will dawn for each one, and so that the feeling of civic duty and responsibility for the common cause is placed first and foremost.

Not one of the questions of perestroika can today be resolved without consideration for the effect which it will have on national relations. The process of renovation demands the well-ordered, persistent and unified work of all the workers and representatives of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Many problems associated with the continued strengthening of the Soviet multinational state and with the growth of the fraternal friendship of USSR peoples require constant and serious study. We should, evidently, support the proposal for the creation of a special scientific-research center which could perform systematic scientific-research work in the field of national relations.

The questions of continued internationalization of the state and social life of the union republics and the national autonomies may be the subject of special discussion at the sessions of the Soviets and at the meetings of workers. The organs of authority should remember that the joint labor of people of different nationalities facilitates the cohesion of the peoples and the strengthening of their friendship and cooperation. It is specifically for these purposes that we must comprehensively facilitate the formation of multinational collectives in the sphere of production as well as in institutions of science, higher education, culture, public health, and consumer services. Also, we must decisively counteract attempts—regardless of whom they are made by—to manifest harmful traditions and customs, national isolationism, conceit, and a disrespectful attitude toward other nations and peoples.

One of the important peculiarities of the Soviets is that they clearly manifested their inter-ethnic nature from the very moment of their emergence. As Vladimir Ilyich pointed out, the Soviet republic unites the workers of all nations and stands up for the interests of the workers without differentiation of nations. Also, the fact that it was the Soviets which comprised the basis for the multinational state largely determined its development along a path of harmonic combination of inter-ethnic and national tasks. The structures of the Soviets, their multinational make-up, the principles of formulation

and activity of interrelations with the population as well as with all the state organs and public organisations on the territory unified by the Soviets—all these are adapted in full measure to the realization of these tasks.

The Soviets of People's Deputies resolve questions within their jurisdiction based on all-state interests and on the interests of citizens of all nationalities living in the territory under their jurisdiction.

In recent years, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium have adopted legislative bills which significantly expand the rights of the organs of authority. The enterprises under republic and all-union jurisdiction were charged with the responsibility of acquainting the local Soviets with the plans of their development, and the ministries—with considering their conclusions in reviewing the plans of the enterprises as well as their own programs. This made it possible to better integrate the production interests with local interests, and with the tasks of developing the cities and oblasts. We may cite numerous examples of the effective work of the Soviets, which skillfully realize the rights and capacities granted to them on these questions. This is particularly important in multinational regions. Thus, the Stavropol Kray Soviet of People's Deputies actively exercises its right to locate on its territory all new industrial enterprises of union and republic affiliation. The interdepartmental commission created under the executive committee strives to locate new facilities primarily in the medium-sized and small cities, where people of different nationalities live. It sees that the volume of industrial construction is coordinated with the building of communal and social-domestic facilities. As a result, it has been possible to significantly increase, specifically, the industrial potential of the small cities and to ensure the development of the production and social infrastructure.

All of the nations and peoples of the USSR are quite broadly represented within the make-up of our country's organs of power. Of the various nationalities inhabiting our country, 63 are represented in the USSR Supreme Soviet, 78 in the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics, and 120 in the local Soviets.

In continually bringing to life the Leninist line on ensuring equality of all nations and peoples in state construction, the party is demonstrating particular concern for the peoples with small population numbers. This largely explains the fact that the representation of nationalities which are relatively small in number but which have their own national states and national-state formations is, as a rule, higher among the deputies of the local Soviets than the portion of these nationalities in the country's population. Thus, the portion of Khakass, Altay, Balkars, Yakuts, Buryats, and representatives of a number of other nationalities among the deputies of the local Soviets of People's Deputies elected in 1987 was 1.5-2 times higher than their portion in the country's population.

The nationalities which are relatively few in number are also represented more broadly in the USSR Supreme Soviet than their portion in the general population. This is ensured primarily by the fact that every union and autonomous republic, every autonomous oblast and every autonomous okrug, regardless of the number of its population, sends an equal number of deputies to the Council of Nationalities (32, 11, 5 and 1, respectively). The portion of Armenians, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Azerbaijani, and Georgians among the deputies of the Supreme Soviet exceeds by 1.5-2.5 times their portion in the country's population. At the same time, the representation of the nationalities most numerous in population numbers (Russians and Ukrainians) among the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet (45.5 and 11.3 percent, respectively) is lower than their portion in the country's population (52 and 16 percent, respectively). Thus, our very reality refutes the fabrications of bourgeois propaganda regarding some "political supremacy" of one nation over another, or "the suppression of the rights and interests" of the less numerous peoples.

The Party Program notes that the CPSU proceeds from the fact that in our socialist multinational state, new tasks on improvement of national relations regularly arise in the process of the joint labor and life of over 100 nations and peoples.

The primary task is the universal strengthening and development of our single union multinational state. The Soviet socialist state embodies the dialectic unity of the international and the national. The Soviets of People's Deputies, uniting the workers of all nationalities on a class, international basis, express most fully and precisely the internationalism of the socialist state and our form of life. The work of the Soviets—the most extensive and powerful state organs which protect the radical interests and goals of the working class and the workers of all nationalities—ensures an ever closer cooperation of all nations and peoples and a strengthening of the unity of all the Soviet people.

Let us present the following question: what is the significance of the Basic Law for the practical application of inter-ethnic relations? Reflecting the steadfast rapprochement of the country's nations and peoples, the Constitution serves to further strengthen the principles of union of a multinational state and naturally combines socialist federalism with democratic centralism. However, this certainly does not mean that the interests of individual republics, nations, or peoples become secondary and are sacrificed to the global all-union interests. The true historical value of socialist federalism is that the form of state arrangement so genially discovered by Lenin makes it possible to give full consideration to the peculiarities of the development of the union and national state.

All the union Soviet republics have equal rights. Each one has the same rights and responsibilities in any of the most important spheres of state activity. Each is represented in the supreme organs of the USSR—in the

Supreme Soviet, the government, and the Supreme Court. We might add that appropriate representation is provided also in the system of state organs of the union and autonomous republics. This is one peculiarity.

Another is that our Supreme Soviet consists of two houses. The general interests of the USSR workers, regardless of their national affiliation, are represented by the Union Council. The specific interests of citizens of various nationalities living in the union and autonomous republics and in the autonomous oblasts and okrugs are represented by the Council of Nationalities.

The Constitution has established the complete equality of the houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This radically distinguishes it from the two-house parliaments of the capitalist countries. The Union Council and the Council of Nationalities have equal legislative initiative. A law is considered ratified if it is approved by both houses. As practical application has shown, the joint activity of the houses and their commissions broadens the capacities of the Supreme Soviet in the decision making process, since not only all-political, but also national interests are taken into consideration.

During the meeting at the CPSU Central Committee with the heads of means of mass information, ideological institutions and artists unions held on 7 May of this year, it was noted that the role of the Soviets must be reinterpreted. The importance of the work of the Soviet sessions, their commissions and deputies must be increased. The work of the Supreme Soviet is also in need of reorganization. We are called upon to concentrate on the solution of these urgent problems in a matter-of-fact way.

In the past 2 years alone, the deputies elected to the Council of Nationalities had occasion to discuss many acute, often controversial questions at the meetings of the houses and their commissions. These were questions dealing with republic and regional national-economic projects, with ecological environmental protection measures, and with shortcomings in the implementation of social programs on individual territories.

At the same time, it seems expedient to hold separate meetings of the permanent commissions of the houses on a broader range of questions. The meetings of the permanent commissions of the Council of Nationalities should examine various questions in greater detail and with consideration for the peculiarities of development of the national-state formations.

The problems of internationalization and of qualitatively new national relations oriented toward higher standards of human co-existence require collective and open examination. Let us turn to the events in Alma-Ata, as well as in Nagornyy Karabakh. Why did incidents occur in these regions? It was because many social

problems had been ignored there for years. National interests of entire groups of the population were not given proper consideration, and often even national conceit was encouraged. If we call things by their true name, we must say that the Leninist principles of national policy were openly violated. All this has required strict evaluation and in-depth analysis and conclusions.

In order to quell potential conflicts, fairness and total objectivity are needed in the administrative decisions on site as well as in the central organs of power. It is quite understandable that these questions have become the subject of particular concern for the Council of Nationalities and its organs, and are constantly under their close control.

Lenin taught us the skill of being internationalists in deed, and our duty is to preserve and augment the traditions of internationalism. The January (1987) Plenum of the party Central Committee noted that all our experience shows that only consistent, steadfast internationalism can be successfully counterposed to nationalist crazes.

On an organizational level, it would be quite important to examine the question of creating permanent commissions to deal with problems of inter-ethnic relations. Such permanent commissions could be formed and are already being formed based on the specific national peculiarities and needs in the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics, as well as in the local Soviets. Therefore, in electing the higher and local organs of power, it would be expedient to ensure in them a more commensurate representation of the nations and peoples living on their territory.

The Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets, Councils of Ministers of the union and autonomous republics, and the executive committees of the kray and oblast Soviets whose territory is populated by different national groups may today have small subsections dealing with these questions. Their creation would facilitate improved coordination and intensification of research in the sphere of national relations, as well as the attraction of scientific cadres to this work.

A most important direction of CPSU national policy is also the increase in the material and spiritual potential of each republic and its maximal utilization for the harmonic development of the entire national economic complex. Thanks to the economic integration and specialization of the union republics on the basis of centralized planning of the country's national economy and the integrated development of the economy of each union republic, as well as the expansion of initiative by the Soviets, an organic combination of all-union—international, and republic—national, interests is being achieved.

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Under conditions of the renovation of socialism, the question of the actual economic equality of peoples should be tied more closely with the principle of social fairness. The differences in regional and national peculiarities do not exclude the development of general criteria in evaluating the results of the work.

Today there is no longer any need for unilateral aid by the workers of the central oblasts to the population of other regions of the country, as was the case during the initial period of socialist construction. Today we have every right to expect and demand from the republic and local organs that they approach the resolution of all questions of economic development on their territories from all-state positions. It is specifically thanks to the joint labor of all the peoples that the large-scale programs are being implemented for the assimilation of the natural resources of Siberia, the Far East and North, the Baid zone, for the development of the Russian non-chernozem region, as well as the Food, Energy and other programs. Through their joint efforts, the peoples of the USSR are fighting for the intensification of our economy. The implementation of a unified scientific-technical policy accelerates the internationalization of the country's economic life.

At the same time, the negative tendencies in the economy which became apparent in the 70's-early 80's and which were noted at the 27th CPSU Congress could not help but be expressed in the national processes. These include low growth rates for labor productivity in industry in a number of regions, regional differences in the structure of the industry, and especially in the professional training of the cadres, etc. Despite the gradual levelling of the social-class structure of the Soviet nations, the numbers of the working class in general and its national cadres in particular are still inadequate in the republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, Moldavia, and a number of the autonomous republics, krais and oblasts.

In order to correct this situation, it is necessary to create the appropriate material and organizational conditions: to increase the involvement of the native population in the industrial sectors; to accelerate the rate of elevating the level of training of the cadres and improving methods of professional orientation work among the youth; to create socio-economic prerequisites for greater mobility of the population and involvement of women in social production. For these purposes, it is necessary to strengthen the industrial base of the republics and to realize a broad range of social measures. In order to achieve international tempering of the cadres and their enrichment with experience in party and state work, it is necessary to step up the exchange of cadres between the republics and regions and between the local and central organs.

Once I was asked in an interview: doesn't the equalization of the levels of development of the union republics lead to a disappearance of national differences? In answering the question, I cited the following example. During the discussion of the draft of the 1977 Constitution, some comrades suggested introducing into the Basic Law the concept of a single Soviet nation, limiting the sovereignty of the union and autonomous republics or even totally eliminating them and creating a single-house Supreme Soviet. The error and vulnerability of such proposals is clearly apparent. The socio-political unity of the Soviet people certainly does not mean the disappearance of national differences. Having built socialism and having for the first time in the world resolved in principle the national question, we have laid the foundations for the final rapprochement of our peoples. However, we would have taken a dangerous course if we had begun to artificially force the objective and regular process of national integration.

National differences are retained even under conditions of equalizing the levels of development of the individual republics, and we cannot underestimate them or allow ourselves to ignore them. Yet there are still many such cases. The USSR Supreme Soviet gets letters in which citizens report various cases of infringement on the national culture—for example, the closure of schools giving instruction in the national languages.

What can we say in regard to such actions? They run counter to Lenin's behests, the traditions of October, and the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress. Of course, Russian, which has been adopted by the Soviet people as the language of international communication, has become an important factor in strengthening the socio-political and moral unity of our people and in developing and mutually enriching the national cultures. However, would it be right if a representative of some nationality studied Russian yet did not know his own native language and lost his ties with his age-old national soil? The same may be said of truly national traditions in music and expressive art, as well as in folk art. The rapprochement and mutual enrichment of cultures must, in the opinion of Lenin, proceed along a truly democratic, truly internationalistic base. There is nothing more foreign to the communist ideology than the desire to artificially prompt an objective historical process or to hinder it.

The formation of bilingualism is of particular importance in the interaction and rapprochement of national cultures. It seems that at the present stage this is one of the central links in developing national relations. In the practical work on the formulation of bilingualism it is necessary to create favorable conditions for the voluntary study of Russian and the native languages. In practical application it is necessary to adhere to the principle of equality of the languages.

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The current processes in national relations require serious and thoughtful study. Without ethno-sociological research, without a knowledge of public opinion and the

entire spectrum of demands of the multinational population, it is impossible to conduct practical work in this sphere today. However, we must say frankly that we still underestimate the importance of such research. For a long time, some sociologists preferred to create works in which they embellished inter-ethnic relations and avoided the formulation of acute problems which were coming to a head. As a rule, negative phenomena were kept quiet. It was unpleasant to talk about them, and this led in part to the negative phenomena which we are now encountering.

V. I. Lenin often noted that we must deal with national policy in a very basic manner, along all lines, both in theory and in practice, and with consideration of the fact that this is the most basic principle question of life. The CPSU Central Committee plans to examine the problems of national policy at one of its upcoming plenums. It will discuss a broad circle of questions in this vital sphere of public life and will outline the means for specific solution of social, economic, cultural and other problems. Reorganization in the sphere of national relations means the overall affirmation of the Leninist course and increased attention to the peculiarities of peoples and their needs in the name of continued international cohesion and unity of our society. A comprehensive and complete consideration of the national interests is a vital aspect of the developing socialist democracy and the constitutional victories of socialism.

The upcoming 19th All-Union Party Conference will define the specific means of democratization of Soviet society and the continued renovation of socialism.

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Past Two Years' Work of RSFSR Soviets Reviewed

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[Article by V. Orlov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "Broader Authority—Higher Responsibility"]

[Text] On the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference—a very important political event, Russian Federation workers are living with the ideas about accelerating economic and social development that were worked out by the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 27th party congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee Plenums.

The restructuring process is growing and deepening. The changes embrace all aspects of our life. Positive improvements are occurring in economics, social relations and the spiritual area. Democratic principles in managing state and public affairs are gathering strength.

The key questions of ideological support for restructuring have found reflection in the decisions of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The plenum proposed the task of radically improving the role of the soviets as the basis for our society's political system. It talked about the need for a rebirth of the power of the soviets in its Leninist understanding, that is, we are faced with making soviets at all levels actively functioning agencies.

One cannot fail to note that the activity of the soviets has been filled more and more with a new context during the post-April period. Many of them are trying to combine branch and territorial interests, production and the service area and to combine the capabilities and resources of enterprises having different subordination in order to satisfy the people's requirements and needs better. Democratic principles are being strictly observed in the activity of the soviets and their agencies.

This is contributing in no small degree to the realization of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Measures To Further Improve the Role and Strengthen the Responsibility of the Soviets of People's Deputies for the Acceleration of Social and Economic Development in Light of the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress," which was adopted 25 July 1986.

Now when the decree has already been in effect for almost two years, there is every justification for saying that the soviets have received levers for greatly influencing the formation and fulfillment of economic and social development plans, for coordinating the activity of enterprises in searching for and mobilizing additional reserves, for improving the use of manpower, and for solving the tasks in expanding the social and production infrastructure thanks to the decree. New opportunities have also been revealed for deepening the democratic essence of state organs of power and the participation of the masses in developing solutions and exercising strict control over their fulfillment.

A series of measures aimed at realizing the decree's most important propositions has been carried out in the Russian Federation since its adoption. The magazine's readers will evidently be interested in learning what work has been specifically done.

I will first of all point out that a joint session of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers discussed the tasks that flow from this decree. A detailed discussion of it also occurred during sessions of the autonomous republics' supreme soviets and local

soviets. Considering the importance of the new large-scale tasks posed to the soviets under restructuring conditions, the Presidium has promoted in every way possible the realization of this basic document.

We analyzed the first work results of the soviets under the new conditions during a meeting in which the chairmen of the supreme soviet presidiums and councils of ministers of all the autonomous republics and the executive committees of kray and oblast soviets and the directors of union and republic ministries and departments participated. We were convinced during this that a gap exists in a number of the republic's regions between the wider authority, which has been granted to the organs of power, and the specific content of their activity. Based on the results of the exchange of opinions that took place, the republic's Presidium and Council of Ministers outlined additional steps to improve the work of soviet and economic agencies further.

The time that has passed since then has shown that many soviets noticeably increased their coordinating role in the complex solving of economic and social problems when they reorganized their activity. While examining the progress in fulfilling the decree on improving the role of the soviets as a control measure, the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium became convinced that the organs of state power in Lipetsk Oblast, for example, had considerably strengthened their interaction with enterprises and organizations and that they are successfully realizing the special-purpose complex programs aimed at accelerating the technical re-equipping of production, improving capital construction, solving the housing problem, and supplying the population with goods and services.

Here, the absolute majority of the enterprises coordinates the main indicators with the executive committees without fail. At the present time, approximately 40 percent of the housing and children's preschool establishments and more than 30 percent of the schools and communal facilities are being built using the assets of enterprises of higher subordination. This is significantly greater than during past years. The development of a labor resource balance has recently been assured for the first time in the branch's economic and social development plans. During 1987 alone, 7,300 work positions have been made more efficient and 1,200 people have been released and sent to other branches. The oblast's soviets are effectively using the rights granted to them for developing summary estimates of construction and assembly organizations and their work load and the organization of single customer services.

In accordance with the decree, the Central Chernozem zone oblast soviets (Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Lipetsk, and Tambov oblasts) have established a coordinating council for expanding and distributing the output of mass demand items that have not been centrally

planned, and developed proposals for the specialization of the oblasts in the production of household chemical, sports and tourist merchandise.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has also pointed out considerable shortcomings in the work of Lipetsk Oblast soviets—shortcomings which are, unfortunately, inherent in many other local organs of power. First of all, there is the sluggishness in implementing the 25 July 1986 decree. A slowdown and the expectation of some additional instructions from above on how one should act have been observed in those matters where—as they say—the hands of the soviets have been untied. It is necessary to say that the comments, which have been expressed on this score, have aroused the soviets to work more energetically and with a proprietary grip.

The soviets' role in insuring complete development on their territory, introducing advanced technologies, intensifying production, improving management, and using the new management forms has grown. For example, Sverdlovsk Oblast soviets have intensified their influence on the formation of the economic and social development plans of not only cities and the rayons in general but also those of individual enterprises. In this regard, it is important to point out that they are achieving full satisfaction of the social and everyday needs of the people and—based on this—providing conditions for making the human factor more active and the work of the labor collectives highly productive. The percentage of assets invested by ministries and departments in the capital construction being carried out in accordance with the plans of local soviets is reaching almost 50 percent. Housing construction, the development of the construction industry, the supply of water, the generation of power and heat, the service area, and the building of roads have begun to be financed with large amounts from this source.

Unfortunately, however, all soviets are still not acting with sufficient assertiveness. Many are reconciling themselves to low rates in expanding the social infrastructure and are not displaying the necessary exactingness toward the directors of enterprises of union and republic subordination, who frequently evade the solving of social questions using any pretext.

For example, the work of the Orenburg soviets in the complex development of a city, where an impermissible shortfall in the construction of housing and other social and domestic projects exists, was analyzed not too long ago. The main reason for this shortfall is the unskillful use of their expanded authority, the fear of spoiling relations with higher agencies, and a shortage of glasnost in solving urgent social problems.

The soviets need new approaches and a high level of activity, especially in that which directly touches upon the people's vital interests. The solving of the housing problem, the fulfilling of the Food Program, and the filling of the market with high quality goods—these are

their immediate task. It was from this point of view that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session, which was held in April of this year, examined the question of the work of Russia's soviet and economic agencies in providing each family a separate apartment or individual house by the year 2000.

The preparations for this session were carried out under the conditions of widespread glasnost. The main program indicators, which were developed by the republic's Gosplan, were sent in advance to the autonomous republics, krais and oblasts where the Supreme Soviet deputies familiarized themselves with them and discussed them with local soviet bodies. The theses in the report of the republic's government on this question were actively discussed on the pages of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and in other mass information media. Many valuable proposals and comments aimed at intensifying housing construction rates and introducing the required order into housing and communal facilities, were dealt with.

The Russian Federation is carrying out a large housing program. More than 138 million square meters of total housing area have been commissioned during the first two years of the five-year plan. This exceeds the five-year plan's control figures by 11 million square meters. The housing conditions of approximately three million families have been improved.

The soviets of the republic's Maritime and Stavropol krais and Volgograd, Tambov and several other oblasts are demonstrating examples of self-initiated and creative work to accelerate housing construction. What is permitting them to achieve high results? First of all, there is the insuring that effective use is made of house building capacities, the expanding of local construction materials production and the increasing of construction using cost accounting methods. One cannot fail to mention that these soviets are actively attracting the assets of the population for housing construction and promoting the organization of housing complexes for youth, the widespread use of the collective contract, etc.

Despite the measures taken, however, the housing problem in the republic continues to be a critical one. Housing construction plans are not being fulfilled everywhere. In 1987, 12 autonomous republics, krais and oblasts, among which were Novosibirsk, Penza and Chita oblasts, Krasnoyarsk Krai and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

Having thoroughly and comprehensively analyzed the state of affairs in housing construction, the Supreme Soviet approved the "Housing-2000" republic program. According to our estimates, it will be necessary to commission 19.4 million living quarters, or 1.25 billion square meters, in order to provide each family in Russia with a separate housing area by the beginning of the next century. This is more than half of the housing area built during the years of Soviet power.

The soviets have a great responsibility for the realization of the outlined plans. We are primarily talking about the fact that they are the ones who see to the unconditional fulfillment of the targets stipulated for commissioning housing and who insure the timely building of social, cultural and communal projects and the complete organization of public services and amenities on RSFSR territory. The achieving of the goals that have been posed is impossible without broadly disseminating housing construction practices utilizing the economic method, organizing housing construction cooperatives, providing more effective help to individual home builders, insuring the preservation of housing, and improving the work of the housing operating services.

The serious violations of housing legislation and of the principle of social justice in distributing housing, which have been tolerated in a number of regions, are causing a great deal of anxiety in us. Such cases have occurred in the Karelian and Kabardino-Balkar ASSRs and the Ivanovo, Kuybyshev, Tyumen and Chelyabinsk oblasts. The republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium has repeatedly directed attention toward this, including in its decrees adopted during recent years regarding Amur, Pskov and Chita oblasts. The republic is taking steps to set this matter right. Much, however, still remains to be done here.

The soviets' responsibility for satisfying the population's need for food products has grown significantly. There are quite a few examples in the Russian Federation of this task being solved successfully. The republic's Supreme Soviet Commission for the Agroindustrial Complex has, in particular, approved the experience of the Omsk people in increasing the production of agricultural products on the citizens' personal subsidiary farms. Omsk Oblast is persistently implementing a long-term complex program which provides for creating the appropriate conditions to expand these farms. The number of cattle on personal farmsteads is increasing from year to year, the demands of the villagers for acquiring calves and poultry are being fully satisfied, and the necessary help is being provided them in the supplying of fodder. That is why—with a large amount of public production—the share of the personal farmsteads is more than 20 percent of the gross agricultural output. The arrival of animal husbandry products in kolkhoz markets has increased significantly. As a rule, the cost of one kilogram of meat does not exceed 3.5 rubles; in consumer cooperative stores, it is approximately three rubles. Incidentally, I will point out that the per capita consumption of meat products in this oblast is 74 kilograms, or more than the corresponding all-union indicator.

Opportunities exist everywhere to improve significantly the supplying of the population with food products. The appropriate rights have been granted to the soviets for them to realize these capabilities. Unfortunately, it is necessary to state that many are still displaying sluggishness, not repudiating old methods for directing agriculture, not combining local initiatives with the advantages

of the new economic mechanism, turning slowly to economic work methods, using lease and family contracts poorly—and everywhere there is a shortfall. Some local organs of power are displaying dependence as they did before and are hoping for state resources for the delivery of food products whose production can and must be organized on the spot.

The presidium and permanent commissions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet have repeatedly analyzed the progress in fulfilling the Food Program in the autonomous republics, krays and oblasts. In particular, the Presidium has approached from a position of high exactingness the evaluation of the work of the Kostroma Oblast soviets in using local capabilities for increasing the production of food products and improving their supply to the population. In this oblast, the milk yield is low and almost 40 percent of the rural farmsteads do not have cattle. The plans for the production of food products by the local food industry are being systematically disrupted, and the variety of the food products is poor. The Kostroma Oblispolkom, however, has not drawn conclusions from the justified criticism. Time is passing, but an increase in the production of animal husbandry products is not visible. The work of enterprise rural subsidiary farms has even deteriorated and the personal subsidiary farms of the citizens are not being expanded. Several other regions of Russia are also tolerating the marking of time. All of this, of course, disturbs us very much. That is why the monitoring of the soviets' work to carry out the Food Program will be strengthened even more. In the near future, we plan to analyze the state of affairs in the agrarian sector in a number of autonomous republics, krays and oblasts.

Positive improvements in the soviets' work to fulfill the Complex Program for Expanding the Production of Consumer Goods and Services are taking place. One can name quite a few soviets that are paying constant attention to these questions and achieving good results. Primarily, these are the soviets in Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Ulyanovsk, and several other oblasts. They are involving all enterprises, regardless of their departmental subordination, in the production of consumer items. Here, the technical re-equipping of shops engaged in the production of goods and their mastery of new methods to replace obsolete ones are under the control of the deputies. The quality of the goods is a subject of special concern for the mentioned soviets. Exhibitions and review contests for promising items are devoted to this, and an exchange of work collective experiences and the creative collaboration of enterprises have been set up.

The result of the efforts made in this same Irkutsk Oblast has been a sharp increase in the production of new items, especially stylish items, at contract prices. Irkutsk cooperatives are plugging themselves more and more energetically into the production of goods for the population. During the first quarter of this year alone, they produced various products totaling 762,000 rubles.

However, the level of demand satisfaction for many goods still lags behind requirements. If one talks about the total mass of goods, it is growing. The trouble, however, lies in the fact that much of what is produced is of poor quality and clearly does not suit the purchaser. In order to insure an increase in product quality not in words but in deeds, it is necessary to put all economic, organizational, legal, and indoctrinational factors into operation. It seems that the soviets must assume responsibility for the solving of these questions. Here, of course, a great deal of work faces deputy groups and posts which must declare a very decisive war against all bad workmen.

One must note that all of the capabilities of local industry—the branches directly subordinate to the soviets—are far from being fully used to produce goods. In the oblast, krays and autonomous republics, you will frequently encounter popular economic and domestic items for sale that could be successfully manufactured from local materials.

The following example also convincingly testifies how alive are the old methods in organizing the production of consumer goods. During the drafting of plans for their production during the current year, the ispolkoms of more than 30 oblast soviets in the Russian Federation asked the RSFSR Gosplan and appropriate ministries to decrease the state targets passed to the enterprises. Under present conditions where the question of filling the market with quality products has been posed so sharply, such an attitude toward the realization of the tasks in the complex program and the five-year plan is simply intolerable.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium permanent commissions, and deputies have recently increased exactingness on the republic's ministries and departments and on the soviets' workers for satisfying the population's requirements for goods in mass demand.

The introduction by Supreme Soviet deputies during the fifth and sixth sessions of inquiries addressed to the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the republic's Gosagroprom, can serve as an example of their serious concern. Based on inquiries by deputies N. M. Ivanenkova, K. P. Fedoseyeva and S. S. Shalavina about providing school uniforms to students and by N. V. Dmitreyeva and A. R. Volchenkova about increasing the production, expanding the variety and increasing the quality of children's food products, the Supreme Soviet required the republic's government and agroprom to take concrete steps to solve the problems that had been raised. In carrying this out, the RSFSR Council of Ministers adopted at the beginning of this year a decree on additional measures to satisfy the requirement for special food products for young children.

On the whole, one can point out that the work performed by Russian Federation soviets to fulfill the 25 July 1986

CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers decree is having a large impact on improving the activity of state organs of power in solving questions within their competence.

In our opinion, however, several very important propositions in this document are still not being fully worked on. First of all, it is necessary to point out that many soviets have still not become true masters on departmental territory and are not giving a decisive rebuff to the attempts of some managers to defend their narrow departmental interests.

The adoption of the Law on a State Enterprise (Association) opened up new opportunities for the soviets to coordinate forces and assets for integrated development on their territory. Soviet bodies now have a right to address specific proposals directly to labor collectives. Of course, this assumes the increased responsibility of the soviets: You see, it is necessary to act publicly and on a democratic basis.

In the not too distant past, they turned to union and republic agencies for the solution of social and economic tasks; they traveled the so-called command administrative path. A different, more democratic, approach is required under present conditions. It is necessary to learn to manage together with the enterprises using a mutually acceptable platform and to convince labor collectives of the advisability of some action or other and not achieve what is desired by administrative pressure. It is also necessary to mention that, if a work collective allocates some resources for general purposes, it is evident that a soviet should subsequently report on their use. Undoubtedly, this will bring the organs of state power closer to the workers and they themselves will be able to judge the work of the soviets clearly.

At the same time, some soviet workers rightfully complain that norms for withholding assets of enterprises, which are located on the territory of the soviets, for local budgets have not been established everywhere and that economic relations between the organs of power and the work collectives have not been fully adjusted as yet.

Of course, the restructuring process, which is gathering strength with each day, is struggling with strong-willed methods of management, primarily at the expense of deepening democracy and glasnost and the introduction of cost accounting and the contract. The very existence of these is unthinkable without the direct inclusion of people in the solving of our common tasks. One cannot fail to take this into consideration. No soviet will achieve success in its work if it is not able to repudiate the old habit of commanding. Soviets must master new methods for working under the conditions of democracy and glasnost and display, figuratively speaking, a taste for economics more fully. This is an extremely complicated, but unavoidable, task.

Everything testifies that a very critical time—a time for action—has arrived. Decisions have been made and a number of new acts aimed at strengthening socialist democracy are—it is possible to say—on the threshold. The activity of the workers is high as opposed to past years. Using all of this for the common good is the primary task of the soviets today.

The large-scale tasks, which the 27th CPSU Congress posed for accelerating social and economic development, require a decisive change in the content, style and methods of council organizational work and a steady expansion of the limits of socialist self-management. Many soviets are restructuring organizational work and actively searching for more effective ways to solve the tasks that have been posed and to make the human factor more active. Without waiting for additional instructions, they themselves are boldly solving the questions which life is advancing.

The restructuring process has affected the session activity of the soviets. Unusual approaches to organizing and conducting their sessions are being used more and more frequently. In this regard, one of the sessions of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet, which discussed the problem of population's transport services, deserves attention. During the preparations for it, the oblast press published in advance an oblispolkom appeal to work collectives and all inhabitants of the oblast. A frank television broadcast, devoted to answering questions from television viewers about transport services, was presented. All of this permitted more than 1,500 sensible proposals and comments to be received and quite a few shortcomings in transport work to be eliminated.

New approaches are visible in the session work of the soviets in the Maritime, Stavropol and Khabarovsk krais and Moscow, Kemerovo and a number of other oblasts. They are using more frequently sessions without a report but with a discussion of earlier published materials during sessions of the permanent commissions. The practice of a preliminary discussion of reports and drafts of decisions in labor collectives and at places where the citizens live is being incorporated actively. In contrast to past years, some soviets are conducting their sessions over the course of two days. This creates extremely larger opportunities for deputies to participate actively in solving questions of local life.

Certain changes are also occurring in the session work of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. When preparing for the sixth session, at which it was necessary to examine the State Economic and Social Development Plan and the RSFSR State Budget for 1988, the Presidium sent the main indicators in the draft of the plan to all autonomous republics, krais and oblasts. Not only Supreme Soviet deputies but also the deputy aktiv of the local soviets participated in the preliminary discussion of them at the local level. More than 200 proposals, which

were sent to the RSFSR Gosplan, ministries and departments and which were taken into consideration during the final work on the draft of the plan, were submitted.

The work of this session was also organized in a new way. After hearing the reports on the plan and the republic's budget, the permanent commissions discussed them during their sessions. The results of the examination of these documents were reported to the session. This had a positive effect on the activity of the deputies, expanded their capabilities for exercising their authority, and contributed to an expansion of democratic principles in the work of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet. I will add that more than 130 deputies spoke during the debates on the plan and the budget.

In a word, council sessions are more and more getting rid of unnecessary ceremony and show; human concerns and vital tasks are being discussed during them in a business-like fashion. The deputies are assembling not simply to vote but to work strenuously.

At the same time, changes for the better in the content of session work are still not occurring everywhere. Secondary questions are often raised during council discussions and the importance of the representative agencies exercising their control functions is being underestimated. Instances of overly organized sessions still persist. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium pointed out many of these types of shortcomings during the discussion of the work of Kurgan Oblast soviets to improve the style and methods of their work and the discussion of the ways the local soviets in the Mordovian ASSR conduct sessions.

The analytical and monitoring activity of the soviets' permanent commissions has been noticeably increased. They are participating in the drafting of economic and social development plans and the monitoring of their fulfillment and they are preparing material for review during council sessions.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions have begun to work more actively. Last year, they reviewed approximately 100 questions on economic, social and cultural construction. Their sessions heard reports by the republic's Ministry of Highways, Ministry of Local Industry, Ministry of Consumer Services, the councils of ministers of the Mordovian and Yakut ASSRs, and the ispolkoms of a number of kray and oblast soviets.

The commission member deputies participated in the preparation and discussion of questions during the sessions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and usually were present at the sessions of the collegiums of the republic's ministries and departments, sessions of the local councils, and meetings of labor collectives. The ties of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions with public organizations have been strengthened. For example, quite a few of the questions examined during their

sessions were prepared with the participation of AUCCTU, Komsomol Central Committee and RSFSR People's Control Committee workers.

In attaching important significance to further improving the work of these deputy formations, the republic's Supreme Soviet heard a report from the commission on health care, social security and sports during one of its recent sessions. In order to exchange experiences, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium regularly invites the Planning and Budget Commission of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of the analogous commissions of the supreme soviets of the autonomous republics and kray and oblast councils to its sessions.

Nevertheless, one must admit that fundamental changes have not occurred in the work of the council permanent commissions. Many of them are not making a thorough analysis of the state of affairs in the national economy and of the work of management and economic agencies. There are still quite a few soviets who examine important economic and cultural questions without a preliminary discussion of them by the permanent commissions and without co-reports. This primarily pertains to the soviets in the Buryat ASSR and Amur, Rostov, Ryazan, and Sakhalin oblasts.

The extension of socialist self-management requires an increase in the deputies' responsibility for the fulfillment of their duties and the intensification of their work in the soviets and election districts. The number of deputies in the Russian Federation is now approximately 1.16 million—this is an enormous public force, and the soviets and their executive committees should provide comprehensive help to them, especially with respect to their reporting to the voters and work collectives, carrying out of instructions, organizing of receptions for citizens, reviewing of their letters and proposals, and working in deputy formations.

It is necessary to point out that the activity of the deputies is growing everywhere at the present time. I will cite as an example the RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies. Deputy N. V. Dmitriyeva, who heads the department of children's illnesses in the Ryazanskiy Medical Institute imeni Academician I. P. Pavlov, has proven herself to be a genuine public figure. She frequently visits the city's enterprises and has a good knowledge of the working and living conditions of Ryazan female workers. It is no accident that the question of improving maternity and childhood protection has been reviewed during sessions of the Ryazan city and rayon councils on her initiative. The deputy promoted the opening of a 140-bed section for treating children in the city's hospital, the establishment of a medical genetic center, and the construction of a maternity home and specialized hospital.

N. Kh. Galina, a tractor operator on the Yunduz Kolkhoz in the Bashkir ASSR, was elected as a deputy to the third convocation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. This woman is well known in the republic not only as a

first-rate machine operator but also as a deputy who is responsive to the needs of the people. There has not been a case that she has not responded to the requests of her constituency. Thanks to her efforts, a House of Culture, a polyclinic, a school, and a kindergarten have been built in the okrug.

The Supreme Soviet presidium is trying to disseminate the best work experience of the deputies. Informational reference materials, in which the work of the deputies in the election districts is treated along with the activity of the Supreme Soviet and its bodies, are issued on a regular basis for this purpose. It has become a rule to conduct training for the deputies on the eve of Supreme Soviet sessions. In April, for example, the deputies discussed with interest reports by four of their comrades about the fulfilling of instructions and the reviewing of proposals, applications and complaints from the voters and their reports to them, and their interrelationships with state and public agencies.

Russian soviets attach important significance to carrying out the voters' instructions. The work to implement them was noticeably enlivened after a review of this question during the fifth session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. A large amount of housing, communal and consumer construction is being carried out and educational, health care and cultural projects are being built in the republic based on these instructions. In the Russian Federation, more than 473,000 instructions were issued to local soviet deputies alone during the present convocation; of them, a fifth have already been realized.

Many soviets, however, still lack a responsible approach to the instructions. They are not exercising the required control over their fulfillment and are not fully using their authority to combine assets and coordinate the efforts of enterprises in their realization. Council sessions and ispolkom and permanent commission meetings are not listening to those who are directly carrying out the instructions. At times, the deputies themselves are not displaying the required initiative here. We encountered all of these shortcomings when we examined the question of the Arkhangelsk Oblast soviets' work with the voters' instructions.

I want especially to talk about the importance of expanding glasnost in the work of the soviets. Ever more diverse forms are being used in this task. The Chuvash ASSR, for example, is widely using reports and presentations by deputies and council workers to work collectives and at places where people live. The councils are more and more frequently holding "open letter" days and general meetings with citizens. The most critical and urgent problems raised by the people are then discussed during sessions of the soviets and meetings of the executive committees and permanent commissions. The comments and proposals of the workers are taken into consideration during the preparation and adoption of decisions. All of this will undoubtedly reduce the stream

of complaints in local and central agencies, including those concerning the operation of transport, environmental protection, and consumer services.

Nevertheless, the possibilities of glasnost are still not being fully used. Socially significant information still often remains the privilege of a narrow circle of people and people everywhere do not have a complete opportunity to know what is being done in a work collective, the city, and the oblast—especially when matters concern the transfer of personnel, the granting of housing and various benefits, etc.

The councils also face a large amount of work in the task of carrying out party decisions on further strengthening legality and law and order and reinforcing the protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens. The participation of the soviets in developing and implementing a state-wide universal legal education program and in radically improving the legal indoctrination of the population is closely linked with this task. It is necessary to remember that the soviets are responsible for the strict observance of Soviet laws by all the officials and citizens on their territory. The 2 April 1988 CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Condition of the Struggle Against Crime in the Country and Additional Measures To Prevent Violations of the Law" aims our organs of people's power at this.

The successful fulfillment of economic and social development plans depends to a considerable degree on how the lower soviet links—settlement and rural—act. There are more than 25,000 of them in the RSFSR, and approximately 756,000 deputies in them. They consistently and actively implement party policy and exert an effective influence on improving all aspects of local life.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium has summarized the work experience of the Lipovskiy village soviet in Smolensk Oblast in accelerating social and economic development on the territory within its jurisdiction under restructuring conditions. Their skillful use of new forms and methods for insuring an increase in agricultural production and the development of the social sphere was singled out. Working with the board of directors of a kolkhoz, this council prepared and is carrying out a program for the shift to the better management conditions. It is achieving an increase in the responsibility of the deputies, specialists and all kolkhoz workers for the introduction of cost accounting and self-financing. As a result, the kolkhoz has successfully completed the plans for the production and sale of all types of agricultural products and its net income reached almost one million rubles last year. The assets earned are being directed toward improving the cultural and living conditions of the kolkhoz workers.

This, of course, is far from being an isolated example of successful work by soviets at this most numerous level. However, the difficulties, which many rural and settlement soviets encounter in their daily practices, are

known to us. Questions concerning their reinforcement with personnel, the establishment of a material base that answers modern requirements, and the correct regulation of mutual relations with the enterprises and farms located on their territory, are awaiting a solution.

In fulfilling the requirements of the 25 July 1986 decree, Russian Federation soviets of people's deputies have acquired certain experience in solving important social and economic development tasks. Under the present conditions of strengthening the principles of democracy and glasnost, their work practices are inseparably enriched with instructions and proposals expressed by workers during discussions and presentations in various forums, the mass information media, numerous letters and appeals, and the personal contacts of the council workers with the population. This public activity of the Soviet people serves as a reliable basis for improving the work of the soviets and inspires a search for new ways to radically improve their role in our state's political system.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference will provide a new impetus to this process. In understanding the questions that are being submitted for its review from the positions of restructuring, the deputies are more and more distinctly recognizing that the time has come to act in an innovative manner and with a complete return from our efforts and to raise the prestige and authority of the soviets as organs of people's power through concrete deeds.

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08802

BSSR CP CC Discusses Party Cadre Selection Procedures

18000593 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 16 Jul 88 p 1

[BELTA report on the meeting at the BSSR CP Central Committee: "To Be at Vanguard of Perestroyka"]

[Text] The realization of deep, turning decisions of the 15th All-Union Party conference depends on the activity and purposefulness of the Party committees and organizations, and on how fast and thoroughly they will restructure their work in the light of new tasks and bring it closer to life. Today it is especially important to assure everywhere the vanguard role of Party organizations in order for each communist to become an active fighter for perestroyka.

A detailed discussion concerning how to bring the work of the BSSR Communist Party's obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, and primary Party organizations, took place on 14 July at the BSSR CP Central Committee with the

participation of obkom and Minsk Party gorkom secretaries and chiefs of organizational and Party work departments, as well as responsible personnel of the RSSR CP apparatus.

Paramount attention was paid to the problems of democratization of the inside-Party life and, especially to such important issues as admission to the CPSU member ranks, solution of cadre problems, and separation of functions of Party committees, Soviet and managerial bodies, and public organizations.

Speaking of Party ranks reinforcement, participants of the meeting noted that we must decidedly end control of this work by means of "purchase order", which often creates artificial obstructions for admitting progressive-minded, initiative comrades to the Party. However, this does not mean that it is now allowed to reduce requirements for people joining the Party. It was stressed that the admission to the CPSU must strengthen the Party and help to deepen the ties with working people. Therefore, it is important to select the cleanest people with regard to their ideology and morals. The main criteria must be their political position, active participation in perestroyka, attitude toward work, and moral make-up. It is necessary to take objectively into account the opinion of the working collective and to admit new members to the Party ranks at open Party meetings after discussing preliminarily the applications of joining the Party with their comrades at work. Unfortunately, this is done at very few places. A number of places are lacking substantially deep analysis of the situation in the primary Party organizations, and the possibilities of increasing the influence of the Party at the decisive production sectors and the responsibility of communists for realization of perestroyka are not always used.

The efforts of Party committees and primary Party organizations directed toward restructuring the work with cadres were subjected to a thorough analysis. It was noted that elections of managers, replacement of vacant positions based on announcing the vacancies, and other new forms of work following the tasks of radical economic reforms and democratization of all aspects of life, are spreading. Preparing and retraining of cadres and forming their reserves are somewhat improved. At the same time, the quality of this work does not meet modern requirements and in many places has an erratic character. A substantial part of the managers have not learned to work under conditions of widening democratization and glasnost, and is trying to operate using old methods. Because of that, conflict situations between management of a number of collectives and groups of workers were lately taking place. It was noted that Party committees and organizations insufficiently actively promote to management positions women and able organizers from the ranks of young people and activists who are not Party members. Primary Party organizations often either do not participate in decisionmaking concerning personnel or are led by management.

The participants of the meeting were united in their opinion that a clear differentiation of functions between Party, State, economic management, and public organizations is necessary; and that substituting somebody else's responsibilities does not further an increase in responsibilities of cadres, and development of their initiative and creativity, and distracts Party committees from organizational and political-educational tasks. Urgency of the directives of the 19th All-Union CPSU conference concerning the increased role and authority of Soviets, and the necessity to strengthen the apparatus of their executive bodies with literate, experienced, and energetic cadres, was stressed. Attention was paid to the importance of the fullest use of possibilities of public organizations and the inadmissibility of giving them orders.

Other problems of organizational and Party work were also examined. Concrete proposals directed toward realizing decisions of the All-Union Party conference in practice were discussed.

The following people participated in discussions: the chief of the department of organizational and Party work at the BSSR CP Central Committee, V.I. Borisov; the 2nd secretaries of the Party obkoms, namely, A.P. Sayenko from Brest, V.A. Sanchukovskiy from Gomel, I.G. Moshko from Grodno, A.N. Bychek from Minsk, and N.F. Grinev from Mogilev; the 1st secretary of Minsk gorkom of the BSSR CP, V.G. Galko; and the chiefs of departments of Party obkoms, E.M. Glushkevich, F.I. Klyukach, and others.

The 2nd secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, N.S. Igrunov was mediating the meeting and made a speech.

13355

**ESSR CC Member on Official Language Debate,
National Symbols Decree**

*18000611a Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
7 Jul 88 p 1*

[Interview of Viktor Aleksandrovich Vakht by M. Leven:
"Flag Over Your Home"]

[Text] Recently the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet published the Ukase Governing National Symbols. That act was preceded by broad discussion both in the press and among the masses of the people. What things should be considered to be national symbols, the specific forms they should take, and where and how it is proper to use them—all these topics evoked heated arguments. But now the Ukase has been signed and a MOLODEZH ESTONII correspondent has asked Viktor Aleksandrovich Vakht, secretary of the Presidium of ESSR Supreme Soviet, to comment on it.

[Opening statement by interviewee] People have had national symbols since ancient times. It was felt that possess some magic power and therefore they carry within themselves a very large emotional content. At first they were symbols taken from man's natural environment, but later on symbols created by people's hands appeared. But the main thing is that, even in the remote antiquity, symbols united people. Then that function was transferred to state, legalized symbols, to official symbolism. That function has been preserved to our time—take, for example, the currently existing State Coat of Arms, the State Flag, the State Anthem... Those symbols, which in our republic have only recently received the force of a normative act, also have historical origin. It is important to note here that although these national symbols were not used during the past several decades, nevertheless in definite circles of the population in Soviet Estonia they were remembered. In the process of perestroika that is occurring in our society, and the process of democratization and glasnost, people have begun talking about these symbols at the top of their voice. The press has printed research on the Estonian national colors (blue, black, and white) as being the colors that were chosen by the Estonian national student body as long ago as the last third of the nineteenth century in its struggle against the German-language student body there. Blue, black, and white became the colors of the Estonian students' corporation, as a symbol that united the progressively minded youth in the struggle against the suppression of the national uniqueness and the national spirit. And that suppression was extremely tangible in tsarist Russia. With the passage of time, the blue-black-and-white flag in the eyes of a large segment of the Estonian nation became the traditional symbol of national self-awareness, the love of freedom, and the striving to get rid of foreign influence upon one's native land.

[Question] Is it true that the blue-black-and-white also became the state flag of the Estonian Republic?

[Answer] Yes, it did, but not immediately. During the dominance of the bourgeois dictatorship, for a long time there was no state flag. And when the question arose about a state flag, as well as the combination and sequence of colors, a large number of proposals and drafts were submitted and arguments developed. For example, seamen remarked that at sea a flag with a white stripe on the bottom would not be visible, but it would fuse into the white-foam crests of the waves... After prolonged discussions the flag with three stripes—blue, black, and white—was nevertheless approved.

[Question] That flag was the flag of the bourgeois state and, so far as we know from history, was sometimes used to cover over matters and actions that were by no means attractive...

[Answer] Of course it was the flag of the bourgeois republic, but there was probably no harm in that. Although we do remember that it was used as a symbol

also during the period when Soviet Estonia was occupied by fascist Germany. It was used to mobilize the fighting men into the penal detachments that subsequently operated against the partisans in Pskov and Novgorod oblasts; they went into their "combat actions" with the three-color embroidery on their sleeve... In this regard also the Hitlerites remained true to themselves, jesuitically turning inside out the very essence of the Estonian national symbolism. That is how the dark spots were put on this flag. However, one should not see only the spots, and so, on the recommendation of the working group engaged in developing the national symbols, the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet decrees that in the present atmosphere of the democratization of public life, it is completely desirable to recognize this combination as the national colors. At the same time, the cornflower and the swallow were approved as national symbols also.

[Question] The Ukase states that they are recognized "outside the area of state symbols." Could you please explain how this should be understood?

[Answer] State symbols are established by the ESSR Constitution. The appropriate Statutes governing their use are approved, and those Statutes are carried out by officials and citizens, that is, the state coat of arms must be in the place where it is supposed to be, and the State Flag has to be hung accordingly. This is done on the basis of state laws. There are also local symbols—city emblems, various traditional signs. They are established in accordance with normative acts enacted by the local soviets and the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies. It is precisely outside the area of these state symbols that the national symbols now exist. The Ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet includes a paragraph that stipulates the development of a statute governing the application and defense of the national symbols. The draft of that document is already prepared and will apparently be enacted within the very near future. Naturally, it will be published immediately.

[Question] To a definite degree the use of the national symbols is linked with the democratic rights of the individual, and the freedom of the individual to use his own national symbols. Isn't there a danger that the document being prepared will limit in this sense the freedom of the individual?

[Answer] No, there is no such danger. The draft of the new statute states that, for example, the combination of the national colors can be used in all public measures—up to and including family holidays. If a particular citizen considers it necessary to raise a flag such as this over his individual home, then he is completely free to do so.

[Question] But what about days of state holidays? Can the red flag and the blue-black-and-white be flown side by side?

[Answer] Yes, they can. On such days—according to the statute draft—all citizens and officials must guarantee the display of the State Flag on their own building. It is completely possible to display alongside of it the blue-black-and-white flag. It is hung to the left of the State Flag (if, for example, you and I are standing with our back to the building). And what about municipal buildings? The draft stipulates the answer to this question also: one may hang the national colors here alongside of the State Flag if the building residents agree to that. The consent is determined by simple majority.

[Question] I would like to know what about Dlinny German? The flag of Soviet Estonia has been hanging there since September 1944...

[Answer] Wherever the State Flag has been installed, as the expression goes, "in perpetuity," the blue-black-and-white will not be flown. That is, at the Dlinny German tower, on enterprise buildings and on the buildings of enterprises and state institutions, only the State Flags can be displayed. But the national colors, as stated in the Ukase, function outside the area of state symbols. This, I repeat, does not infringe in any way on the civic freedoms of the individual: whoever wants to display a small flag with the national colors, for example, on his desk at work, can do so.

[Question] The next question is linked indirectly with the publishing of the Ukase Governing National Symbols. But it also has attracted a large amount of interest on the part of the broadest segments of the population in our republic. I have in mind the question of the status of the state language in Estonia. Because it is well known that the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet has formed a working group that is supposed to resolve this problem. You head that commission. What, then, is the situation as of today, Viktor Aleksandrovich?

[Answer] There are several drafts dealing with that status, and they have been carefully studied by the members of the working group. The question that is the chief and deciding one here is the question of whether or not the Estonian language should be recognized as the state language. There are also, however, proposals of a different nature. First, the proposal was made to include in the republic's Basic Law a statute to the effect that we have two state languages—Estonian and Russian. Secondly, the proposal was made to discuss the following question: although the recognition of the Estonian language as the state language appears enticing and outwardly positive, will it not lead, essentially speaking, to a negative result—to national exclusivity, to a limitation in the development of science and culture, to a state of estrangement from the other republics and from the same Russian-language science and culture? Without a doubt, such a danger exists. Because some of us have national feelings that are so hypertrophied that they are ready to close themselves off into rather narrow

"national confines." It must be understood: if this approach in the republic's social life takes the upper hand, it can cause serious harm to Estonian nationality.

[Question] It seems to me that every kind of limitation reduces a nation's intellectual and moral potential. But there is an even greater danger that this will reduce the rights and freedoms of the individual who has been caught within the pincers of "national separatism": by adjusting himself to fit into the parameters that have been enforced by "national ideology," the individual loses, or voluntarily expends, his uniqueness. The figure becomes a pawn, and is it really important what language pawns converse in? Because the rules of the "game" have been assigned. In this regard one can get along only with symbols. They are even easier to understand...

[Answer] The proposal to include in the ESSR Constitution an article concerning language is completely justified (incidentally, I am convinced that the fact that it has not been in the Constitution as yet is incorrect). Of course, one must ask in turn whether the Estonian state system and Estonian culture can develop, or simply exist, without the Estonian language. Obviously they cannot. We have the proposal: include in the Constitution a statement that the Estonian state system, like Estonian culture, develop on the broad base of the Estonian language. They are based on it.

[Question] Do I understand you correctly that you propose including in the Constitution an article not to the effect that the Estonian language is the state language, but that national culture and the state system develop on the basis of that language?

[Answer] To me personally this posing of the problem seems to be the one that is most acceptable. In my opinion this concept itself is the most constructive one. That is why the constitutional definition of the status of the Estonian language in the republic is completely substantiated. And this, most obviously, must be done at the very next session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet. The main thing is to assure that the future article in the Constitution (the Basic Law of ESSR) reliably serves the interests of the republic's development and serves its national culture. To the same degree this article must serve to reinforce the friendship among people of various nationalities who are residing on the territory of the ESSR and to reinforce the Union as a whole. Will specifically this concept be approved? I cannot say. The fact of the matter is that in our public life today the emotions have become so white-hot that everyone is defending in the most furious manner his own point of view as the one that is most just...

[Question] Or could it be the showiest, the one that appears to be most effective? But effectiveness, in and of itself, does not guarantee fruitfulness...

[Answer] For the time being, the most rigid concept dominates: "The Estonian language is the state language, and that's it!" But other proposals, for some reason, do not focus attention on themselves. They seem to slide along a tangent... But if we accept the rigid concept that was mentioned, it must be clearly stipulated what this really is as a state language, and how it correlates with the languages of the other nationalities that also live in our republic. However, we do not have today a theoretical base for this kind of precise answer. Possibly we will have to develop and adopt additionally a Law Governing Language. And then to explain everything completely in it. We have referred to the experience of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, whose Constitutions contain articles about a national language as a state language (in Abkhazia there are even three state languages, and even so there are many unclear areas). But their experience does not help us to any large extent, because in their Constitutions concerning language were established many decades ago. They do not correspond today to our questions concerning what the role of a national language should be under democratization, when the role of the individual republic in the family of Soviet nations is increasing, with the reinforcement of our unity... We have been conducting an intensive search in this area, but it is obvious that no language must be or can be encroached upon. We must avoid that danger.

[Question] With all respect for the national sovereignty of each nation and each national language, it is necessary, in my opinion, to find points of rapprochement, rather than forms and methods of opposing one nation to another, one language to another. Don't you agree?

[Answer] I agree, of course. Although I also understand that it is not simple to find here the optimal and balanced resolution. And without that it will be difficult for us to proceed ahead. But we must not delay. We must not lag behind time in this matter. With all the mistakes that occurred in the past and that exist today, we must not answer one mistake with a new mistake. We must not go from one extreme to another. We must be very intelligent in this matter. And solicitous about everyone who we live with. I shall explain what I have in mind. This topic is also closely linked with the problem of the state language. The unspoken theme of many statements concerning the isolation of the Estonian language as the one state language on the territory of the republic is the struggle against great-power Russian chauvinism. This is natural and understandable. However, do not some orators go to the other extreme themselves? Do they not sometimes themselves become Great Estonian chauvinists with respect to representatives of the other nationalities living on Estonian land? We must also think about this.

[Question] At the party conference that has just ended, it was decided to recommend the first secretaries of the party's rayon and city committees as soviet chairmen. This idea itself has caused many arguments and doubts. What is your attitude to it?

[Answer] For the time being, the soviets' ispolkoms are subordinate (at the republic level) both the Council of Ministers and to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, according to the legislation that is currently in existence, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, practically speaking, deals specifically with the soviets, with the holding of sessions, and with meetings and the operation of the standing commissions and deputy groups. The work of the apparatus at the ispolkoms, and the bulk of all kinds of commissions, are managed by the appropriate departments of the Council of Ministers. As a result, the ispolkom gets into a very complicated situation: it is, as it were, a "servant of two masters." This, then, explains the shortage of time that the soviet administrators experience and—in the attempt to kill several birds with a single stone—the dissipation of efforts. Therefore this problem came to a head long ago. It was raised both by jurists and by practical workers. They proposed assigning presidiums locally, in the soviets. There were arguments about who should head them. The All-Union Party Conference has provided the answer. However, for the time being, only

the first step has been taken. Much that is unclear lies ahead. Obviously, the new laws governing elections and the local soviets will act as the regulators (these acts are currently being developed), and then the mechanism for this central idea will manifest itself completely and graphically. Apparently at the first session in 1989 we will have to adopt our Law Governing Elections. That will be preceded by nationwide discussion.

[Question] And thus democratization will receive new confirmation, this time legislative?

[Answer] Yes, because at the conference it was not by accident that one topic of discussion was assuring that the election of a first-rank party administrator to the position of soviet chairman will become yet another—and a completely democratic—checking of his competency and authoritativeness. As well as his popularity. And this also is of no small importance.

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Journalist on Issues Raised for USSR by Direct Broadcast Satellite TV

18300379 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 28-30

[Article by Rudolf Boretskiy, doctor of philological sciences: "TV from Outer Space: the Beginning of a New 'Information Era?'"]

[Text] For almost a year now the Polish press has carried stories on "outer-space" or "satellite" television. I put these words in quotation marks because the television, of course, is terrestrial; it is created in studios primarily in the USA and Western Europe. Outer space, or rather a "belt" of it with an orbit 36,000 kilometers from the surface of our planet, is a unique antenna-transmission field. From there and only from there the communication satellites which hover in that belt are capable of retransmitting programs received from television studios on earth; moreover, they produce a TV signal strong enough to make it possible to receive these programs, by-passing the state network, which chooses, shapes and consequently controls.

Reports, interviews with leaders of the mass media, scholars, "round tables" and discussions by experts are being published. They contain attempts to judge the degree of our preparedness for this innovation and to determine the reasons for viewer interest in it, as well as debates about the possible consequences. Here are some of the headlines which reflect the ambiguity of the developing information-propaganda situation and the attitude toward it: "Satellite TV Starts" "Are We Threatened with Satellite Colonialism?" "With a Dish on the Roof," "What Are Communication Satellites Bringing Us?" "Demon from Outer Space," etc.

And what is it that has taken place in the country of our closest Western neighbor, only a thousand kilometers from Moscow? The possibility of receiving programs retransmitted by Western European and American satellites was discovered in the Polish People's Republic (PPR) in the spring of last year. The number of such "outer space" programs now exceeds 20. Next year, according to certain forecasts, it is expected that this number will reach 30 or 40.

The abbreviation NTV (direct television broadcasting) appeared as early as the 60's, signifying the direct reception of programs from outer space by the television set in the home. Has NTV come to Poland? Yes, because in hundreds of homes "satellite" programs are already being received, something which I witnessed last year. No, because this "outer space TV" remains mediated: it requires a special parabolic antenna—a "dish" about 1.5 meters in diameter, a converter-transformer and other "small parts," that is, an intermediate apparatus between the satellite and the receiver. The cost fluctuates within the range of 1,500-2,000 rubles. More than 500 permits have been issued for the installation of these individual antennas, and the State Radio and Television

Inspectorate is considering about 1,000 applications. (A clarification is essential here: obstacles to the issuing of a permit may include the creation of interference for other television viewers, a building's unsuitability for the installation of antennas and other, as a rule, technical reasons).

But that is today. And what is the prospect for the near future? How does the "potential audience" react to "outer space TV?" Here are the data from a survey carried out by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the PPR Committee on Radio and Television (they were cited in the No 6, 1987 issue of the Polish magazine REPORTER). The following were "very interested" in outer space TV programs: 35 percent of 16-29 year-olds; 27 percent of 39-49 year-olds; 22 percent of 50-59 year-olds; 12 percent of 60-year olds and over. There were approximately twice as many men as women in this group. Thirty-eight percent of those questioned expressed "moderate interest." Citizens with secondary or higher education predominated.

Even more curious is the range of preferences expressed for various types of programs. In first place were entertainment programs (40 percent), then sports programs (37 percent), scientific-popular and cultural-educational programs (11 percent) and in last (!) place were information and public affairs programs with a total of only 5 percent. The low level of interest in information programs from abroad indicates satisfaction with their own information, with the reliability and completeness which have been characteristic of the PPR press since 1981.

A market for the necessary equipment is developing at a fairly rapid rate in the PPR. At present the standard equipment (the "Sapora" brand, for example) can be purchased in stores only for convertible currency. At the same time their own craftsmen are learning to produce antennas, converters and cables, and the first private workshop-cooperatives have appeared.

Polish sociologists and researchers in the mass communications field are noting the emergence of an unexpected trend. Some of the recent video enthusiasts (and in Poland they include one out of every eight or nine families) are inclined to reject their recent pastime in favor of "outer space TV." That is, they are prepared to sell their video equipment along with their collection of cassettes in order to acquire the equipment for satellite TV.

I have gone into such detail on the situation which is developing in the PPR because interpreting and dealing with this new phenomenon in the sphere of mass information and culture is becoming a top-priority task for us; even today it is turning from an abstract and prognostic task into a concrete-practical one.

With a certain amount of imagination (may the strict technicians forgive us this liberty!) one may consider that the history of outer space TV is 30 years old. That is

as long as the exploration of outer space. The first artificial Earth satellite, our "Sputnik 1" of 4 October 1957 opened up the possibility of global outer-space communications. And the "Telestar" and "Molniya" satellites only made that possibility concrete, they gave it objective form, so to speak. The changing generations of technical means followed one another (and today they continue to follow each other); this process includes quantitative growth in the power of the signal, as well as the search for optimal orbits and reliability. The equipment has advanced steadily from satellite-antennas which operated in conjunction with complex and expensive ground facilities, to powerful "outer-space telecenters" which can bring TV programs to the planet's inhabitants immediately and on a universal basis. Thus arose the idea of a worldwide communications system, the tempting but contradictory prospect of "world TV."

It would seem that is is precisely the contradictory and ambivalent nature of this idea in our divided world rather than technological or financial factors which have been paramount in holding it up. After all, the equipment—especially with regard to the spiritual sphere—is derivative and secondary. What is primary is the goal and the content for which the equipment acts as a means of transmission. A need arises here for scientifically-based forecasting and prognostication. The blind and expensive method of trial and error is not in any way appropriate here. It is all the more unforgivable when the interests of ideology and politics are concerned, when an incursion into the sphere of social psychology, social pedagogy and culture is planned.

A bibliography of foreign publications devoted to the study of worldwide TV lists many hundreds of titles. Included in this literature are many books, brochures and publications of a deeply propagandistic nature, which are openly hostile to the world of socialism. In the 60's they developed the idea of outer space as an "ideological battlefield in the 'cold war.'" Today publications of this kind frequently present NTV as an inalienable part of "star wars."

But there are also serious scientific works which deserve careful attention. They include the paradoxical essays by the Canadian scholar M. McLuhan and works by the American researcher of mass communications V. Schramm, and the strictly scientific predictions—unexpected for a writer of science fiction—by the Englishman Arthur C. Clarke, which have already been confirmed by experience. And there is still a very large quantity of applied research (sociological, socio-psychological, program-political, esthetic, etc.). As we see, the NTV phenomenon is growing into a problem of global significance. After all, we are talking about human consciousness, and moreover on a planetary scale!

And the question arises here with complete inevitability: why has our country, which opened up the era of outer space to the world and which has achieved indisputable technical-technological heights, not published a single serious work containing an insightful analysis of this phenomenon?

Of course, it would be incorrect and unfair to claim that no such attempts were made. Timid and isolated attempts, perhaps, but they were made. As early as the late 60's this problem was touched upon by some of our most far-sighted engineers who attempted to go beyond a narrow technical vision (V. Makoveyev, for example), and by some of the leading people in TV who attempted to remove themselves from the day-to-day problems of programming (G. Yushkyavichyus, for example). And even the author of this article put forward—in those same years—a proposal to establish a research group to study future NTV problems. But times changed, and beginning in the early 70's this topic disappeared (at least as a subject of open research) and became "taboo." The only official document of those times was a unique "safe conduct" for NTV—a project of the International Convention on Satellite Television, presented by the USSR to the UN General Assembly in 1974. But this document, which was quite constructive in principle, for the most part touched on only one aspect of a multi-faceted problem, and that aspect was international law. As an object of comprehensive research from the positions of science and creative practice, satellite communication—a harbinger of worldwide TV—ceased to exist in the 70's.

Several reasons for this can be seen. And, of course, the reasons were not only subjective ones, which depended on the leaders of USSR Gosteleradio (State Committee on Radio and Television of the USSR Council of Ministers) at the time, who pretended that the problem simply did not exist. The main reason, it would seem, is that the perspectives opened up by NTV were viewed and judged in our country primarily as a threat. And there is a sufficiently valid explanation for this. It includes the sad experience of international radio broadcasting (especially the "radio wars" of Nazi Germany), the genuinely universal scope of every possible "voice" during the "cold war" period, and the growing expansion of "information imperialism." (As is well known, the giants of that imperialism such as Associated Press, UPI, France Press and Reuters today supply about 80 percent of all the news with which the Western mass information and propaganda media inundate the planet every day. Nor should the completely objective threat to national cultures be ignored. The well-known Polish scholar and propaganda theoretician, Professor Leslav Voytasik, called the post-war deformation of Japanese culture a "clinical example" of a socio-cultural threat: 40 centuries of national self-development and then 40 years of Americanization, which have changed the uniqueness of Japanese culture into unrecognizability.)

Finally, the definite lag in the development of the technical means of information must be included among the reasons for the emergence of the "threat concept" and the "closing off" of NTV problems in our country, which one may suppose lay behind the concept. (Here it is instructive to recall the by-no-means-inspiring experience with the dissemination of video in our country or the virgin territory of cable TV). That is a short list of the

main reasons which led to the neglect of the true meaning and genuine content of the problems of outer space TV, and which for a good decade and half paralyzed the creative search for optimal prognostic decisions.

Today outer space TV has come to our nearest friends and neighbors. It is at our Western boundaries. Today satellite TV still requires extra equipment. Tomorrow it will come directly onto the screen of home television sets, and there will be no time for unhurried reflection and long discussions. A reality is emerging which requires immediate decisions. Is it not better to prepare ourselves for them today, without delay?

The problems are too numerous to list. There is the many-fold increase in the sources of information—the limitless expansion of choice for the public. It means that even now it is essential to do a preventive study of the public's expectations, preferences, judgments and tastes. This is a combination of the specialized, individual consumption of information (video or "subscription" cable TV) with universal, global dissemination through communications satellites. It means that even now it is essential to develop video stocks and cable TV systems as alternatives (or more accurately as supplements?) to NTV. And, finally, there is the main problem, which is to discover how diverse television programs can co-exist on one screen. Everything is interwoven and melded together into a still unknown form of TV with many faces, which is already appearing on the horizon. And when it becomes reality, the general task will be to create those conditions which will provide the opportunity to maintain the dominant position of our state television on the screen and to preserve its audience.

Nonetheless, behind the multitude of problems which NTV poses, there is one which is probably the most significant. This problem is journalistic in its nature and very essence. Even now one can foresee that the mass development of new forms of television—video, cable, NTV—will lead to a situation in which the most tangible losses will be felt primarily by the artistic-entertainment division of the state TV channel. Let us recall the data from the poll of the Polish audience or the experience with the development of our domestic video, experience which is modest as of yet but already provides grounds for generalization. The viewer's choice concurs: in first place lies a fiction film or a variety entertainment program. This is, so to speak, for home programming. But what will be left for state programming? What will be the main course of its existence and development when the new "information era" dawns?

In a low-circulation publication, which only a handful of specialists read, the author of this article wrote 12 years ago (in an author's dissertation abstract): "One can

foresee that the blank spots in programming which are developing as a result of the curtailment of the entertainment division will be filled mainly by documentaries and other forms of screen journalism. It is clear that regular TV, which exists side by side with new forms of individual choice and 'home programming,' is becoming increasingly oriented toward reality, reviving the forms and style of 'direct' (reporting) television." The bases of this revival are already present in our programs, and in quite convincing form ("Search—Problems—Resolution," "Good Evening, Moscow," etc.). But if one looks ahead, this is still a precondition for the establishment of state TV in an information-propaganda system. As for entertainment programs, it is clear that they will increasingly acquire the form and style of "live action" with audience participation, similar to, let us say, "Musical Ring" or "Around Laughter."

In an epoch of widespread glasnost and the consistent development of democracy it is possible and necessary to shift one of the greatest achievements of human genius—direct satellite television—into the realm of new judgments and concepts. It is necessary to become aware of NTV as a unique opportunity to tell the world about ourselves, to show our country and our life "in the forms of life itself." The situation, as they say, is working for us: today news about events in the USSR, including our perestroika, are the focus of attention from even hostilely-inclined information organs. It is necessary to work persistently and patiently, in a documented and convincing way, to break down the false stereotypes of consciousness created and nurtured by propaganda unfriendly to us. And it is difficult to imagine a medium which is more promising or more suited to such a task.

I think that the circumstances of the emergence and development of satellite TV in the country of our friends and neighbors must be viewed as a possible model for our future. Even now—without postponing this matter until tomorrow—it is necessary to draw to it the attention of those organizations which will have the job of providing the ideological, creative and technical basis for our ability to compete in the face of NTV. I am convinced that today it is essential to create a research center, staffed with specialists possessing a range of skills, whose formulations and recommendations will help the departments of USSR Gosteleradio to prepare for the new information situation in a reliable manner. And, in my view, the initiative in the creation of such a center must come from the main interested party—Gosteleradio.

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Round Table on Impact of Perestroika in Ukrainian Media

18300383 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 5-7, 13-14

[Round-table discussion under "Questions in Party Leadership" rubric: "Tested by Democracy: 'Round Table' in Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"; first paragraph is ZHURNALIST introduction]

[Text] At the Communist Party Central Committee, PRAVDA correspondents held a discussion of the problems in restructuring the republic's press. Participating in the discussion were Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Yu. Yelchenko, L. Kravchuk, head of the Central Committee section for propaganda and agitation, newspaper editors, secretaries of party committees and editorial staff members.

Information for Thought. About 16,000 people, including almost 11,000 members of the Union of Journalists, are working for the newspapers, journals and publishing houses of the Ukraine. A total of 1,800 newspapers are published in the republic.

[Correspondent] Tell us, please, what is new in the Ukraine in the area of party leadership through the means of mass information and propaganda and how this is helping to increase their effectiveness?

[Yu. Yelchenko] There has been an improvement in the selection of journalists and in their training and retraining and the people are better informed. Regular press conferences of members and candidate members of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and heads of ministries and departments for press workers have become part of the system. Analogous work is being done locally. Party authorities began to give the publications more help in fight struggle for efficiency. In the last 2 years alone, the Central Committee supported 12 critical and problem republic publications. Party obkoms examined more than 250 questions having to do with the work of the press. The social and welfare questions of press workers are now being resolved better.

[A. Zonenko, editor of the newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY] Today we are trying to be bolder in writing about subjects that we did not touch before. And the main thing is that we are seeing to it that there is a response to every critical word of the newspaper. The editor's office has established an effectiveness department. Here is concentrated all information on the responses to critical material and the department frequently has to remind the "silent ones" that the editor's office expects a practical response to the newspaper's statement. We regularly publish the rubrics "Returning to What Was Printed," "No Formal Responses Accepted" and "Frankly and Sincerely."

[Yu. Yelchenko] Many editor's offices send reminders similar to those about which you spoke only to party committees. But is this always the right thing to do? For there are also soviet, economic and trade-union authorities. And if the statement in the newspaper concerns them, then they, of course, are the ones who must respond to the newspaper. And there is something else. Through the mass media, we appeal quite a lot to perestroika and the newspapers are printing critical materials and receiving standard, banal and sometimes quite futile responses. How, then, can we obtain a more effective reaction to the statements of the press?

[A. Zonenko] We have, in particular, serious complaints against the Zhitomir Party Obkom and personally against its first secretary, V. Kavun. At the start of the year, the newspaper published the critical article "Going Through Official Channels" on the bureaucracy in some oblast organizations. Several times we reminded the obkom of the necessity of responding to this publication. We received many comments on the material, selected some of them and sent them to the first secretary of the obkom with the request that he read them and then comment in the pages of the newspaper. We agreed to disputes and polemics. If the counterarguments are convincing, we will accept them to. But much time has already passed and we have not heard a word from Zhitomir.

Information for Thought. On the eve of the "round-table" meeting, PRAVDA UKRAINY published the editorial "So Where Is the Response to the Criticism?" It specifically named the "silent ones"; for example, the Kirovograd Party Obkom did not answer the article "Elections Without...a Choice" for 7 months; the Volynskiy Obkom and Oblispolkom have not sent a response to the material "They Answered in Writing" in the last 4 and half months; the Odessa Obkom is in no hurry to respond to the article "Storm on Dry Land...."

[Correspondent] The attitude toward criticism in the press is an especially important matter. Let us continue the conversation on this....

[A. Zonenko] I call the Sumy Party Obkom, for example, and speak to its secretary I. Makukhin: Why are you not answering the newspaper? Four critical articles were published in your area and there has been no reaction to them. But he talks as if it were nothing.

[L. Kravchuk] And what if we look at this matter from the other side? I, for example, had to face the fact when the RABOCHAYA GAZETA criticized the Krivorog Party Gorkom because the first secretary of the gorkom and other city leaders have not dealt with the questions of domestic services for the population and conducted themselves improperly.

But the gorkom did not agree with all of its positions and informed the editor's office of this. It, however, delayed the printing of their response. Why? Because it was not

what the editor's office wanted to see. There was another matter involved in the case of Zhitomir. I advised the people there: do not delay, discuss the article. No, they kept silent. A kind of dead end resulted.

[V. Romanyuk, first secretary of the Vyshgorod Party Raykom]. Newspaper articles must be truthful and accurate. Prejudice and injustice greatly injure the individual or an entire collective. But there are also people who, although the material was truthful, still consider it unobjective....

[V. Mikhaylovskiy, secretary of the Kiev Party Gorkom]. The editor of VECHERNII KIEV V. Karpenko said that the editor's office sometimes got calls when critical material appeared: "Who sanctioned the critical article and who approved the publishing of the feature article?" The newspaper repeatedly wrote about serious shortcomings at the "Arsenal" plant. Every time, however, the enterprise managers perceived this as an insult and sent formal written responses to the editor's office. It was only after 9 months that the party committee finally gave a fundamental assessment of the situation at the enterprise. As for PRAVDA UKRAINY, I welcome its campaign for effective statements but I do not quite understand why the editor's office wants only the party gorkom to respond to any article having to do with Kiev.

[A. Zonenko] Because we are an agency of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Yu. Yelchenko] In my opinion, one must endeavor to get those with whom the newspaper article deals to respond to the editor's office. The main thing is to achieve an improvement in the work. As for the relations between Zhitomir Party Obkom and the editor's office of PRAVDA UKRAINY, both sides are incorrect, in my opinion. By the way, V. Kavun, member of the Central Committee, and Z. Zonenko, candidate member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, could long ago have "clarified relations" on a high-minded basis. As it is, one writes and the other keeps silent. This does not correspond to the spirit of the time.

Nevertheless, there are convincing examples of a businesslike reaction to press statements. The extensive discussion of the work style of the former heads of the Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk and Lvov oblast party organizations in PRAVDA and other central newspapers and the critical assessment of the instances of the incorrect attitude toward journalists here played a large role in eliminating shortcomings in party work. This is a serious lesson for all of us, including for the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

From the Report at the Congress of Republic Journalists:
"The editorial offices frequently receive responses acknowledging the criticism to be correct and reporting on

the measures taken but repeated checks reveal that nothing has happened. Most newspapers do not leave such managers alone and keep bothering them, trying to get a positive result."

[V. Zaruda, editor of the newspaper KYIVVSKA PRAVDA]. I think that the newspaper certainly must show persistence to obtain specific answers to its statements. The raykom secretary came forward at one of the conferences in the party obkom and declared that the editor was prejudiced toward Obukhovskiy Rayon—there had been 13 critical articles on it in the past year. We were pursuing a serious subject dedicated to the state of extracurricular work. And suddenly such a statement. What should we do? We discussed the matter in the editorial staff and decided to continue to speak out. The secretary of the raykom finally understood that we want to help the rayon and soon he himself was involved in the work.

[L. Kravchuk] Journalists and party workers must know how to organize their interrelations at a high-minded level. Unfortunately, what is frequently seen here is ambition and a morbid conceit on one side or the other. Typical in this connection was what happened in Bershadskiy Rayon of Vinnitsa Oblast. A conflict flared up between the newspaper and party raykom on the basis of the abnormal relations that had arisen between the editor and the first secretary of the raykom. The secretary thought that the newspaper is exaggerating in its criticism and the editor repeated that the raykom is suppressing the newspaper. The result was that they stopped inviting the editor to meetings of the party raykom bureau.

[V. Zaruda] Any editor's office, whether it be of a rayon, oblast or republic newspaper, must work in close contact with the party committee. The success of our articles, in particular, on Stavishchenskiy and Brovarskiy rayons was achieved precisely because of such contact. Close mutual understanding with many party committees allows us to refrain from special reminders, a form that in itself appears to be far from the best.

[L. Kravchuk] Yes, the cases of reminders are simply anecdotal. The Smelyanskiy Rayon newspaper CHERVONYI STYAG published the article "Cart Before the Horse" that criticized the republic's Ministry of Construction because it is not properly getting the plans to the local construction trust. Deputy Minister V. Plitin sent a response to the editor's office on the measures taken. But this, it turns out, did not satisfy the editor's office. It thought that the minister had to send the response without fail and wrote him a letter: "After reminding you repeatedly...we ask you personally to give the editor's office a specific answer." Moreover, this letter hinted that they may complain to the Central Committee....

[A. Shestopalov, editor, of the Kozeletskiy Rayon newspaper LENINSKY SHLYAKH in Chernigov Oblast]. It was said here that there are some managers who are not yet correctly interpreting glasnost and that not everywhere are they establishing the conditions for effective press work. Here, in Kozelets, for example, a conflict arose with the rayispolkom. Afterwards, as we presented the decree of the raykom bureau on the page, in which mention was made of the ispolkom of the rayon soviet, its chairman A. Kamenetskiy summoned me and declared: "You understand that you are undermining my authority! You should have called and worked it out...."

Then something else similar happened. Speaking at the plenum of the party raykom, I said that we have administrators who suppress criticism and, appealing to the chairman of the ispolkom, I proposed: "Instead of calling people on the carpet, it would be better for you to go to the editor's office and take an interest in how the collective is getting along and write to us at the newspaper." My words did not please the rayon authorities. There was a sense of pressure on the editor's office from the rayispolkom and its services, including the police. It became significantly more difficult to work....

[A. Zonenko] I think that you should have immediately reported all of this with good arguments to the secretary of the party raykom and informed the raykom bureau.

[A. Shestopalov] We reported it. We got verbal support but the situation did not change. The party obkom also knows about what happened. Its first secretary L. Palazhenko said to look into it at the bureau. But no one did.

[V. Romanyuk] The case under discussion is extraordinary. I worked as chairman of the rayispolkom and I think that such an attitude toward an organ of the press is inadmissible. Our party committee is showing serious concern about its rayon newspaper. In agreement with the party obkom, we began to issue it twice a week. The Saturday issue has eight pages and the Tuesday issue four. This made it possible for journalists to devote more time to materials. The newspaper's circulation increased significantly in the last 2 years. It has become customary that some one from the party raykom is present without fail at the urgent meetings in the editor's office. The work of the sections of the editor's office is always coordinated with the work of the raykom.

[Correspondent] But let us note that even now it is sometimes not easy for a critical journalist to work. Here is one of the letters received by the editor's office of ZHURNALIST. It is from Ivan Grigorevich Garkavchenko from Donetsk.

"For exactly 20 days, from the 3rd through the 23rd of December 1987, I worked as a correspondent for the rayon newspaper ZNAMYA TRUDA of the city of Volnovakha

in Donetsk Oblast. They did not allow me to work any longer there. The editor did not publish the materials that I did. And as a result, they suggested that I leave 'on my own volition'...why?"

The answer was simple: "Your materials are too critical and are not suitable for our rayon newspaper. They are more for oblast and central newspapers. Write your statement 'on my own....'"

So it is. It turns out that for a rayon editor a newspaper is like his own estate. If I want to publish something I will, if I do not, I will not. I will provide work when I want to and dismiss people when I want to! But my materials were needed by the people for whom they were done! But neither the editor nor his deputy understood this and they asked me to leave the newspaper.

Then, a little later, those materials that were rejected in Volnovakha were published in the republic RABOCHAYA GAZETA and in our oblast newspaper RYANSKA DONECHCHYNA.

On 18 January, I began to work for another rayon newspaper, MAYAK in Krasnoarmeyskaya Donetskaya Oblast. There I did several reports and published them. They are letters from one enterprise: "When Subcontractors Interfere" (3 February), "Cost Accounting and Lost Millions" (6 February), and "Cost Accounting and the Worker's Conscience" (9 February).

But because of the reports and their necessity, they again dismissed me, this time under Article 28 of the Code of Labor Laws of the Ukrainian SSR, as a person "who did not pass the trial period." This label "who did not pass" was attached to me at the will of those "above" who did not like my report "Cost Accounting and Lost Millions." And the result was the lightning reaction: "dismiss under Article..." on 16 February....

I am 46 years old. I have a higher education. I graduated from Kursk State Pedagogical Institute. I studied at the Literature Institute imeni A.M. Gorkiy. I have been working in prose for years. But this is how things turned out at the newspaper....

After my "Volnovakha" dismissal, I talked with A.V. Rudenko, an instructor in the sector for the press, television and radio of Donetsk Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party. I was hoping for his assistance but heard only the words: "We know about the situation in the Volnovakha newspaper but...we cannot do anything, because this editor and this line of his suit the local rayon leadership."

But this line is observed in the best traditions of the stagnant years: "As if nothing happened!"; "Do not show yourself," etc.

The editor's office of the oblast newspaper RADYANSKA DONECHCHYNA supported me. It made me its public correspondent. It is publishing my materials and ordering new ones, which I am doing. But to be a public correspondent means to have sporadic earnings. And I have two children...."

[R. Reznikova, department head of the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBASS] Yes, it is sad story. One wants to help such a person.

[L. Yaroshenko, department head of the newspaper INDUSTRIALNOYE ZAPOROZHYE] We certainly must help each other if we want to act in the spirit of perestroika.... There has been an increase in the number of letters coming in and the editor's office has established a new department for social problems, which deals with questions of housing, public health, trade and everyday life. But to explain better what is bothering people, we did a survey dedicated to social justice. We strive to consider different opinions and publish them in the information and discussion issue KONTAKT, which we publish twice a week. They reflect the urgent questions of the day. We also give editorial comments.

Returning to the reaction, I want to say that the party obkom gives us all kinds of assistance. The rubric "Resonance" was introduced for responses. Every day we publish up to six materials under this rubric. Many comments are coming in on the publications of the rubric "Manual Labor on the Shoulders of Machines" about the introduction of cost accounting and the transition to self-support and self-financing.

[V. Zaruda] A characteristic sign of our days is the increased number of responses not only to critical materials but also to reports on positive experience. The report, for example, on how seven people in Belotserkovskiy Rayon took 15 hectares of land and produced a record harvest of vegetables on them evoked many letters. Next year the link intends to supply the entire rayon with vegetables from its plot. At one of the sovkhozes of Zgurovskiy Rayon, it was decided to introduce the family contract for raising animals but the farm management did not accept the agreement. We spoke out for this reason. The obkom bureau supported our criticism and, on the basis of this publication, an analysis was made of the situation in the oblast as a whole and recommendations were made.

[Reznikova] And I will tell of still another feature of these days in our professional life: we in the editor's office began to select the department heads. The departments became larger. Previously we had eight of them, now there are four. All creative workers participated in the elections.

FROM RABOCHAYA GAZETA: "Whereas in the Transcarpathian, Donetsk and Zaporozhe oblasts they have begun to practice the competitive filling of vacancies in editorial staffs, there are simply not enough journalists

in other places. In practice, the editorial staffs of the newspapers of Vinnitsa Oblast are not being filled with students from the journalism departments of the universities of Kiev and Lvov. Not many of them are being assigned in the Zhitomir area. Not even half of newspaper workers being contracted have a special education in journalism."

[Correspondent] The attitude of party committees toward their newspapers has an effect, of course, on the frame of mind of journalists. What effect does it have?

[Reznikova] Party authorities have begun to support the newspaper articles. This, of course, improves our frame of mind. Just recently in Donetsk Oblast, more than 50 publications received the support of party committees. The mail to the editor's office was reviewed at the meeting of the obkom bureau. Locally they are now paying more attention to the signals of working people that SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBASS is printing. The rubric "Perestroika: Work, Ideas, Proposals" is basically made up of readers' letters. We are publishing critical letters more often. We are also trying, of course, to provide material on the experience of perestroika, on its "foremen." As always, a flier sent out to subscribers asked them how they would like to see the newspaper in the future.

[L. Kravchuk] The new demands being imposed on the press are putting the further improvement of newspaper personnel on the agenda. This year we have already carried out three group seminars for the workers of rayon newspapers. Courses for raising the qualifications of the editors of city and rayon newspapers have been organized in the Higher Party School under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. They collected about 300 questions from newspaper editors, grouped them according to subject, drew inferences and produced a document reflecting the needs of the rayon press. It is significant that the first group of questions has to do with transport, gasoline and housing. About 1,000 journalists at the level of department heads of rayon newspapers are in urgent need of apartments.

From the Report at the Plenum of the Republic Union of Journalists: 140 editorial staffs of rayon and city newspapers are in unsuitable premises. The working conditions of local journalists are especially poor in Snezhnoye, Krasnyy Liman, Melitopol, Izmail, Kotovsk and Belsorod-Dnestrovsk.

[Correspondent] The personality of the contemporary journalist or editor is a very current question. It is probably worthwhile to discuss it.

[L. Kravchuk] After housing and everyday life, as the survey shows, the editors are very concerned about the question of the relations between journalists and raykom workers. We talk a lot about the personality of the contemporary secretary of a party committee or director but we keep silent about editors, many of whom, in

particular, are short on political culture. There are among them those who do not read books and do not watch films. Such an editor is outstripped in culture by his subordinates and he is supposed to be a well-educated intellectual whose authority is regarded by all in the rayon.

[R. Reznikova] If we are now talking about raising the role and authority of the editor, does it not seem abnormal to you that in the Ukraine there are few editors who are members or candidate members of the party raykom buro? Here in Donetsk, for example, not a single editor of an oblast newspaper is a member of an obkom buro and there are only three buro members among city and rayon editors.

[V. Zaruda] In this meeting, I would like to find out how the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee reacted to the report on the newspaper SILSKI VISTI in the ninth issue of ZHURNALIST last year? Quite a lot of time has already passed and the editor's office of the journal has not received a response from the Central Committee.

[L. Kravchuk] The article "The Collective Defended the Editor" printed in JOURNALIST basically correctly raised important questions about the management of the press and revealed certain shortcomings in the style of our work. They are now the focus of attention of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. At the same time, there was much in the article that evoked questions from us and the journalistic public. It seems that there has been a certain distortion of the discussion of the problems from the constructive to the personal plane and that there has been an attempt to reduce everything to the persecution of the editor by Central Committee workers. But this is not quite the case. The newspaper still has its shortcomings and unresolved problems, as does the editor, I.V. Spodarenko. And the Central Committee has a right to point out these shortcomings to its newspaper. This must be perceived correctly and without arrogance, which naturally does not rule out discussions and the exchange of opinions. This is our point of view.

[Correspondent] But it was certainly necessary to bring it to the attention of the editor's office of ZHURNALIST

in time. It is quite abnormal when the editor's office does not receive a response to a critical article within a year. For it is not the only one waiting for a response—the readers are waiting too.

[Yu. Yelchenko] The documents of the most recent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee noted repeatedly: press material, the familiarization with the local situation, and the incoming information indicate that the development of glasnost and the democratic spirit is not proceeding easily, is even painful in places. We have that in our republic as well, as indicated by the mentioned fact. Much needs to be corrected and the best needs to be promoted to raise the role of the mass media and propaganda means on the threshold of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

IN SUMMARY. As the conversation showed, much of what is holding perestroika back is in ourselves. There are still many sharp corners in the work of the Ukrainian press. Journalists are running into them and readers are writing about them.

Take, for example, the level of criticism. As the authors of letters in PRAVDA and ZHURNALIST think, it is still not high in the pages of the republic press. The newspapers report on details and carefully pass over some major and serious problems in party and economic management. The reaction to critical reports is unhealthy.

In the course of the conversation, the question was raised about what is new recently in the party management of the Ukrainian press. The responses indicate that clearly there is still too little of what is new. Is this not the reason why the press of the republic, just as almost the entire local press, lags noticeably behind the central newspapers? One of the main lessons of glasnost is perhaps that some local workers declare their support of it but prefer to pursue matters in the old way and are reluctant to meet the demands of democratization and real renewal. Meanwhile, it is time for them to shift from declarations to action and to restructure their own work in fact rather than in words.

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Volga German on Wartime Experiences in NKVD Construction Camp

18300370a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Edward Ayrich, personal pensioner, CPSU member since 1940: "In the Difficult Years of the War." Towards the Plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee: To Instill the Culture of International Relations. First paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] In the years of the Great Patriotic War most of the Soviet population of German nationality—men and women alike—worked on the labor front. They were members of the work army. Up until now this topic has been closed for discussion in our press, although these people worked selflessly in the name of victory over the enemy.

As a former political leader at the construction of the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant in the Northern Urals, I would like to share some of my recollections.

I spent my childhood on the Volga, in the large rayon center of Mariyental. When fascist Germany treacherously attacked our Homeland, my comrades and I expressed our feelings about these events on the evening of 22 June at the town meeting of the Markshtadt workers. We announced our desire to enlist in the ranks of the Red Army so that we could fight against fascism with weapons in our hands.

From one day to the next we waited, along with the other volunteers, for our orders from the military commissariat. However, fate had something different in store for us. In accordance with the Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 28 August 1941, my family and I found ourselves in Krasnoyarsk Kray, and soon after that our echelon moved to the Northern Urals, where we spent many years in the dreary taiga building an industrial giant for the production of aluminum, which was called the NKVD BAZstroy. Here we experienced all the bitterness of the degrading position of an innocent person under camp conditions. Yet a good number of us were communists and Komsomol members.

The communists were faced in all seriousness with the question of how to organize party-political and organizational work under extraordinary conditions, when the feeling of annoyance and bitterness was so great. After all, the people around us were very different in age, in life experience, and in political maturity. With rare exceptions, none of them had worked in construction prior to the war.

We had to put our own party ranks in order. Those with weak wills and those who had lost heart had to make way for the new members who were capable under the most difficult conditions to take up the burden of responsibility for the fate of the 10,000-man collective.

We had to find a means of working with people and to decide in principle under what motto, under what slogan we would work. After all, they tried to impose the idea on us that we had to absolve our guilt before the Homeland with honest labor. But what guilt?

The group of communists taking the initiative announced at the meeting with the construction political section chief that, as USSR citizens, we wanted to fulfill our duty to our Homeland with dignity and to work under the slogan of "Everything for the front, everything for Victory!" We also had to improve our living and working conditions, to build additional barracks to house our people by our own efforts after work and in our rare days off. We had to embark upon the organization of our own subsidiary farming, facilitate the conditions of living and transporting the labor army members to work, and finally, achieve the status of being addressed with the words: "Comrade labor army worker," and not simple "labor army worker," as was the custom.

We must pay our due to the chief of the political section, who listened to our proposals with great attention and approved many of them. Several detachments were created according to the production principle. In ours there were around 6,000 labor army members who worked in the industrial zone in motor and railroad transport and on the construction of the commune city. Column political leaders were named, and I, a 23-year-old at the time, was one of them. Detachment party and Komsomol organizations were created.

All the construction sectors began to work in a shock-like, front-line manner. Often we did not leave our work stations for days at the sites of timber cutting, laying railroad access ways, construction of timber-cutting, brickmaking and repair-mechanical plants, temporary power station, warehouse buildings and many enterprises for the production of building materials. However, the most intensive work was at the rock quarry and in the construction of the fill dam made of rubble on the Turya River, which was to provide water supply to the future plant and city.

We had no construction machines. The only labor tools we had were the crow-bar, miner's hack, sledge-hammer, pick, shovel and wheelbarrow. Under these most difficult conditions the people performed a great feat—by the spring flood time of 1942 a dam and railroad access routes were built. This ensured the continued successful course of construction work at all the other facilities.

The summer of 1942 proved to be difficult in all respects. Alarming news came from the front. From home they told us that women were being mobilized into the labor army.

Here, in construction, we were working with our last efforts, but by fall we had to erect the main facilities under roof. The winter, with its bitter Urals frosts, was

not far away. The work was performed in a continuous conveyer—the ditch diggers barely had time to dig the foundation pits, while the carpenters were already laying the molding. The fitters appeared here too. They were hurried along by the concrete placers. As soon as the foundation was finished, the installation of the equipment began, without even waiting for the walls to be erected. However, this equipment had come from evacuated plants and was unassembled and partially damaged. Here, innovative thought and working savvy were needed.

Under conditions of such competition the brigade movement "On the front watch" was born. Perpetual Red Banners were awarded for high production indicators. At the repair-mechanical shop, at the auto repair shop, in the railroad shops, and in sections of Uralektromontazh a movement of Stakhanovites and thousand-percent men developed. These workers fulfilled daily production norms of from 200 to 1000 percent. Comrades Breytigam, Erlich, Obgolts, Pfundt, and others became thousand-percent men.

It was necessary to improve the food situation. We took up the creation of subsidiary farming where we could grow our own potatoes, cabbage and carrots. The land for plowing had to be torn away from the taiga. First we had to fell trees, then uproot stumps. We plowed individual pieces of land. But in the fall we already gathered our first harvest!

The second year was already more successful. Gradually our so-called 11th agricultural section became one of the best subsidiary farms in the Northern Urals.

In the spring and summer of 1942 we build barracks by an unusual means. In the evening after work each brigade would carry on its own shoulders the necessary building materials to the detachment, and during the day the night shift and all the service workers joined in the construction. What effort was needed so that the construction of housing could be finished by winter... We also built a bath, a kitchen and a clubhouse.

However, the concern for the Red Army was of primary importance for us. The majority of us had performed military service before the war, and many came from active duty straight to us, the labor army. For holidays we always gave up 200 grams of bread from our meager bread rations, so that the flour saved could be used to bake cookies to be sent as presents to the front.

The enthusiasm of the BAZstroy labor army was especially apparent in collecting funds for weapons for the Red Army. We collected 353,785 rubles for building tanks and 1,820,000 rubles for the construction of a squadron of airplanes. After that we received a telegram of thanks from Stalin: "I send to the workers, engineering-technical workers and employees of German nationality working at BAZstroy, who collected 353,785 rubles

for the construction of tanks and 1,820,000 rubles for the construction of a squadron of airplanes, my fraternal greeting and the thanks of the Red Army".

We did not hide our tears of joy at the meeting held on this occasion. This was the first official acknowledgement of our labor, our sincere desire to help the front, our desire to give our last efforts for victory over the enemy...

We worked with new inspiration at the primary start-up facilities.

And suddenly there arose the first alumina shop, the electrolysis shop, the TETs at the Volchansk coal deposits. There, in the marshy terrain, an entire city arose, and coal mining by the open pit method was organized.

The secretaries of the party organization of the first construction rayon and the TsTsstroy, comrades Polyakov and Boronin, came to our detachment quite frequently. Under their supervision we, the political leaders, organized front-line watches at the construction facilities, issued "lightning-express" and "combat sheets", and read the reports of the Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] during lunch breaks. Short discussions of the results of the preceding day's work and the upcoming tasks were always held during the day and night shifts. The political leaders performed extensive organizational work before the brigades went on the front-line watch. They dealt with questions of living conditions, medical services, organization of food supply, help to the weak, and personal questions of the labor army members. Thus, time went by and the results of our labor became ever more tangible.

All the enterprises producing building materials, the temporary power station, the assembly-mechanics shop, and all the pumping and compressor stations worked to their full capacity. Work was expanded on the construction of a second alumina and a second electrolysis shop. The construction of housing and social-cultural-domestic facilities for the future city of Krasnoturyinsk was in full swing.

The long-awaited Day of Victory came, and we had cause for a dual celebration: on 9 May 1945 the electrolysis workers of the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant poured their first metal castings, for which the builders and installers of the BAZstroy had worked so forcefully for all these long years. Many of the labor army members who worked on the construction of the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant received medals "For Outstanding Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

These awards summarized a very difficult period in our lives—the wartime period. Peacetime life began.

After the war I worked for 3 years at the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant. For 16 years I served as trainer at the children's sports school at this same plant. Since 1964 I

have been the senior trainer of the hockey team of the Alma-Ata "Dynamo." Here I became a USSR Honored Trainer, an Honored Cultural Worker of the Kazakh SSR, and was awarded the Order of Friendship of Peoples and two Honorary Certificates by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

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Historian on 'Mistakes' During Collectivization in Kazakhstan

18300370b Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by B. Tulepbayev, director of the Institute of Party History under the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences academician: "To Know the Past In Order to Remember About the Future"]

[Text] Probably never before has the interest in history, in the fates of individual personalities and entire peoples, been so great as it is in our time. And this is quite natural: man wants to know the past in order to understand the present, since the two are inseparable.

The editors of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA receive many letters asking us to tell about certain stages of development and formulation of the republic and individual moments in its complex history.

For example, Kherson resident I. V. Golovko (a native of Lugovoy Village in Kustanay Oblast) turned to the editors with the request to explain that truly dramatic situation which arose in Kazakhstan in the late 20's-early 30's.

"Winter came," the letter's author recalls that time, "all the horses were shot because they had glanders disease. The carcasses were hauled off to the livestock burial yard and the people were prohibited from using them for food because they were contaminated. But the people were starving. They went to the livestock burial yard, took the meat, (fortunately it was frozen and did not rot), and ate it. And they survived, while those who were afraid of the disease swelled up from hunger and died. Very many people died... Help us to get to the bottom of things: how could this have been allowed to happen?"

The article published below gives answers to these and a number of other questions.

The 3 years which separate us from April of 1985 have yielded much: the 27th Party Congress, the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the speech by M. S. Gorbachev, "October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues", as well as his speech at the February Plenum, "To Revolutionary Perestroika—the Ideology

of Renovation." These have all armed the historian with a Leninist understanding of the analysis and interpretation of historical processes and phenomena.

In light of all this, the party History Institute is reorganizing its activity. We understand that from the height of the present day it is necessary to interpret the sources and lessons of what we have been through and the changes taking place in the country, to expose and clearly show the past as a dialectical process in all its unity and multiplicity, its achievements and its shortcomings, as well as its contradictions.

This presupposes the persistent, forceful and critical work of thought, and requires time, talent and responsibility. Here we cannot get away with improvisation. We can understand the impatience of the public, the desire to read the unknown pages of our past as soon as possible. However, this cannot be a justification for hasty statements or for any hurried evaluations which may lead only to superficial conclusions which do not reflect the entire complexity of the occurring processes. "It is inadmissible," noted M. S. Gorbachev at the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "that instead of truly scientific studies we throw onto the general public some hasty conjunctures, which sooner confuse than illuminate the truth."

With consideration for the new content which is contained in a theoretical and political plane in the CPSU documents, we are today mobilizing our efforts to significantly accelerate and elevate to a qualitatively higher level the development of new problems, as well as those which have already been basically solved but require certain, sometimes considerable, corrections in accordance with the spirit of the time. We are striving to overcome the depersonalization of historical events and to solve the problem of the so-called "gaps" in history; to objectively define the place of Kazakhstan and its party organization in the USSR and the CPSU; to define and bring into scientific usage new sources and to critically re-interpret known documental materials. These goals are served in certain measure by the monographs published in 1987 by S. B. Baysembayev, "Lenin and Kazakhstan"; G. A. Kozlov, "Basics of Organization and Party Activity"; R. N. Melikova, "In a Single Rank"; the collected articles "Lenin's Envoys in Kazakhstan," "Fighters for Soviet Power in Kazakhstan," "To Think and Act in a New Way," and others.

The names of many fighters for the power of the Soviets and for the cause of socialism have been returned from oblivion. The public, which is interested in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan, is today being informed about the real contributions to the victory of socialism made by Turar Ryskulov, Mukhamedkafiy Murzagaliyev, and Seytkali Mendeshiev. The undeserved accusations and labels have been removed from Shakarim Kudayberdiyev and such a contradictory but leading personage as

Bakhitzhan Karatayev, Ivan Tomchuk, Serikkali Dzha-kupov, Alfred Chigovi, Vikentiy Boksha and others have been returned from historical "oblivion."

The main task of the collective of the party's History Institute is to prepare a new edition of the "Outlines of Kazakhstan Communist Party History", which would meet the current requirements for historical-party science. This is not an easy task.

The field of vision of the historians, in our opinion, should include questions of a new reading of the course of post-war construction, experience and lessons of reforms of the 50's-70's, and the development and functioning of the party and society in the 70's-early 80's.

A complex of problems deserves the particular attention of researchers of the history of Kazakhstan's party organizations. These problems include the solution of the national question in Kazakhstan, the formulation of the Kazakh socialist nation, and the affirmation of the ideology and practice of socialist internationalism in Kazakhstan. The study of the various aspects of these major problems must be conducted on an on-going basis.

We also see our task in coordinating the scientific research in the republic and orienting the efforts of party historians working in the higher schools toward the development of the above-mentioned problems. We must admit that everything is not in order here. We have already encountered such approaches in reviewing the themes of dissertation works. Many candidates for advanced degrees and their scientific advisors have still not been able to cast off the burden of outdated notions and stereotypes and to take a new look at the role and problematics of the study of the party.

Of all the problems of historical-party science, the topics of the Alash-Orda movement and the errors and extremes allowed in Kazakhstan in the period of collectivization, which are rather important for the present day, require immediate in-depth study and illumination.

The scientific community knows that the Alash-Orda was a counterrevolutionary, bourgeois-nationalistic state formation.

The illumination of the history of Alash-Orda began in the second half of the 20's. The Institute of Party History and the most prominent leaders of the Kazakhstan party organization did much to see that the workers learned the truth about the Kazakh bourgeois nationalists and their leaders. The brochure by A. Bochagov, "Alash-Orda", and the collection of documents under the same name edited by N. Martynenko, and later "The Outlines on the History of the Alash-Orda" prepared by S. Braynin and Sh. Shafiro, as well as a number of newspaper and journal publications exposed in general outlines the basic moments of the history of the Alash-Orda, which proclaimed Alash autonomy at the beginning of 1917 under the protection of the White Cossack sabers, and

created a government which fervently defended the interests of the feudal-landowner circles. All of the above-mentioned publications stated that the nationalists together with the white guard overthrew Soviet authority in a number of rayons, and tried to suppress the liberation struggle of the workers and undermine the transition to peace.

However, the studies on the history of the Alash-Orda movement did not avoid serious errors. They did not expose the ideological sources of the Alash movement, the peculiarities of formation of the Kazakh national bourgeoisie and national intelligentsia, and did not overcome the deeply erroneous notion about the supposedly progressive role of the Alash-Orda at this well-known stage of Kazakhstan history. It is specifically this which partially explains the fact that in the period of grouping the debaters unethically labelled their opponents as "national-deviationists" and "Alash-Orda followers." Often such a stigma was placed on certain honest writers, or leaders of the arts among the old national intelligentsia. There were many cases when such "characteristics" affected the fate of these people in the period of disruption of socialist law and order. This obliges the researchers to look very closely at these circumstances and to distinguish the true Alash-Orda followers from the supposed ones.

The facts also indicate that despite the decision by the VKP(b) Kazkraykom buro in 1935 regarding the preparation of a special study on this question, the topic of "Alash" and "Alash-Orda" in the research studies of historians very soon disappeared.

The course of historical development shows, and practical application confirms, that the insufficient development and hushing up of a complex problem in the course of socialist construction and the manifestation of negative phenomena in the history of Kazakhstan work against us. This in turn persistently demands that we understand all aspects of the past, that we perform an in-depth study from the class-party positions and that we broadly illuminate the socio-economic bases of the Alash movement, the ideological sources, the political platform, the experience and lessons of our party's struggle against the bourgeois-nationalistic ideology. This task takes on particularly current importance in connection with the CPSU Central Committee resolution entitled "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization on the International and Patriotic Training of the Workers."

The transition to a settled lifestyle and collectivization has great importance in the socio-political life of Kazakhstan. Many brochures, books, and individual research works have been written on these problems. Nevertheless, interest in these questions remains intense.

Unfortunately, the gross errors and extremes in the process of transition to a settled lifestyle and subsequently to collectivization did not receive sufficiently

complete and comprehensive illumination in the historical-party literature. This led to the formation of "gaps." Therefore, there is a persistent need for an in-depth scientific development of the question of the real relation between the objective and subjective factors which led to the tragic situation—the starvation and mass deaths of the people in Kazakhstan in 1931-1933. Scientists are called upon to tell us from the positions of historical truth what circumstances were directly associated with these dramatic events and who was specifically responsible for the situation which occurred.

The desire of many to more fully understand what really happened in those years is quite understandable. However, it is difficult to agree with the desire of certain researchers and journalists to resolve this question in a hasty, sensational manner, with hurried and superficial evaluations and conclusions which incompletely reflect their totality and complexity of the events which occurred.

Everyone is well aware of the fact that the strategic course toward the implementation of collectivization was adopted by the 15th VKP(b) Congress. Its implementation was called upon to put the small-scale peasant economy on the tracks of socialist development. In Kazakhstan the resolution of these questions was associated with the specifics of a transition to socialism, by-passing capitalism. It was necessary to overcome the vestiges of the patriarchal-feudal past and the nomadic method of managing the livestock raising economy, as well as the problems of everyday life and psychology associated with it. In the course of preparations and collectivization, the republic party organization implemented a series of major socio-economic and political measures. In 1926-1927, there was a re-allotment of the arable hay fields in Kazakhstan and land management was introduced. In 1928 the farms of 700 of the largest feudal landowners were expropriated. The confiscated livestock and means of production were handed over to the poor and to the first kolkhozes. Work on the transition of the nomadic economy to a sedentary lifestyle was also expanded in the republic, but this process had not been completed by the start of collectivization. This complicated the emerging situation even more.

The leadership of the VKP(b) Kazkraykom believed that enough had already been done in the republic to go from general democratic measures to socialist ones, i.e., collectivization. However, in reality this conclusion proved to be unfounded. The aul workers were not yet sufficiently prepared for collectivization within the deadlines which had been set. Nevertheless, speaking out at one of the meetings, Kazkraykom First Secretary F. I. Goloshchekin announced: "I have encountered the opinion that here the kolkhoz will progress more slowly than in other regions of the USSR. I consider this opinion to be incorrect."

Under his influence, the December (1929) Plenum of the VKP(b) Kazkraykom, which reviewed the questions of the five-year plan and cooperation of agriculture, wrote

that "it is necessary to comprehensively... stimulate the collectivization of livestock raising farms at the same rate as for grain farming... with the expectation of fully encompassing the population within one year," that we must "force mass collectivization of the poor and moderate livestock raising farms."

This decision pushed the local party and soviet organs to violate the principle of voluntary kolkhoz membership. Also, a clearly incorrect attitude toward the middle peasantry was allowed.

The forced socialization of all livestock, the hostile agitation of the bais that they must slaughter all their livestock before joining the kolkhozes, the low level of political consciousness of the aul sharuas themselves led to the situation where mass slaughter of personally owned cattle became widespread, accompanied by pilferage from kolkhoz herds. The 6th Kazkraykom Plenum noted that from 1929 through 1933 the herd size in Kazakhstan declined from 36-40 million head to 4 million head. The matter was complicated even more by the severe crop failure which gripped the Ukraine, the Povolzhye, the Urals, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This led to a sharp reduction in food resources in the country and in the republic. All these errors and extremes, the mass slaughter of cattle coupled with the crop failure, led to serious food shortages. The Kazakh working masses found themselves in a particularly difficult position. In a number of areas the bais were able to provoke the migration of over 300,000 livestock farms to other rayons and even to neighboring republics, which was accompanied by their even greater impoverishment, depriving people of all means of existence and dooming them to starvation and death. The agricultural production forces in Kazakhstan had suffered a serious decline.

By 1932 the situation in Kazakhstan had taken on an extremely tense character. Many communists understood this. Letters began to come in to the VKP(b) Central Committee and Kazkraykom from workers and prominent leaders of the republic, criticizing the gross errors in management of agriculture and the extremes in socialist reorganization of the Kazakh aul.

However, as U. Isayev, chairman of the Karelian Autonomous SSR Soviet of People's Commissars noted, all the signals were evaluated by F. I. Goloshchekin as "someone's desire to scheme against the leadership by means of popularizing its errors". He never did admit that there were gross errors in the work of the Kazkraykom, as well as in his own personal work. The republic party organization, unfortunately, did not find the strength to itself correct the errors which had been allowed. In connection with the clear failures and difficult situation which had arisen in Kazakhstan by the end of 1932, the VKP(b) Central Committee adopted the resolution, "On agriculture, and specifically livestock raising, in Kazakhstan." This resolution pointed out that "the tasks of the farm and village settlement may be

successfully fulfilled in the same measure as collectivization, only on the basis of voluntary widespread participation and independent action of the poor and middle masses themselves in the struggle against the bai order, in the struggle against right-wing tendency (nationalism, on this question) and 'leftist' turns."

On 21 January 1933 the VKP(b) Central Committee unseated F. I. Goloshchekin from the post of first secretary of the VKP(b) Kazkraykom. The prominent party-state leader L. I. Mirzoyan was sent to Kazakhstan to perform his duty, accompanied by a large group of experienced workers.

The republic party organization undertook the task of correcting the situation with bolshevist energy. The soviet state continued to give extensive aid to the workers of Kazakhstan. Considerable funds were allocated for the improvement of conditions for the nomadic herders, for the construction of housing, for the acquisition of livestock, and for the remission of seed loan payment. In 1932-1934 the republic received over 5 million centners of grain from the state in food aid. The kolkhoz farmers were given 956,600 head of livestock, including 549,400 sheep and goats. To strengthen livestock raising, the sovkhoses sold the kolkhozes 40,400 head of cattle and 126,000 sheep and goats. These measures had great significance in improving the material well-being of the aul workers and in the successful transition to a sedentary lifestyle and to collectivization.

The 6th Plenum of the VKP(b) Kazkraykom, which was held in July of 1933, most decisively condemned

Goloshchekin's faulty style of management. The speakers also seriously criticized the collective organs of party management—the kraykom buro and secretariat, I. M. Kuramysov, L. B. Roshal, Ye. Yernazarov, U. D. Kulumbetov and others. Acknowledging his errors, U. D. Isayev justly noted that all the members of the Kazkraykom buro bear serious guilt for what had happened.

It was stated at the Plenum that the miscalculations which occurred in the rates, means and forms of collectivization were "primarily the result of gross political errors and distortions allowed by the kray committee."

A brief presentation of the complex and tragic events of the early 30's in Kazakhstan requires further in-depth development, thoughtful analysis and objective conclusions.

The enrichment of the thematics of scientific research with consideration for the development of current historical-party thought and the demands of party practice, as well as the formulation of a series of new problems and a more in-depth approach to the development of the formulated thematic direction, their new interpretation from the standpoint of those positions which were defined by the 27th Congress—all this will make it possible to more broadly and fully utilize the experience accumulated by the party and to better understand the regularities of its development.

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Rybakov Describes Response to 'Children of the Arbat'

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[Interview with Anatoly Rybakov by Olga Martynenko]

[Text] It is August 1936 and Stalin is on his way to Moscow from his dacha. As his car sweeps along the deserted road, he muses on the fact that people in ancient times prostrated themselves at the sight of their lord and master. It was not to show their obedience but because the act excluded chances of an attempted assassination. A raised head was chopped off instantly!

These thoughts come to him following the first show trial of those implicated in the NKVD "Trotskyite conspiracy"—including Kamenev, Zinovyev, Bakayev, Yevdokimov (16 in all)—which unleashed the terror that carried off millions of lives.

This is one of the notable scenes in Anatoly Rybakov's latest novel "1935 and Other Years." It will appear in the literary magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV this autumn and excerpts will be published in OGONYOK.

The novel concerns itself with the preparations for and the machinery of this trial and is the sequel to the author's immensely popular "Children of the Arbat."

"Children" has had a print of 1,200,000 and that number will be doubled before the year's out. But the demand still outstrips the print run. Twenty-four companies, including amateur ones, have based stage productions on the book which is being published in 26 countries. While the author is naturally pleased with this success, he worries that it will lead readers to expect too much from the sequel.

Rybakov lives in the writers' village of Peredelkino near Moscow. The bird song and summer greenery were somehow out of keeping with what we discussed.

Some people wonder why the past should be raked up to bring back the blood-smeared shadows. They would rather forget it all and make believe it never even happened.

"Are you suggesting all these be dropped?" The author casts an almost hostile glance at me as he walks over to the shelf packed with thick folders labelled "Stalin and the War," "Tukhachevsky," "Varya," "Sharok," "Statistics"—files of his characters, sketches for his future novels.

His factual material comes mainly from newspapers of the 1930s and the letters of people who lived through those times.

Hew showed me one such letter, a dozen or so typewritten pages, each signed as if it were an official record. It comes from a former high official in the procurator's office and he writes: "I will soon appear before God, but before that I would like to appear before you..."

LETTERS

Rybakov is getting such letters by thousands and they bring him invaluable information, are a sort of a readers' referendum. They show 85 per cent support for Rybakov; 15 per cent are against his book.

Says the author: "Those against are not so much indignant at myself as at the authorities who they think should punish the writer and ban the book. The extreme example of this style is a xeroxed anonymous letter, as usual full of grammatical mistakes, urging me to repent by a specified date or else face physical destruction. The date has already expired."

Rybakov does not react to threats. He went through exile and the war, and says that the feeling of fear is biologically alien to him.

Another curious document is a letter from Nina Andreyeva. In her article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA she had alleged in passing that Rybakov had frankly admitted borrowing some ideas for "Children of the Arbat" from emigre publications. He immediately demanded that the newspaper answer where, when and to whom he had "admitted" that. Which ideas and from which sources had he borrowed? Nina Andreyeva's reply came after a two-month delay and it is really worthwhile citing at least this part of it: "A participant in one of last autumn's TV programmes, discussing books devoted to our recent historical past, said that you had not denied during your meeting with Moscow readers that you had used some foreign sources."

"The rest of her arguments are much of the same kind," laughs Rybakov. "I may add that I believe everyone is free to use any sources, including emigre sources, like the memoirs of Denikin, Vrangeli or Kerensky, as long as the facts are straight."

What is the author's reaction to criticisms which range from reproaches for the denigration of Stalin to blame for idealizing him?

"I accept all criticism if it does not contradict the truth. It's dishonest to blame some dark forces and their machinations and conspiracies for the abuses of our history."

"Nor can I accept Valentin Rasputin's advice which appeared in the press that I write about, for example, Stalin's henchman Kaganovich, rather than Stalin. By the same token I could suggest that Rasputin go ahead and write, say, about the tsarist politician Pushkevich."

'CADRE REVOLUTION'

But let's go back to the novel. The deep wound in our history, which Rybakov has touched, is still fostering. People continue to ask: how could lofty ideals and goals degenerate so ominously, how could a man for whom terror was an ordinary tool of government reach the very heights of power?

The author traces back the evolution of reasoning by Stalin who finally arrives at conviction in his own absolutism. Stalin reasons that everything potentially harmful to his power should be destroyed. Hence his "cadre revolution," the systematic replacement of those close to him, using the medieval methods of the inquisition. His principle is—everything that promotes the interests of the party and the state is ethical. The Party and the state is HIMSELF.

In particular terms the meaning of ethics is demonstrated by this story in the novel: the NKVD investigator Sharok asks a higher-ranking officer what kind of questions he has prepared for the coming grilling. "Questions?" the officer returns. "Here are my questions—this rubber truncheon."

"What should we make of our past?" I ask Rybakov.

"Unfortunately, history is unpredictable," Rybakov says.

"On my recent lecturing tour in the US they constantly asked me about the Stalin phenomenon. I replied: despite your Bill of Rights, the most democratic constitution at that time, signed in 1786, you tolerated slavery till 1865. There are some zigzags in the past of every country and every nation. I'm convinced that Stalin is but a tragic chance, that we had all preconditions for taking a different path. Helped on by the New Economic Policy (NEP), the country quickly overcame economic ruin and matched prewar standards—all without repressions and dispossessions of the kulaks (rich farmers).

"Stalin's scheming, perfidy and cruelty were helped by the absence in the country in those years of democratic experience in relations between Party members. The people in key positions had been through the Civil War and preferred commands to persuasion. For many of them NEP was an unacceptable tragedy, and they withdrew from the Party and shot themselves. When Stalin sent NEP to hell, many liked it.

"This is only one of many reasons, but as a novelist I am primarily interested in Stalin's personality, his views, deeds, the mystery of his power over people. His phenomenon needs an in-depth historical analysis. That is why I think it imperative to publish Roy Medvedev's fundamental book "Let History Judge," a remarkably honest and sober piece of research into the origins of Stalinism and its consequences."

WERE THE PEOPLE SILENT?

What category in his opinion did the people's attitude to the leader belong to—cause or effect? People in his novel were far from being silent: they shouted, applauded and urged for the execution of "enemies of the people." He shows how yesterday's accusers and executioners themselves became victims the next day. People forgot all sympathy because they were in the grip of a great, all-absorbing fear. To blame the crimes on everybody to make everybody blind to the facts—is also part of Stalin's insidious strategy. But why is it people so willingly refused to see?

"Yes, Stalin is our shared guilt and common misfortune. Admittedly, we shouted, applauded, there was a mass-scale psychosis, a hypnotic trance. Even after nothing threatened our lives, we voted to condemn or to expel other people. I think the greatest harm done by Stalinism to our society is of an ethical nature: we have unlearned to reason and feel.

"We must have the courage to face our past squarely, it lives on in us, good or bad. Good? The 19-year-old soldier lads fighting in the last war, their mothers who had to till the land, those who died in the war or who were tortured to death in the camps. The memory of them helped us survive to this day."

As a pioneer of books about Stalin in recent times, what does he think about the growing number of publications denouncing Stalin's personality cult?

"Most of them are serious and deep. But I see some written by people whose life has been quite all right yet who try to portray themselves as victims of the cult. You can't sensationalize the national tragedy, turn it into a fashionable subject or cash in on it. You must part with your past with dignity.

"I quite frequently hear calls for unmasking, condemnations and trials. Of whom? I'm not calling for forgiving and forgetting everyone and everything, but feelings of revenge and hatred are counterproductive. Those with a scrap of courage in them can come forward and repent publicly; those who are too afraid, let them repent in their heart, for we can't advance without moral cleansing."

But besides moral cleansing and repentance, doesn't he think that guarantees must exist, too? Civil courage must be protected by law. He's given a very good description of arbitrariness, but the first novel ends in January 1937.

"The number of facts is not as important as understanding them. The message of those dark years, of the innocent blood is that people living now and those who will live after us should know that arbitrariness under whatever pretext leads to degeneration."

New Film 'Risk-2' Admits Fuchs' Role in Soviet A-Bomb Development

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No 29, 24-31 Jul 88 p 11

[Article by Gennady Zhavoronkov: "A Prayer for Those Still Alive..."]

[Text] "Risk-2," a new two-part feature-publicistic film made by director Dmitry Borshchevsky and based on a screenplay by Natalya Violina, was premiered at the Udarnik Cinema in Moscow.

This is a very personal film. About everyone and for everyone with concern and hope. It's about World War III, which started when World War II was still going on. No one officially declared it. But undeclared, it hovers over the planet like a suffocating smog, reducing people to mental despair, self-immolation, fear and drugs, and shortening the life span allotted by nature.

Hiroshima was doomed long before 1945. It was doomed when the "genie," later to become known as nuclear energy, was created in the lab of the German scientist Otto Hahn. Its coming of age would be awaited with impatient, reckless hope, while it would be met by the world with horror and a feeling of doom.

In the first few minutes of the film we see little paper lanterns floating. Yellow, blue, red. They're floated every August 6 "since 1945." Each lantern represents the soul of a person killed in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Hundreds of thousands of little lanterns, hundreds of thousands of lives, all taken by this dress rehearsal for World War III.

The film "Risk" is a lament for them, and for all those whose little lanterns have yet to sail down the rivers of the world.

The murderous force of the genie, at Einstein's prompting, would be understood by Roosevelt, but would not be immediately appreciated by Russia or the Reich: Hitler would deport his best scientists of non-Aryan origin, the mania of Stalin's suspicion would bar many Soviet scientists from research; and the Russian nuclear genie would appear in the world six years after the American one.

Stills of the first postwar summer flash by—the first peaceful holiday in Red Square. On the rostrum we see Stalin, Eisenhower and Harriman. A holiday held a week after Hiroshima. Later Harriman would put down in his diary a prophetic phrase: "They think that the war is over. War is only just beginning." And this would prove to me mercilessly true.

The film "Risk" will return to our history (though posthumously, unfortunately) the name of a person who believed that he alone had made World War III impossible. In the West, the name Klaus Fuchs would almost become a dirty one for having stolen atomic superpower

from "Christ's children" and given it to the "chief demon"—to Stalin. Klaus Fuchs, a German physicist expelled by the Reich, working with a group of American nuclear scientists, secretly but disinterestedly passed on working blueprints to Russia. Later he would explain his position in court: "I restored the balance of power. Therefore things didn't come to war." And he added: "If democracy triumphs in Russia, Stalin will go down in history as a second Genghis-Khan." Nor did he doubt the correctness of his stand during his eight-year imprisonment or before his death a mere six months ago.

It would be wrong to believe that "Risk" is a film about the "parents of the genie"—most likely it is about its "educators": those who countered destructive energy with creative ones—reason, tolerance, and will. Those who in the excruciating chase to keep up with the leader did not allow themselves to give in to the temptation of settling accounts with each other. And the accounts already implied not just millions, but billions of lives.

With a particular insistence, the film calls our attention to moments when the opposing sides were ready to stop and extend a hand. Not to strike, but to shake. And each time mutual mistrust made them waver, and hide their hands again behind their backs.

A film of accusation? Yes! A film of despair? Yes! A film of hope? Three times yes! Because these feelings, having been reunited, make us hold our breath and not lose track of the film's logic.

The film has returned to us a truth without which we were thoughtlessly careless, unduly self-assured and tragically trusting.

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MOLODAYA GVARDIYA Round-Table Takes Critical View of Shatrov Play

18000560 Moscow MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88 pp 250-264

[Round-table discussion held by MOLODAYA GVARDIYA: "False Substitution. Social Scientists Discuss M. Shatrov's Play, 'Farther... Farther... Farther!'" First paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The participants in the round-table discussion held in Leningrad were: I. K. Smirnov, doctor of economic sciences, professor and department chairman at Leningrad University; V. I. Yermenko, candidate in philosophical sciences, docent, chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism at the Leningrad Institute of Soviet Trade imeni F. Engels; V. I. Kardashov, candidate in historical sciences, senior instructor at the Institute for Advanced Training of Leading Workers in Shipbuilding; A. M. Muravyev, candidate in historical sciences and docent at Leningrad University, and M. V. Popov, candidate in economic sciences and docent at Leningrad University.

M.V. POPOV. The plays of M. Shatrov on the Leninist theme have become a notable phenomenon not only in the cultural, but also in the socio-political life of our country. They have already influenced and are continuing to influence the minds not only of the youth, but also of the older generations in our society. The dramatist has shown enviable persistence, even forcefulness, in standing up for and broadly propagandizing his views. This active pursuit could only be commended were it not for the fact that the moral direction which M. Shatrov takes, that path along which he goes farther and farther, leads us away from an objective illustration of history. Individual deviations and distortions, naturally, could not and cannot help but evoke the objections of specialists in the field of Marxist-Leninist theory who recognize their responsibility for a truthful depiction of history and propaganda of not just any, but specifically of Lenin's ideas. And even the viewers who come to see the play about Lenin evidently want to find out what Lenin thought (or at least might have thought). They certainly do not want to be given, under the guise of Leninism, those ideas against which Lenin fought all his life.

We can only express bewilderment at the letter written by leading figures in theatre (many of whom staged Shatrov's plays or acted in performances of these plays) addressed to PRAVDA with the demand that, in essence, a prohibition should be placed on discussing plays prior to their staging on the basis that drama without a stage is like a soul without a body. [1] The power of art is great. People have faith in it, and we must justify this faith rather than exploit the excess trustfulness of the viewers. "The political ill breeding of Russians," noted V. I. Lenin, "is expressed, by the way, in their inability to seek accurate proof in controversial and important historical questions, in their naive trust of exclamations and exhortations, of assertions and oaths by interested parties" (Lenin, V. I. Collected Works, Vol 23, p 306). It is therefore no accident that in his Directives on Film Making V. I. Lenin directly stressed that "films of a propagandist and educational character should be given for proofing to old Marxists and writers, so that we do not have any repetitions of the unfortunate incidents where propaganda achieves reverse goals" (Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 44, p 360-361).

The polemics which have arisen today around the play "Farther... Farther... Farther!", though they might seem unexpected to many, actually do have a prehistory.

Twenty years ago, PRAVDA subjected the staging of M. Shatrov's play "30th of August" ("Bolsheviks") to serious analysis. It was noted that "the reading of the testimony by socialist-revolutionary Kaplan, who shot at Lenin at the Mikhelson Plant, was too drawn out in the play. There was too much repetition of irrelevant specifics, too much focus on secondary details. The character of the malicious hysteric begins to take on an uncharacteristic scope... The juxtaposition of events taking place in those days in Russia with the facts of the French revolution is too annoying in the play. The discussion by

the Bolsheviks at the Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] meeting on this topic is too long and unfruitful for the stage rhythm of the play. The circumstances of the French revolution and the nature of the October days are phenomena which are politically and morally different in principle. Here the author and the theatre is betrayed by the sense of true historicism... We get the impression that Lenin only permitted, absolved, forgave, stopped and excused. No, he first of all directed, and he did not stop at punishment when it came to enemies of the revolution, to traitors of the cause of the revolution." The article stressed: "Leniniana is the highest form of ideology. It is the mightiest incandescence of party principles. It is the apogee of artistic and civic talent. Has the right to take up Lenin's theme been given to just anyone?" [2]

Historical truth was also violated in M. Shatrov's play, "The Sixth of July." "In it," noted the journal KOMMUNIST, "the primary attention is focused not on the work of V. I. Lenin and the Central Committee of the party of Bolsheviks who headed up the destruction of the leftist Socialist-Revolutionary counterrevolutionary revolt, but on the leader of the leftist Socialist-Revolutionaries Spiridonova and those around her." [3] In the play, and later in the film by the same name, the events are interpreted in such a way that Soviet power hangs by a thread. "It turns out that only chance saves the Bolsheviks and Soviet power. Such an interpretation of the event echoes the conclusions of the bourgeois falsifiers of history, who consider the very fact of the winning of power by the working class in October of 1917 to be an accidental occurrence. If Soviet power emerged 'by accident,' then this time it also held on purely by accident!" [4]

Specifically at that time, I believe, the dramatist was faced with the choice: either to draw the correct conclusions from the criticism of social scientists, or to go farther in promoting the idea of the "accidental nature" of Soviet rule in Russia. It seems that he chose the latter course, trying to ascribe the idea of Russia's unpreparedness for revolution to V. I. Lenin himself. In the play "Revolutionary Etude" ("Blue Horses on Red Grass"), the character representing V. I. Lenin says: "This is a dead end. Today we are a poverty-stricken, absolutely illiterate people." [5] Yet if M. Shatrov had turned to the appropriate literature, he would have become convinced that V. I. Lenin and the party had to struggle mostly against the Menshevik-Trotskyite ideas regarding the impossibility of socialist victory in our country due to the supposedly inadequate cultural development of the Russian proletariat. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries called the communist hopes for building socialism and communism in Russia "monkey-bread in a mignonette pot" (cf.: Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 39, p 19). The thesis of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR comprises the cornerstone of the political platforms of all those oppositionary groups and deviations against which our party fought.

The enemies of Leninism believed that "building socialism in the USSR is a fairy-tale made up to amuse the muzhiks [peasants]" (Historical Experience in the CPSU Struggle Against Trotskyism, Moscow, 1975, p 546). V. I. Lenin fought against these ideas to the end of his life. Yet the character who is supposed to represent Lenin in "Blue Horses on Red Grass" does not believe in the victory of socialism in Russia. He maintains that it is a dead end. And, as we know, there is no other way out of a dead end but to turn around and go back...

We must say that "Blue Horses on Red Grass," which filled the stages of our theatres in the 70's, received noisy support in the press. Since the role of Lenin in this play could be "played" even without any transformation, almost any rank-and-file actor could play this role. At one time this fact evoked protest from one of the authors of the current letter by theatrical leaders sent to PRAVDA. "This is unnatural," wrote Hero of Socialist Labor and USSR People's Actor M. Ulyanov, "that in any theatre, where it is almost impossible or unusually difficult to find an actor to play the role of Chatskiy or Hamlet one can find an actor to play a great role, a most dramatic role by its scope of events, the role of V. I. Lenin." In the plays themselves, everything was in accordance with the notion hit upon by M. Shatrov: a man who did not resemble Lenin said that which essentially had no resemblance to what Lenin actually said.

The next step in the development of Shatrov's "political theatre" was the play entitled "That Is How We Will Conquer!", where the notion of the dead end to which the Bolsheviks had supposedly brought Russia shone through even more clearly. The affirmation that "between us and socialism is a deep abyss of inadequate civilization and semi-Asiatic lack of culture" was ascribed to V. I. Lenin. [6] However, this affirmation is not from the arsenal of the proponents of Leninism. "Our opponents often told us," wrote V. I. Lenin, "that we are undertaking the irrational cause of imposing socialism in a country which is not cultured enough" (Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 45, p 376-377).

In accordance with the principle of party orientation of literature and for the purpose of putting an end to counterfeiting of Leninism in the artistic sphere, the CPSU Central Committee at one time established an order according to which no artistic work dealing with a Leninist topic could be published without a positive review from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee. However, toward the end of the Brezhnev period this order began to be grossly violated, and the evaluations of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee were ignored. At the admission of A. Svobodin, the play, "This Is How We Will Conquer!", "as well as the other plays and scripts by M. Shatrov devoted to Lenin and the revolution, we might add, were never approved by the IMEL." [7] Nevertheless, they saw the light of day, misinforming the politically immature viewer.

After Brezhnev and several other high leaders attended the play, "That Is How We Will Conquer!", a zone closed to criticism was formed around M. Shatrov. Social scientists were not allowed to speak out in the press. Literary critics exalted the supposed historical accuracy and ideological purity of the play in many of their reviews. It is not surprising that the question of its being awarded the USSR State Prize was predetermined. The zone closed to criticism was protected also by state "armor." What could all this lead to? That, to which it ultimately did lead. M. Shatrov, like anyone who receives a monopoly on the truth, went even farther away from it in his last play than he had gone before. By its content, the play "Farther... Farther... Farther!" represents the logical conclusion of the notion of the dead end to which the Bolsheviks led by V. I. Lenin supposedly brought the country. They are judged by their political enemies, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are aided by the Kornilov followers and other reactionaries. By its form, the play is performed as an expanded anecdote of the type: "Lenin, Stalin, etc. meet in the next world..." Only there are more characters and the Mensheviks are listed primarily as the positive heroes. Martov, for example, is again, for the n-th time, depicted by Shatrov as a smart and pure man. That is evidently how he was at one time, but he had spent himself. Already in 1914 V. I. Lenin wrote to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova: "...you are holding up the inevitable process of throwing out scoundrels a-la Gahin, Martov, Dan and Ko from the workers movement... I am infuriated by the foul blackmail of Martov and Ko in the matter of X: let us crush little by little this band of blackmailers" (Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 55, p 350). Later he noted "the stupidity of the petty bourgeois democrats, the Chernovs, the Tsereteli and the Martovs, with their jabber about the unity of democracy, the dictatorship of democracy, the all-democratic front, and other rubbish" (Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 36, p 194).

It is not surprising that when the zones closed to criticism began to crumble and social scientists finally got the opportunity to openly express their opinion, the gross distortions of the history and theory of Leninism which are present in the latest Shatrov play received critical evaluation in PRAVDA as well as in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and AGITATOR, the journal of the CPSU Central Committee. And this was not a "campaign" or "hysteria," as the foremost theatrical leaders who sent the letter to PRAVDA call this criticism. Rather, it is a natural desire by the Soviet community to express its opinion and to stand up in defense of those socialist ideological and historical achievements which are profaned in the play by the opponents of Leninism. PRAVDA speaks out most justly in favor of a careful and most respectful attitude toward the creativity of the artistic intelligentsia, but also for the right of the Soviet community to express its opinion about this creativity.

V.I. YEREMENKO. The interest of readers in M. Shatrov's plays, in our opinion, is largely determined by the "original" interpretation of historical events and the author's interpretation of the past, which he often places on the lips of famous historical leaders. What is the method of artistic assimilation of the historic past used by M. Shatrov in his plays about Vladimir Ilyich Lenin? To what degree does it correspond to the regularities of social development?

In science, the fate of research often depends on the principles of cognition, i.e., on the method. For example, the same factual material may lead to opposite conclusions if different approaches to it are used. This position is equally true also for artistic creativity. A writer does not have the right to forget that socialist realism is first of all dialectical-materialistic realism, and that its principles must be most thoroughly maintained when we speak of major historical events.

Up until now, Soviet science believed that the true reasons for World War II bear an objective character. Unlike the bourgeois subjective-idealistic conceptions of the reasons for the war of 1939-1945, Marxism proceeds from the notion that the war was the result of the socio-economic nature of capitalism, which nurtured fascism. The real weight of the world's first socialist state in international relations was not yet decisive, and the effect of the Soviet Union on the fates of war and peace was in a certain sense limited.

Under these conditions, the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union was to a decisive degree determined by the logic of specific historical development, and not by the evil will or mistakes of individual personalities. We have already spoken about scientists, but this point of view dominates also in fictional literature about the war. So, it was all the more surprising to read in the play "Farther... Farther... Farther!" that, as it turns out, the war with fascist Germany could have been avoided if it had not been for Stalin and "his foolishness." Moreover, this thought is placed on the lips of Lenin, who is credited with the great achievement of substantiating the class essence of wars.

M. Shatrov formulates his approach to history as follows: "The past is nothing more than what we think about the past. There is no other past" (NAUKA I RELIGIYA, 1987, No 4, p 4). So what do we have here: all that existed is only thought? Such philosophical delusions exist even to this day, but they are classed among idealistic prejudices and are radically foreign to materialism.

We begin to understand why M. Shatrov leans not on fact, but on his own interpretation of a historical event, why he does not burden himself with proof of what he has written. This leads to the fact that the reader experiences a certain confusion, a doubling of the consciousness (to believe or not to believe?). He reads closely the scene of the Politburo commission meeting, where the

fate of Kamenev and Zinovyev was determined. The reader is also gripped with complex and contradictory feelings after becoming acquainted with the scene in which Ordzhonikidze has words with Stalin. Here the author does not refer to the appropriate documents, and therefore, we must assume that we are dealing with artistic fabrication. But is creative fantasy suitable in describing such situations? Doesn't it contradict the selected genre and the research material? Isn't it an example of the reconstruction of history in favor of the author's position? I believe that this is specifically the case.

Instead of the truth about the revolution, the reader is given the author's version of interpersonal battles in the leadership of the party. The selected research method brings M. Shatrov to the idea of the accidental nature of the October revolution which, we must say, has long been espoused by bourgeois historians. According to the play, it turns out that had Lenin stayed 3 hours longer in Fofanova's apartment, the revolution might never have happened.

Moreover, the historical face of Russia, according to the play, might have been entirely different if V. I. Lenin had not come to Smolny in time.

Need we say how far this position is from the Leninist analysis of the essence, character, and reasons for the October revolution in Russia. V. I. Lenin sharply criticized the left-wing communists specifically for not understanding the objectivity of the revolution, and not comprehending the fact that it is impossible without an all-national crisis, without the support of the party by the majority of conscious, politically active workers. Without the support of the working masses, said V. I. Lenin, there is no party of the revolutionary class, but merely a revolutionary group. The play by M. Shatrov, which does not even mention the people, depicts specifically a revolutionary-oriented group of Bolsheviks which is internally unstable and vacillating.

Thus, the real picture of the October revolution in the play is turned upside down. The reader is shown the "intellectual childhood" of the party leaders, who are more concerned with internal strife than with work among the masses in preparing for the revolutionary uprising.

F. Bacon had a clever and appropriate thought: "...even a cripple who walks along a road gets ahead of the man who runs without a road." We cannot expect success in studying any question by following a false path or by using an unsuitable method. It is somehow embarrassing to remind a professional dramatist that the laws of dialectics are in effect in artistic creativity as well, that the dialectical method of analysis obligates the writer to see a phenomenon in its development, in its unity and interrelation with other phenomena; to remind him to

consider all sides of a historical event and not to isolate and absolutize separate aspects of a phenomenon, not to force objective reality into a predetermined scheme.

This is particularly important, stressed the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "because today there are frequent cases when one side of the past or the present is arbitrarily selected, the side which responds to certain interests, while the other side which is not to their liking is ignored, not written into the definite construction, so to speak. Thus, subjectivism develops, the subjectivism which has brought so many hardships to our science, literature, art, and to our cause as a whole. This subjectivism is the direct path to a distorted interpretation of events and occurrences and to erroneous conclusions and decisions".

Undoubtedly, M. Shatrov has creative talent, experience, an ability to deal with the facts, etc. However, the presence of these qualities alone does not guarantee a writer success. It is important that the significance of specific facts, their artistic selection and generalization rest on dialectics as an inalienable property of any creative thinking. Unfortunately, we cannot yet say this about the dramatist.

I.K. SMIRNOV. First of all, I would like to say a few words about the very phenomenon of "The Political Theatre of Shatrov" and about the genre of documentary drama. This phenomenon reflects a certain stage in the development of our society, whose beginning was marked by the 20th CPSU Congress. It was then that the first efforts at substantiated research on many events in our history were made. Unfortunately, these studies were not brought to their conclusion and the great demand for truth about the history of our society and about its present which has arisen since the Congress was not satisfied.

The success of dramatist M. F. Shatrov was to a considerable degree ensured by the fact that he found the courage and bravery to write about a subject which few writers or speakers dared address in the recent past. Behind this courage, the reader and viewer did not notice, or maybe did not want to notice, the "insignificant" shortcomings in [Shatrov's] works. It is true, as M. V. Popov has already said, in the last years of the "stagnant" period Shatrov found himself in an exceptional position thanks to the official acknowledgement of his "bravery."

Today, after the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress, no one is surprised at such bravery, and the factors of exclusiveness and special position in themselves already cannot ensure the success of an artist.

The genre of the documentary drama presupposes a documental basis for the fictional work. The artist's right to imagination, to his own version of historical events, and to his own interpretation of historical facts is quite

evident. Yet I believe that the inadmissability of ignoring or distorting the historical facts or trying to pass off fiction as fact is just as evident. Unfortunately, the first, second and the third are found ever more frequently in Shatrov's works. This is particularly true of his last work, "Farther... Farther... Farther!", which distorts the truth in a gross manner.

Let me cite only a few examples. Thus, in the play, introducing himself to the viewer, N. I. Bukharin states: "Among the most important stages of my political life I feel it necessary to point out the Brest period, when I made a major political error. But most of all I blame myself, as a Bolshevik and as a person, for not being able to hinder that 'great breakthrough,' that 'revolution from above,' as they call it, which occurred in our country in 1929."

However, let us turn to the documents, and specifically to the stenographic report of the 17th Congress of the VKP(b). Speaking at the Congress, N. I. Bukharin sees his main political error in trying to hinder the implementation of the general party line toward the expanded socialist attack, the forced development of industrialization, the intensified struggle against the kulaks, and the revision of the small peasant farm. He admits that the victory of the right wing, which he headed up, would inevitably have unleashed a third force, weakened to the extreme the positions of the working class, led to premature intervention and to the restoration of capitalism. Admitting for the n-th time his mistakes, N. I. Bukharin said: "...The great achievement of our party leadership and of Stalin himself consists of the fact that they precisely determined the historical moment for the start of this assault, its stages and its effective implementation, and thus brilliantly solved at this historically difficult crossing a most complex and yet world-historically significant problem of socialist revolution in our country."

Perhaps M. F. Shatrov does not consider the stenographic report of the party congress to be a document? Yet in the "document" which is presented in its entirety in the play, in his so-called death-bed letter, N. I. Bukharin, addressing his descendents, asks them not to judge him strictly for his numerous mistakes in methods of building socialism.

M.V. POPOV. It is interesting in this connection also to remember the speech of L. B. Kamenev presented at the 17th VKP(b) Congress. He said: "You don't need to be too smart to understand that the matter here is not one of personality, that comrade Stalin is perceived by the enemies of socialism as he is perceived as by the friends of socialism: as a standard, as the expressor of the will of millions, a blow against whom signifies a blow against the entire party, against socialism, against the entire world proletariat." And there were many such sentiments expressed at the party congresses and plenums in the penitent speeches of leaders of those opposition groups which the party fought against.

I.K. SMIRNOV. Shatrov places the following statement on the lips of V. I. Lenin: "Without a doubt, I am guilty before the workers of Russia, that because of my accursed illness I did not bring the matter of displacing Stalin to its conclusion. I came to my senses too late and did not reform the system in such a way that all this would have become impossible." [8] Yet V. I. Lenin had no intention of bringing the matter of displacing Stalin to its conclusion and reforming the system during his lifetime. According to the strict order of V. I. Lenin, the letter to the Congress containing his "testament" was to have been opened only after his death. However, we will forgive the author this inaccuracy as well. Something else is more important. The primary reason for the evil that occurred after the death of V. I. Lenin was, according to the version of M. F. Shatrov, the system created by Lenin and not reformed by him, which is understood as an abstract "grid of political and ideological coordinates."

According to Shatrov, everything is very simple. V. I. Lenin created an imperfect system, which he did not have time to reform. That was his fault. The closest associates of V. I. Lenin, not having fulfilled his testament, at first did not want to reform the system, and later wanted to but could not. That was their fault. Stalin brought to its logical conclusion the development of the imperfect system created by Lenin, and that was his fault.

So who is right? It is V. I. Lenin's political opponents of all suits, who snicker and instruct him, who turn out to be right in many ways.

But how can we seriously propose such a version of history, and who can agree with it?

There is another logical question. Why were the "heirs" of V. I. Lenin unable to reform the system in time? It is because their ideas and proposed reforms were far removed from Lenin's. They were foreign to the interests of the party, of the working class, and of the working peasantry. We might add, however, that the party, the working class, and the people—the true creators of history—are totally absent in M. F. Shatrov's play.

In a play devoted to historical events there is a total absence also of a historical approach to their evaluation. Of course, within the framework of the selected artistic genre, the heroes of the past epoch have the right to discuss and judge the socialist society which we have built. And of course, the reasoning of Rosa Luxemburg about democracy in a socialist society presented in her "Letters from Prison" in 1918 is in keeping with our time. However, V. I. Lenin was critical of this discussion by Rosa Luxemburg in the historically defined period of development of our society. "Rosa Luxemburg," wrote V. I. Lenin, "was mistaken on the question of Poland's independence. She was mistaken in 1903 in her evaluation of Menshevism; she was mistaken in her theory of accumulation of capital; she was mistaken, along with

Plekhanov, Vanderveld, Kautskiy and others, in defending the unification of the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks in July of 1914; she was mistaken in her prison writings of 1918 (I might add that upon her release from prison in late 1918 and early 1919 she corrected a large portion of her mistakes)" (Lenin, V. I. *Collected Works*, Vol 44, p 421-422).

Nevertheless, at the will of M. F. Shatrov, Rosa Luxemburg presents her prison writings at length in the play, and this presentation is three times interrupted by Lenin's exclamations of "Bravo, Rosa!"

M. Shatrov also ascribes another doubtful statement to V. I. Lenin. In his argument with V. I. Lenin about the impossibility of building a democratic socialist society in Russia, "where a dark, drunken people can be held in obedience only with a club," Martov suggests that he listen to his friend. "Lenin (guessing). Rosa? Rosa Luxemburg? Of course, the 'Letters From Prison'? Why, with pleasure! And although, after she was freed, she had a change of heart about some things, this still does not change the matter. As always, Rosa has deep and serious conviction." [9]

So there you are! B. I. Lenin noted the error of the prison letters, Rosa Luxemburg herself corrected a large portion of her mistakes, and nevertheless—"this does not change the matter" and "Bravo, Rosa!"

V.I. YEREMENKO. The authors of the letter to PRAVDA are concerned by the fact that the polemics around Shatrov's plays are turning into suppression of "artistic difference of thought" and has a far-reaching purpose: to return the workers of the arts "to the epoch of command-administrative methods of cultural management."

M. Shatrov's plays are written in the genre of political theatre. They are based on materials corresponding to the genre and on the author's aims. Therefore, the analysis of M. Shatrov's plays in print is accompanied by political and ideological evaluations. This is not only appropriate, but even necessary. At the same time, we cannot agree with the authors in that the discussion in the press of M. Shatrov's play, "Farther... Farther... Farther!" is accompanied by "political labelling" and "ideological accusations." There is none of this. Moreover, it seems to us that the political evaluations contained in the reviews of the play, "Farther... Farther... Farther!" could have been more definite.

The letter entitled "Along a New Circle?" says that M. Shatrov, who worked on Leniniana for 30 years, never concealed his "political preferences." This is an important moment. In this case, the rather ambiguous category of "artistic difference of thought" is formulated more precisely—"political preferences," beyond which, we believe, there is a specific political position, an individual political view of history. It would be interesting to know what this view consists of.

In the play, "This is How We Will Conquer!", for example, the following ideas are placed on the lips of various leading characters: "between us and socialism is a deep abyss of insufficient civilization and semi-Asiatic lack of culture"; "to remain true to the resolutions means to 'be an idiot'"; "we must break and bend the outdated ideas"; "we must not only support the pacifists in every way possible, but also yield to them." [10]

In the play, "Farther... Farther... Farther!", we can clearly distinguish two main groups of party leaders. The first—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin—are sure of themselves and know how to correctly implement the revolution and build socialism in Russia. The second group—Lenin, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinskiy, Ordzhonikidze, and Krupskaya—unlike the members of the first group, is represented by people who are confused and unsure of the righteousness of their cause. We get the impression that the sympathies of the author lie with the first group.

Even a cursory acquaintance with M. Shatrov's "political preferences" tells us that they lack ideological definition. They are guilty of subjectivism and non-dialectical nature in the formulation of many questions of historical development.

V.I. KARDASHOV. Undoubtedly, Shatrov knows how to attract the attention of the viewer and the reader. They, these viewers, are generally very interested in the history of their country. They want to know everything, and only recently has this interest somehow become far from being fully satisfied. Yet who is it that satisfies it—that is the question? It is primarily not the historians, not those who, it would seem, should be holding the cards. First of all, the historians have not yet awakened from their sleep, which has lasted many decades, when every word which went beyond the bounds of the appropriate "principle" multi-volume works was immediately and unmercifully crossed out. Secondly, historians, no matter how "oppressed" they might be, for the most part are not inclined to rush into believing unreliable and questionable documents, and to immediately publish, publish, publish... Their professional intuition tells them that in the flood of denunciations which has rushed onto the pages of the press, there are very many totally unproven facts, and that they are being used, as before, for purposes of conjuncture. This cause has been taken up by journalists and writers, who in their overwhelming majority do not possess the minimally required historical training and skills. The livelier it is written, the better, as long as it is with fervor and passion—anything will do for the starved public, "thirsting for the truth." And so, resourceful journalists and writers drive this "truth" to the newspapers, journals, to the theatre stages and the movie theatres, and all the while are not embarrassed to swear: "...We have everything documented, we can confirm everything, trust us, trust us, this is the absolute truth in the final instance..." And the people believe. Their old beliefs crumble, and new stereotypes of thought arise in their place, perhaps even more

ruinous than those which existed before, since that "truth" which Shatrov and others try to instill is certainly not as simple and pure as they try to depict it.

Of course, every author has the right to bring together in his play people who never met each other in a real historical situation, to make them talk, argue and judge each other. Of course, every author has the liberty of "cropping" individual phrases from the speeches and articles of V. I. Lenin, combining these phrases at his own discretion, supplying them with his own interjections in convenient places, and then passing all this off as a "Leninist" point of view. Everyone has the liberty of doing this, but what is it that stands behind this freedom of will, for what purpose is it done? Shatrov and his followers maintain that the historical truth is supposedly restored, everyone is rewarded "according to his deeds," every historical personality is placed on its "deserved" pedestal (like Trotsky) or cast into the abyss, into non-existence (like Stalin).

The very formulation of the question in the play (which is characteristic not only for Shatrov) is not historical. There is no subjunctive mood in history. Well, really, is it admissible in a work which lays claim to the historical truth to seriously pose the question: what if Lenin had not fallen ill? What if he had recovered? What would have happened if he had lived for many more years? And, the most important thing for Shatrov and for many other trusting people: what would have happened if the Party Congress had removed Stalin from the post of Secretary General? If we think about the essence of Shatrov's play, the viewer cannot help but think: had this happened, none of the difficulties, hardships, deprivations, losses and tragedies would have occurred in the life of our country. All we had to do was to "displace Stalin." We might ask, can such suppositions be considered realistic? Is this how a man who publicly urges others to learn from Lenin, to read his works and to follow his teachings should represent and depict a historical process?

At the same time, the thought arises: but what was the dilemma, who could have replaced Stalin under those conditions? Anyone who is even remotely acquainted with the situation in the party at that time will immediately say: either Stalin or Trotsky, all other names which come up today in great numbers are no more than fiction. Shatrov does not openly express this dangerous juxtaposition, but his choice cannot be doubted. We can judge this not only by his last play.

Here is how he presents Trotsky: "I, Bronshteyn, Lev Davidovich... am the son of probably the only Jewish landowner in Russia..." This is an introduction expected, of course, to attract the attention of the reader and the viewer. However, such absurdities can only be expressed when one knows for sure that none of his contemporaries knows anything about the subject. The fact is that any Jew who accepted Christianity, a "vykrest," as they called him at that time, had the right

to own land in pre-revolutionary Russia, and such cases were certainly not uncommon. Moreover, there was also another way: to rent land from Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian landowners who had gone bankrupt, and then the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peasants became the objects of double exploitation. The Jewish leaseholder, trying to "eek out" a profit for himself over the lease payment, exploited them mercilessly. There were thousands of such cases in pre-revolutionary Russia. The "internationalist" Trotsky should hardly be proud of his social origins, and it is certainly in vain that Shatrov tries to impose such adoration upon the contemporary reader.

In general, Shatrov is too kind to Lev Davidovich. He characterizes the pre-revolutionary relations between Lenin and Trotsky with merely a single humble phrase: "15-year polemics with Lenin." And that is all! What, then, would he call a violent, irreconcilable struggle? It is as if there were no anti-party block in which Trotsky participated during these 15 years. And what characteristics Lenin ascribed to Trotsky! "Little Judas Trotsky" was not the worst of them.

M. Shatrov subtitled his play "An Author's Version of the Events of 24 October 1917." This version also relates to Trotsky. What will the viewer think having seen Shatrov's play? Here is what. Lenin spent a long time in Finland and illegally in Petrograd, he could not manage the party Central Committee, and Trotsky did everything. That is what Trotsky says in Shatrov's play: "I have everything in my hands and in my head." Lenin demands that we begin the uprising, he is indignant, but the Central Committee does not respond... Many years ago I had occasion to read this version in the three-volume biography of Trotsky written by the infamous Isaac Deycher, and it goes back to the memoirs of Trotsky himself. It could not be that Shatrov did not know this. Why does he impose this version on the Soviet viewer now? Only because he hopes it might pass.

Having analyzed only one topic from Shatrov's play, we may be convinced of his tendentious and wrong approach to his narrative of the past. The same may be said also of many other topics touched upon in the play. PRAVDA already noted that the so-called "Bukharin letter" reproduced in the play is not subject to scientific source analysis. The same may be said also about the long and stormy "conversation" of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, about the version of Kirov's murder, and about many other topics. Yet the viewer believes, and it is important that he not lose faith in Soviet means of information. Authors like Shatrov swear: believe us, believe! And yet, perhaps, we should not substitute one set of delusions for another?

V.I. YEREMENKO. In the letter "Along A New Circle?" the criticism of M. Shatrov's play is viewed almost as an attack on glasnost, on "the very possibility of artistic

interpretation of our country's history." Evidently, there are different notions about glasnost, just as there are efforts to adapt it to one's needs.

From our point of view, we cannot understand glasnost as a boundless phenomenon not related to time or class, as an unsubstantiated and irresponsible reinterpretation of the past and the present.

A number of recent newspaper and journal publications, including those written on historical topics, claim that glasnost as a healthy and necessary process which expresses the essence of the current stage of democratization can degenerate, in the words of Lenin, into "endless degradation and self-humiliation of socialism before the entire world," the depravation "of the socialist consciousness of the working masses..." (Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Vol 6, p 8-9).

Instead of a calm analysis of the difficulties of current development and the reasons for social deformations and deviations from the objective laws of socialism, under the banner of glasnost and freedom of criticism we find much that is perceived as a negation of all prior history. It is no accident that the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee considered it necessary to point out that "individual persons are arbitrarily striving to represent our path as a chain of mistakes and crimes, and are keeping quiet about the great achievements of the past and the present."

M.V. POPOV. I would like Aleksey Mikhaylovich Muravyev, who is present here, to express his opinion of the play in connection with the discussion which is currently ongoing in the press. After all, he is not only a party historian, but also a veteran of the party—a member of the CPSU since 1927 who knows our country's history not only from books and documents.

A.M. MURAVYEV. I cannot help but note that Shatrov as a dramatist has with his works attracted the attention of readers to the most important questions of the recent history of the party and the people. However, his last work, the play "Farther... Farther... Farther!" requires thorough study and critical analysis. Our press has given this work much attention and will help us to objectively evaluate its advantages and shortcomings.

I cannot hide my disappointment at the fact that the leading representatives of our creative intelligentsia in their letter to PRAVDA dated 29 February 1988 and entitled "Along A New Circle?" do not express their attitude toward the critical remarks of historians. This, it seems to me, disrupts the principles of objectivity. However, in their letter to PRAVDA we read: "The polemics around any phenomenon in current art are beneficial, they are as necessary to us as air." [11]

And in these polemics the voice of the social scientists must resound loudly. They should not keep quiet. They must say their word. They must help all of us to correctly evaluate such important events as the ones which M. Shatrov writes about in his last play.

We must note that M. Shatrov, before presenting the contents of the work, explains that this is "the author's version of events taking place on 24 October 1917 and considerably later." I believe that this explanation given by the dramatist is no accident. Creative workers have the right to "their own version," to their own interpretation of certain problems, certain events, and no one is questioning this right of the writer and the artist.

However, the writer's version on such problems as the role of V. I. Lenin and the activity of the party must correspond to objective history and specific historical facts. Here, it seems to me, the writer is limited by political goals and political tasks. He should not fabricate anything that might contradict the Leninist conception of the revolution. "In order to understand the development of the Russian revolution," wrote Lenin, "it is most necessary... to study what main parties there were, the interests of which classes they protected, and what the interrelations of all these parties were."

The writer cannot forget the corresponding directive of Lenin which he expressed as early as 1905 in his well-known work, "Party Organization and Party Literature." That directive was: "Literature must become party-oriented" (Lenin, V. I., *Collected Works*, Vol 12, p 100). The principle of party orientation of literature must be taken as the basis for evaluating the play.

Let us assume that this play goes to the theatre and we have come to see it. The curtain rises, and we first meet the main character of the work, General Kornilov—the oppressor of the revolution. Then there is a "significant dialogue." The main characters of the play, similar to Kornilov, discuss various questions related to revolutionary events, obviously from their own points of view.

Let us examine the illumination of the question regarding the role of the popular masses in the revolution. The Russian popular masses, the groundbreakers, are depicted in a particularly gloomy light. Through the words of Lenin M. Shatrov says: "...The revolutionary charge of the people is melting and evaporating slowly but surely."

I.K. SMIRNOV. I am concerned that a viewer who has not read or studied Lenin's work, who is unfamiliar with the documents and the facts, and who has not assimilated Marxist-Leninist methodology of historical analysis will take this play as an expression of historical truth. Specifically, having seen M. F. Shatrov's play he will learn that the October Revolution might not have happened had the numerous opponents of Lenin within the Bolshevik party and outside of it acted a little sooner.

He will learn that V. I. Lenin's argument with his opponents about the possibility of building socialism in one country, especially in backward Russia, is still not resolved either in a theoretical or in a practical manner. Moreover, today V. I. Lenin's opponents have acquired "new weighty" arguments, while he and the Leninists have none.

He will learn that the ideological struggle which developed in the party after the death of V. I. Lenin is not a reflection of the entire spectrum of interests of classes, social groups and strata, and objective historical processes, but merely the unprincipled fuss of politicians in the name of their own personal interests.

M. Shatrov defends the right of each person to have his own concept of the October Revolution, of socialism, of the means and methods for building it, the right to publicly defend his positions. No one is arguing with this today.

In exercising this right, I speak out against "the version of events which took place on 24 October 1917 and significantly later" as presented by the author of the play "Farther... Farther... Farther!"

But, of course, simply to object is not enough. We need extensive work on creating highly artistic works which truthfully reflect the history of the people, extensive work by historians and social scientists in general. We must be self-critical and acknowledge the fact that we are poorly utilizing those conditions which are being created today for this work.

Plays about Lenin must call upon the viewer to solve problems of our time. It would be of current importance to recreate the analysis which V. I. Lenin gave in 1921 to the work, "New Economic Policy and Tasks of the Political Education Workers" (Lenin, V. I., *Collected Works*, Vol 44, p 168-175), to underscore all the importance of perestroika and the renovation of our society in the struggle against the three main enemies:

The first enemy—communist self-conceit.

The second enemy—illiteracy.

The third enemy—bribe taking.

It is no accident that our party's Central Committee required the study of Lenin's works, particularly those written during the latter years of his life and activity. Only on the basis of a thorough and comprehensive study and assimilation of Leninism can we achieve success in our current endeavors.

M. V. POPOV. In Shatrov's play our historical course is not the course of the struggle of the working class, which leads all workers and imposes its dictatorship in spite of the resistance of its obvious and hidden opponents, in spite of the petty bourgeois aspirations in their own

ranks. Rather, it is a chain of endless mistakes and crimes, explained once again primarily not by class and objective reasons, but by subjective intentions and character traits of individual, although very important, persons. And if by this means the attempt is made to take us willingly or unwillingly to the soil of subjectivism and arbitrariness in explaining historical events, then the duty of social scientists is to warn us that this has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. We should also draw another conclusion. Historians should not wait until dramatists interpret or confuse complex historical questions for them or instead of them.

Footnotes

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Stalin Role in Jewish Theater Director Mikhoels' Death Examined

18000590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 23 Jul 88 p 10

[Article by B. Tulin and V. Shvarts: "The Life and Death of the Actor Mikhoels"]

[Text] On a cold, January day in 1948 a funeral procession moved through snow-covered Moscow. Thousands of people accompanied the last journey of a man whose name

had become a legend in the theater world. The inscription "Solomon Mikhaylovich Mikhoels" shone of the black ribbons of many wreathes. And the following words spoken by Fadeyev expressed the general sorrow: "We have been left by a splendid artist, shining with fame, the very great fame which falls to the lot of those masters about the inspiration of whose creative work books will be written, whose names will live for a long time, for centuries, perhaps, for those persons for whom art is dear."

At that time, in January 1948, nobody yet suspected that completely different words would soon be directed against Mikhoels. He was called a "despicable bourgeois nationalist" and a "wretched American spy." And for a long time the name of this People's Artist of the USSR, winner of a Stalin Prize, Cavalier of the Order of Lenin, professor, and artistic director of the State Jewish Theater would be erased from the history of the country and from that of art, just as the frames which showed him in a small episode of the motion picture entitled "Circus" would be cut from that film.

But just who was this artist, brilliant in fame during his lifetime and demeaned after his death? Why was the "inspiration, mentor, and friend of Soviet art" at the sources of his tragedy? It is far from simple to answer these questions. Mikhoels' fate demands that careful attention be paid to it, for he was—heart and soul—a man of his age, a person and an artist who embodied in himself the precipitous rhythm of its grand-scale social transformations and who, at the same time, became a victim of one of the most gloomy periods in our society's history.

"...My interest in the theater was manifested in early childhood," Solomon Mikhaylovich wrote in his autobiography. He soon left Dvinsk, where he had been born in 1890, bearing the surname Vovsi (Mikhoels was his theatrical pseudonym). At the age of 15 he enrolled at the Riga Technical High School and, upon graduating from the latter—at the Kiev Commercial Institute. It is as if Fate were testing the youth, suggesting that he select different variants of his future path. In 1915 it seemed that everything had been finally decided. Mikhoels was a student of the Law School at Petrograd University. But the Revolution made its own corrective amendments to this future master's biography.

In 1935 he recalled: "As to the question of how I became an actor, I could reply that, at first glance, this was extremely happenstance. Upon returning from the university where I had been studying, I encountered a friend...who informed me that a Jewish theater school was being opened. I immediately understood the importance of this event—in the history of the Jewish theater there had never been a theater school.... I was then 29 years old, and if one thinks about it, this becomes very indicative. It means that these 29 years were lived in a past which did not give me the opportunity to devote

myself to my vocation, and that it was specifically the Revolution which opened up a wide scope for me and made it possible for me to devote myself entirely to art."

From that time to his final hour Mikhoels would serve the cause of the Revolution with his art. But, meanwhile, this was the cold Petrograd of 1919, a city which was mobilizing every last effort for the struggle against Yudenich's attacking troops, and the modest studio under the directorship of A.M. Granovskiy, where the 29-year-old beginning actor took his initial learning steps. In 1927 the critic M. Zagorskiy wrote that it was unknown what fate would have befallen the troupe "if this theater had not found such a brilliant actor as Mikhoels had shown himself to be."

This was already in Moscow, where the studio acquired the status of the State Jewish Theater (GOSYET), and the name of Mikhoels was beginning to shine in the constellation of that period's theatrical talents. Theatergoers would delight in his acting, just as they delighted in the masterful skills of Pashennaya and Khmelev, Tarasova and Shchukin, Garin and Ilinskiy....

The emergence of this theater as an equal among other theaters of our country's peoples, which had been persecuted before the Revolution—the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Armenian—was also the time when its leading actor emerged. In assessing these years, he would later say: "The theater proved to be an accumulator of the best creative forces. Artists, musicians, writers, and public figures were drawn to it.... Re-assessing old values became the theater's ideological line. It took bitter pot-shots at the ideological viewpoints of the masses in the stlets and the petit-bourgeois intelligentsia from the "high ground" of the creative works of Mendel Moykher-Sforim—the patriarch of Jewish literature, as well as Sholom-Aleykhem and Perets...."

This line of the theater was manifested in its first "Moscow" production of "An Evening with Sholom Alekhem," as well as in the shows entitled "The Sorceress," "200,000," and "Three Jewish Raisins." Concerning this last work IZVESTIYA wrote as follows: "As a light, merry show, this evening of parodies is an exceptionally outstanding presentation.... All three parodies are densely permeated with social content, with anti-religious, anti-rabbinical, and anti-Zionist currents—it is strong satire."

While nationalistic by nature, the State Jewish Theater was, above all, a theater of the country of the victorious Revolution, a country which proclaimed the equal rights of nations and nationalities. And it proved this during the first foreign tours of 1928, when the troupe traveled about cities in Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and Austria. These tours took place at a time when emergent fascism had already crippled the souls of philistines, puffing up national-chauvinistic passions. That is why the Soviet ambassador plenipotentiary in France noted that the theater's trip had become a fact not only of great

artistic value, but also an event of political importance. And Mikhoels stated with pride after his return that almost everywhere the performers had been greeted and accompanied by a singing of "The Internationale"—that is the way freethinking Europe welcomed the theater from the country of the October Revolution.

They returned as conquerors, albeit without their chief producer-director: Granovskiy remained abroad in order to stage Moliere for the Lessing Theater. Moreover, it had already become clear to many persons that, from that point on, the troupe would have to operate without its former leader, inasmuch as he had not fully understood the spirit of the revolutionary changes in life and art. And this spirit had by then possessed the minds of the best Soviet actors and producer-directors. There was no doubt about who Granovskiy's successor would be: In 1929 S.M. Mikhoels became the head of the State Jewish Theater.

He clearly understood what path the troupe should take and what its program should be. As a great actor and as an individual, Mikhoels promptly outgrew the framework of a nationality theater and then attempted to reveal this to the collective as well. "That which he had accumulated," Leonid Leonov was to remark later, "was transformed in his creative art into general human culture, and it flowed like a stream into the multinational flow of our Motherland's culture. It was not by accident that this artist's circle of friends was so large. It included A.N. Tolstoy and Yu.A. Zavadskiy, I.S. Kozlovskiy and M.M. Tarkhanov, Academicians L.A. Orbeli and P.L. Kapitsa, M.M. Klimov and I.L. Andronnikov.

For Mikhoels friendship was a concept which was primarily moral. "He could not remain as a mere spectator if a friend was in trouble," wrote his wife, Anastasiya Pavlovna Pototskaya, in her memoirs. "During the period of the so-called 'destructive articles' the following words would often sound over the phone: 'It's me, Mikhoels. Let me simply lend my voice....' Talent went to meet talent because friendship always sprung up and grew in that nutritional environment which is called profound respect, genuine trust, and sometimes even a great, tender love."

During the pre-war years this artist's talent blossomed with particular force. The year 1935 was proclaimed a Shakespeare Year. People prepared for it actively. The most outstanding phenomenon, according to general opinion, was the production of Othello," with Ostuzhev in the principal role. The theater-going public was delighted with Baranova, who played the role of Juliet at the Theater of the Revolution. The State Jewish Theater put on "King Lear," and the critics unanimously acknowledged Mikhoels' Lear as one of the summits in this actor's creative work.

His contemporaries recall the following: the performance began with a procession of the courtiers to the sounds of a triumphant, ceremonial march. And suddenly the music broke off. Amid complete silence Lear

made his appearance, stooped over and wrapping himself in a robe like a household dressing-gown. Without looking at anyone, he slowly made his way to the throne and pulled the Fool, who had seated himself there, off by the ear. And above the bowed heads of the courtiers arose the face of Lear. Practically without any make-up and without the traditional beard. A face which was impossible to forget.

And the performance of the role of King Lear was also amazingly up-to-date. One of the critics remarked as follows: "While in his imagistic associations Mikhoels turned to long-ago times, in his ideological conclusions he was profoundly contemporary. The type of character created by him could not have arisen at all outside the period of the 1930's.... While an individualist and a scholastic, Lear was, after all, also an autocrat. His exceptional personal position intensified within him the consciousness of a personal exclusivity. In the old king, as he is played by Mikhoels, there was the idea that he had been chosen, that by virtue of his own special qualities he had been called upon to carry out a certain important and special mission. Never mind that he has decided to oppose his own will to the will of all other people; he has also decided to oppose it to reality."

But just who, in reality, was Mikhoels playing? Was it only King Lear? Or was he, being endowed, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, with the intuition of artistic genius and with an equal force of logical penetration into the essence of life's phenomena, thinking about another autocrat who had been carefully nurtured on the yeasty ferment of unrestrained praise and anticipated another tragedy involving the blood of hundreds of thousands of repressed people?

"I am the center of the world. There is nobody higher than me.... Everything is insignificant; everything is vanity; the truth lies only in my wisdom; only my individual personality has value!"—that is the way Mikhoels treated the character of Lear. That is what he wrote about this in 1936 and talked about his work on the role. This article was not published at that time, but a year later, in 1937 another of his articles appeared in the journal *TEATR*. It was entitled "On Characters in General and on the Character of Lear in particular"; he the artist states that, in his opinion, the tragedy of Shakespeare's hero is the tragedy of a bankrupted, false ideology.

Was all this known to Stalin? There is no confirmation of this, and if the "leader" never attended a performance at the State Jewish Theater, he would hardly have read about it in the journal *TEATR*. Moreover, he had an utterly scornful attitude toward Shakespearean tragedy as such, having once expressed merely hostility to a version of "Hamlet." Nevertheless, we are entitled to assume that Stalin, who attentively followed what was taking place in art and who controlled the processes directing life in the theater, motion pictures, and literature, after subjectively appraising them with the help of

the prizes named after himself and other awards, could scarcely avoid paying some attention to the State Jewish Theater and the activity of its leader.

What kind of an attitude could he have had toward it at that time? Here it is important to note that by dooming legions of repressed persons, among which were people of all nationalities to the death penalty, prison, and concentration camps, Stalin, as a unique "showcase" turned toward the rest of the world, during the 1930's utilized the outstanding works of the USSR's peoples, including those created in the nationality theaters (moreover, the very creation of these theaters) as testimony to the triumph of the nationality policy widely declared by the "leader of the peoples." This was a unique kind of "exhibition of the achievements of the national economy"; the leaders of the nationality theaters during that period were bountifully (and, by the way, completely deservedly) awarded orders; they were given lofty titles and granted prizes.

The pre-war years also witnessed an upsurge in Mikhoels' public activity. He directed the theater section of the Committee on Stalin Prizes, became a member of the artistic council of the Committee on Artistic Matters, took part in the work of the editorial collegium of the journal *TEATR*, and was a member of the VTO [All-Union Theater Society]. The Order of Lenin, awarded to him in 1939, his being granted the title of People's Artist of the USSR at the same time, and the formal celebration of his 50th birthday at the TsDRI [Central House of Arts Workers], which occurred in 1940—all these things were obvious signs of official recognition of his meritorious services as an artist. But, after all, we now know all too well that during those years a person could be elevated and annihilated merely by a signature inscribed by a dark blue pencil....

In August 1941 Mikhoels, who had been sentenced to death by Hitler in absentia, was elected chairman of the Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee. And two years later, together with the poet I. Fefer, a member of this committee, he was sent to the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Britain. Hundreds of thousands of people delightedly greeted these emissaries of the Soviet Union—the great country which was smashing fascism, that country about which on the anniversary of the military victory Mikhoels wrote: "Today we speak with particular passion about love for our Motherland, for our great Motherland—this is youth, this is a very great humanistic culture, this is our fertile lands, our forests and rivers, this is our language, this is our freedom, the people's happiness and the joy of its creative work. But inextricably bound up with our ardent feeling of love for the Motherland there also lives in our hearts a feeling of ruthless hatred toward all those who attempted to block the path of freedom-loving, eternally creating, eternally young peoples...."

After the Victory he had almost three years left to live. Three years poisoned with a feeling of bewilderment about what was happening. He understood that what was

being destroyed was that upsurge of freedom, the awareness of one's own strength, which the intelligentsia, as well as the entire liberating people, sensed during the course of the victorious course of the war. The hopes for changes were not justified. The year 1946 was marked by the lamentably well-known decree on the journals *ZVEZDA* and *LENINGRAD*. Then repressions were unleashed against film-makers, the theater, and musical culture. One of the journals of that period obsequiously proclaimed the following: "We must decisively, once and for all put an end to the liberal fellow-traveling by all these estheticizing nobodies, who are lacking in a healthy feeling of love for the Motherland and the people, who have nothing for a soul except malignity and an inflated opinion of themselves. We must clear the artistic atmosphere of anti-patriotic philistines."

The official version of Mikhoels' death describes it as due to an automobile accident. This happened in Minsk on 13 January 1948. Solomon Mikhaylovich had arrived there together with the critic Golubov-Potapov as a member of the Committee on Stalin Prizes in order to view several shows. Both of them were killed, and this death caused perplexity among many persons at that time.

Unfortunately, we do not have the documents at our disposal which would attest as to what actually happened in Minsk. But there is other testimony and quite a bit of it. It all boils down to the fact that Mikhoels was assassinated and that this assassination had been sanctioned.

Svetlana Alliluyeva in her book "Only One Year" talks about how once at a dacha she found her father talking with somebody on the telephone. He listened to the other person in silence and then said: "O.K., an automobile accident." Alliluyeva remembers the intonation with which this was said: Stalin's words sounded not like a question, but rather an assertion. Later, a few minutes after the telephone conversation was over, he turned to his daughter and informed her: "Mikhoels was smashed up in an automobile accident."

"He was assassinated, and there was no automobile accident," Alliluyeva wrote. "Automobile accident" was the official version suggested by my father whenever people reported to him about a certain mission being accomplished...."

The fact that the official version of Mikhoels' death was doubted by many persons was also mentioned by Erenburg in his memoirs entitled "People, Years, Life." Citing one of the newspapers published in Lithuania, he wrote that this artist had been assassinated by Beria's agents. "I'm not going to guess," we read in his book, "why Beria, who could have very quietly arrested Mikhoels, had recourse to such a malicious, disguised action...."

Of course, we cannot insist on the absolute reliability or veracity of these and other similar versions. They must be analyzed, all the more so in that people are still alive who could shed some light on what happened and on what followed Mikhoels' death. The latter became a kind of prelude to a tragedy which was played out according to notes written out by Stalin and his henchmen. A few months later the campaign against the "rootless cosmopolitans" was unleashed. Then the State Jewish Theater was closed down, closed down with the Jesuitical formula "because of unprofitability." Soon afterward almost all the members of the Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee were liquidated, in August 1952 the poets and writers I. Fefer, P. Markish, D. Bergelson, and L. Kvitko, were shot, as well as the actor V. Zuskin and many others. And on 13 January 1953, on the fifth anniversary of Mikhoels' death (how bitter the irony of history can sometimes be!), his name again appeared on the newspaper pages. In a report entitled "Arrest of Vermin Physicians" it was stated that the arrested persons had received directives "about exterminating the leading officials of the USSR" from the United States through the "well-known Jewish bourgeois nationalist Mikhoels"....

Does not all this resemble a carefully planned action, calculated for more than one year and whose victims were many outstanding representatives of Soviet culture, art, science, and medicine? It is dreadful to think of what it might have led to if it had not been for Stalin's death.

Not long before his own death Mikhoels wrote the following: "My father did not live on into our own times, but I think that he possibly would have criticized much of what I have done, and would have considered that a country and a people that built socialism should have been given more than I gave. Nevertheless, I suppose that I could have replied to him in all sincerity as follows:

"Listen, Father! With all my soul, heart, and thought, with all that I possess, I have served the Soviet people!"

Justice Official Interviewed on Universal Legal Education

18000535a Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
ZAKONNOST in Russian No 6, Jun 88 (signed to press
7 Jun 88) pp 9-11

[Interview of A. Trebkov, chief of the Department of Legal Propaganda and the Legal Education of the Citizens, USSR Ministry of Justice, by M. Sverdlova: "What Should Universal Legal Education Be Like?"]

[Text] [Question] Andrey Adamovich, legal education has been conducted for several decades. It was organized for various categories of the population, and all kinds of forms and methods have been used. But currently, when M. S. Gorbachev supported at the February Plenum the idea of creating universal legal education in the country, and when the 18 February 1988 decree of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "Rate of Restructuring the Secondary And Higher School System and the Party's Tasks in Carrying It Out," state, "It will be necessary to organize universal legal education as a single statewide program that encompasses all segments of the population, all the cadres both in the center and in the outlying areas," people have taken an attitude toward this as though it was a completely new situation. Let us discuss the concept, goals, and tasks of universal legal education. But am I correct in thinking that a lot of attention was devoted to legal education in the past?

[Answer] Definitely. We are not beginning from ground zero. On the basis of a decision by party and state agencies, universal legal education is being conducted in six union republics, 58 ASSR's, krais, and oblasts in RSFSR, and five oblasts in the Ukraine. However, in the remaining parts of the country, no decisions have been enacted concerning universal education, and the propagandizing of legal knowledge there has been conducted, for the most part, episodically. From positions of today's requirements, this work cannot satisfy us, because we are dealing with a qualitatively new level of legal education, with the systematic instruction of all segments of the population, of all the cadres.

[Question] Wherein, specifically, lie the new features of universal education?

[Answer] First of all, in my opinion, in that the legal knowledge must be given to the public, as is stated in the decree of CPSU Central Committee, on the basis of a single statewide comprehensive program. This task exists on several levels, and it is extremely complex and difficult. It is by no means a simple matter to make the changeover from irregular forms of propagandizing law to the systematic, planned, differentiated legal instruction in the center and in the outlying areas. We need a qualitatively new, higher level of management. Practical life shows us that even where universal legal education was declared, the proper management of that education did not exist and the successes were small. In our

opinion, the role of the justice agencies in managing universal education and its methodological support must be immeasurably increased. Methodology-coordination councils must be reformed.

[Question] In which direction should these reforms proceed?

[Answer] Obviously, it is necessary to begin with a precise definition of the agency under which the methodology-coordination councils are created. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, where I recently visited, this kind of council was created under the party's obkom and it was given the responsibility of managing universal legal education.

[Question] But similar councils were also created previously under the party agencies. For example, in Georgia, Omsk Oblast, and in a number of other areas.

[Answer] The council created in Sverdlovsk Oblast is somewhat different from those that were created previously, if only in its very name—coordination council for universal legal education. It is headed by the party obkom secretary for ideology. The chairman has three deputies: the heads of the party obkom's Administrative Agencies Department and the Propaganda and Agitation Department, and the chief of the oblast ispolkom's Justice Department. The deputy chief of the Justice Department is the council secretary.

It is made up of the chief of the Political Education House; the secretaries of the CPSU Sverdlovsk City Committee and the Law Institute's party committee; the secretary of the oblast trade-unions council; the deputy chairman of the board of governors of the oblast organization the Znaniye Society; the chief of the oblast department of public education; the rector of the higher party school; and one of the professors from the Law Institute. The council not only keeps within its field of vision the questions pertaining to the legal training of all categories of cadres and the population, but can also resolve them efficiently.

[Question] What has happened to the previous methodology-coordination council under the Justice Department?

[Answer] There is simply no longer any need for it.

[Question] Do you feel that the form of coordination and of methodological guidance that has been chosen by the people in Sverdlovsk Oblast is precisely that should be used as the standard one?

[Question] I think so. And this is why: legal education is a component part of the party's ideological work. The guidance of that work is the prerogative specifically of the party agencies, especially in resolving the main task of coordinating all the agencies and organizations that participate in legal education.

[Question] But what role and what place are assigned to the justice departments when creating this kind of council?

[Answer] Let us begin by saying that the department chief and his deputy will become part of the council leadership. The departments retain the methodological support of universal legal education. This is precisely the way that the question was resolved in Sverdlovsk Oblast, where the department conducts all the methodological work together with the Political Education House.

As for the union Ministry of Justice, it will exert its influence upon the state of affairs through its own representatives in the councils. And, in addition, it should be given the right, jointly with the new State Committee for Public Education and with other interested departments, to develop and approve curricula, programs, teaching aids, and textbooks, according to law for all types of educational institutions and all forms of legal propaganda among the public.

[Question] But the bulk of the work in providing the legal education of the public is still being carried out at the rayon level. Why, then, will the instruction programs be developed at the center?

[Answer] There is a manifestation here of one of the trends in the intensification of state management of universal education. The center will develop standard programs, and then the outlying areas are supposed to make adjustments with a consideration of the local conditions and the republic legislation. Blind copying of programs can lead to formalism, and this must be completely prevented. Because the organizing of universal legal education determines the formation of new legal thinking, and the elimination of legal nihilism. We must use all methods and means to overcome the trend in legal propaganda that has been firmly established for years—the trend toward information and enlightenment—and must intensify its link with life, with the tasks of reinforcing labor, state, and planning discipline, socialist legality, and the protection of the citizens' rights and legal interests.

[Question] Am I really to believe that no such link has yet existed for legal propaganda?

[Answer] Yes, it has existed. However, to a large extent only in words. Lecturers on legal matters did not always relate the content of their lectures or discussions on legal topics to the situation in those collectives where there were speaking. Repeated studies of legal propaganda that were carried out by the Ministry of Justice in educational institutions and labor collectives ascertained that that propaganda is sometimes carried out without a thorough analysis of the state of legality or law and order in the outlying areas, and, consequently, without a consideration of the true situation. How, for example, can one explain, if not by formalism in legal education, the fact that the many years of instruction provided to economic

cadres have not moved them off the spot with regard to the reinforcement of legality in economic and labor relations in the institutions that they manage? Over a prolonged period of time, the people's courts annually satisfy approximately one-half the suits involving job restitution (in 1987, 48 percent)! Last year the procuracy agencies lodged 250,000 protests against illegal acts by state agencies and social organizations. Among them, 101 acts enacted with a violation of the law were ascertained in union and republic agencies of administration, 528 illegal decision in kray and oblast agencies, 8810 in city and rayon agencies, and 2929 decisions passed by village and settlement soviets of people's deputies were enacted with a violation of legal norms. And these figures are for one year only!

Well, the legal education was carried out. And we reported from various rostrums about its successes. But legal illiteracy and legal ignorance on the part of certain economic and administrative cadres flourished in the country and there was an increase in their legal cynicism.

[Question] Do you mean, then, that the legal education that was carried out until recently yielded very little?

[Answer] Whether it was "much" or "little" has to be correlated with today's tasks. Quite a bit was done. But while we may possibly have been satisfied to a certain degree with what was done yesterday, the system of legal education that has developed cannot by any means satisfy us today, when we are in the process of a profoundly revolutionary perestroika in all spheres of social life, when an economic reform is being carried out, and a process of democratization and glasnost is under way. Moreover, in my opinion, we cannot adapt the old system to the new requirements or the new tasks. It must be fundamentally reformed.

[Question] Wherein consists today's task of restructuring the legal education of the public, of organizing universal education?

[Answer] Today, when the preparation of the nationwide program of universal legal education is proceeding at full swing, we are faced with the task of collecting all the tiniest bits of information constituting the entire experience of legal education that has been accumulated in the country, of studying it thoroughly, analyzing it, and selecting from it those features that are most valuable. Legal propagandists are faced with the task of bringing legal education closer to the work place and the place of residence of every individual.

[Question] Do you mean that this never used to be done?

[Answer] Yes, of course, it was done, but by no means everywhere. And, once again, this is confirmed by the figures: the magazine CHELOVEK I ZAKON, for example, last year alone received 120,000 letters, in which the citizens asked for explanations of various questions pertaining to housing, retirement, and labor legislation.

Notice that these were not letters containing complaints about specific matters (I am not talking about them), but containing questions that sometimes attested to complete legal incompetency, although many of them had studied (or were enrolled as students) in higher courses and seminars on law. And how many similar letters did other newspapers and magazines receive? Every year the central mass information media alone receive approximately two million of them. It is understandable that letters such as this attest also to the growing interest among Soviet people toward the problems of law and legality. However, the nature of the questions speaks eloquently about the lack of legal information on the part of the citizens. And it also attests to the fact that not everyone can receive the answers to his questions where he lives and works. That is the situation that has to be fought. We need a precise system for making the content of legal acts known to every labor collective, every citizen.

[Question] What legal knowledge, and in what volume, should be given to the population?

[Answer] It would be unrealistic to strive for a situation in which everyone studies all the branches of law in complete volume. Nor are legal experts capable of doing that. Certainly there is also no need to strive for a situation in which today absolutely everyone is set down at a schoolroom desk to study law. The persons who must be the very first ones to obtain legal knowledge are those who, by virtue of their official or public duties, are linked with the application of the legal norms. These are millions of people—economic managers, workers at the *ispolkoms* of the local soviets, middle-level managers, workers at administrations and departments of personnel, labor, and wages, trade-union workers, people's controllers, members of people's *druzhinas*, members of comrade courts, and many others. They must be given knowledge in that volume that is necessary for making well-substantiated decisions, and for the competent fulfillment of occupational and civic duties. And also—and this is no less important—for protecting their own rights.

[Question] What will have to be done first of all to eliminate the public's legal illiteracy?

[Answer] As the experience of universal legal education has shown, we must begin with the creation of legal schools at the enterprises, institutions, and organizations themselves. We must introduce the study of law into the system of economic, political, and Komsomol education. This is not a new idea. Everything has already existed before, but in recent years legal questions have almost disappeared from the system of political training, and then from the system of economic and Komsomol training, or those questions have been dealt with in miserly volume that is insufficient to assure that the citizens receive even an elementary awareness of their rights and duties. And this is also the result of the formal approach to the carrying out of legal education and the cost of legal nihilism.

[Question] What do you think should be the basic trends in universal education?

[Answer] Universal education must become an important link in the developing system of continuous education. It is necessary to change fundamentally the approach to the study of law in the educational system, beginning with the primary school and ending with the institutions of higher learning and the academies, in the state system to provide refresher classes and retraining for administrative workers and specialists in the national economy, and in all forms of mass instruction for the workers at enterprises, associations, institutions, and their place of residence.

One of the chief trends, in conformity with decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, is the legal education of young people. Then, the providing of instruction to the economic cadres and the public *aktiv*. It is, obviously, from these three directions that the universal education should be begun.

[Question] But the country has only approximately 200,000 legal experts. And even those categories of the public that mentioned as being the first among those who require legal instruction number in the tens of millions. By what efforts can one guarantee their legal instruction?

[Answer] I can only cite once again the experience of Sverdlovsk Oblast. When extending the work of organizing universal legal education, the people in Sverdlovsk Oblast created groups of propaganda specialists from among the legal scientists and practitioners. In the course of a year, in the cities and rayons, those groups conducted classes with the *aktiv* that dealt with the most pertinent and complicated legal problems (primarily questions pertaining to economic legislation and the Law Governing the State Enterprise). After obtaining definite legal knowledge, the best-trained individuals were able themselves to conduct the legal propaganda, providing elementary concepts concerning law. The legal experts assumed the responsibility for ten rayons in order to render constant assistance there in the legal education of the population. The remaining rayons will send their propaganda specialists to the oblast center for participation in seminars. Thus, the persons who have been involved in the work of universal legal education include, in addition to legal experts, the party, soviet, and trade-union workers and Komsomol *aktiv* who have undergone the necessary legal training.

A legal school has been created under the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee of the CPSU. That school is for the purpose of training of workers in the obkom and oblast *ispolkom* apparatuses, the chiefs of the oblast administrations, and trade-union, Komsomol, and economic managers. Approximately 400 persons are studying there. Similar schools have been created under the party's *gorkoms* and *raykoms*.

There is a rather large number of forms for studying law, and those forms are the most diverse. Good experience in teaching economic managers has been achieved in Mari ASSR. Lithuanian SSR has an interesting form of universal legal education: through a system of conducting republic-wide contests in legal knowledge. In Estonia approximately 5 percent of the adult population attends the universities of legal knowledge. We also have experience in involving persons who are not legal experts in universal legal education.

[Question] But are the legal experts themselves read to carry out universal legal education?

[Answer] I think that they are not quite ready. It will be necessary to do a great deal to raise the level of methodological training of the legal propagandists from among the legal experts. Many people (especially young people who have entered law-enforcement agencies in recent time) are experiencing difficulties in preparing for statements to be made to the population, in establishing contacts with their audience, in explaining aspects of the law in easily assimilated form, and in conducting a dialogue with their listeners (and today people can no longer take the rostrum and drily expound only that which has been written in the footnotes to the legal codes). Young legal specialists also lack experience in organizing question and answer evenings and debates. Some of them get completely confused when they are unable to find an answer to questions asked from the floor which sometimes are very acute. And there are other problems. Frequently, without receiving methodological assistance from anyone, young propaganda specialists reduce their legal-education work to formal measures, for the sake of getting a "check mark" in a report.

USSR Ministry of Justice will soon be ending the work of preparing the curricula for six categories of legal schools. Methodological teaching aids will be developed on their basis.

[Question] What legal schools are you referring to?

[Answer] The legal schools under the Councils of Ministers of the union and autonomous republics; those under the kray ispolkoms; for the economic and party aktiv in the rayons; under village and settlement soviets of people's deputies; in the ministries, state committees, and departments of union and autonomous republics; and at enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

[Question] And one final question, Andrey Adamovich: when will the new universal legal education begin to gain momentum?

[Answer] It has already begun to gain momentum. True, it has unfortunately not done so everywhere. In Kirghizia, Latvia, certain oblasts of RSFSR, and also in a number of other parts of the country, people are still awaiting instructions concerning when to begin. A rather

large amount of formalism continues to be encountered. But we cannot delay any longer: the new school year in the system of universal legal education will be here very soon.

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Journal Calls For All-Union Campaign Against Organized Crime

18000535b Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST in Russian No 6 (signed to press 7 Jan 88) pp 45-47

["Letter to the editor" by N. Nikolayev: "Problems of Fighting Organized Crime"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee, in its 2 April 1988 decree entitled "The State of the Fight Against Crime in the Country, and Additional Measures to Prevent Offenses," noted that, in addition to certain positive factors in the fight against offenses and crime there have recently begun to appear negative tendencies which cannot fail to disturb the party and society.

These tendencies, from our point of view, must include organized crime. There was a time when the existence of organized crime was not simply denied, but moreover a theoretical substantiation was provided, attesting to its impossibility in developed socialist society, and it was considered apolitical to state otherwise. For the sake of justice, it must be said that in the form in which organized crime exists today, it actually did not exist previously. But even then, when it had already begun to spread like a cancerous growth, we continued to close our eyes to the problem. And it is only comparatively recently that people, finally, have begun to talk openly about it.

We must acknowledge the scientific and civic bravery of learned criminologists who convincingly proved its existence. One of the first to do this was Professor I. Karpets, director of the All-Union Institute of the USSR Procuracy, at the 6th International Congress of Criminologists from the Socialist Countries, in Moscow in 1987 (see SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST, No 8, 1987). However, the official agencies did not hasten to acknowledge that fact or to make the appropriate conclusions from it. Meanwhile practical life has been forced to take into consideration the real state of affairs and to take steps in the fight against organized crime.

A major turning point with respect to this problem occurred after the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress, when bans were decisively removed—the bans dealing with the possibility of bringing to criminal responsibility any officials who were wallowing in corruption, bribery,

thefts, protectionism, and other abuses. The law-enforcement agencies, and primarily the procuracy, dealt the first powerful blows to the centers of organized crime, despite the resistance and footdragging on the part of influential individuals, and they unmasked and brought to criminal responsibility a considerable number of morally degenerate officials, including those who were occupying high positions in party and soviet agencies, ministries, and departments. Areas that proved to be affected by the "malignant growth" were entire areas of the country (Krasnodar Kray, Rostov Oblast, Moscow, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, etc.), the trade network, and personal services. Information about this was made public knowledge, and the trials were reported in the press and over the radio and television. The people warmly supported the decisive steps to eradicate organized crime.

It would seem that we should sound a fanfare and be well satisfied with our successes. But practical life shows us that the first blows only stunned temporarily and put into a state of shock certain criminal groupings. Many of them went into hiding. However, as one can be convinced by the experience of the fight against organized crime in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and other regions of the country, we have not yet got all the way down to the deeply underlying roots. We removed only the first echelons. Moreover, after regaining consciousness and restructuring itself (because the criminal world also has its own "perestroika"), organized crime has changed over to the counteroffensive, changing its tactics in certain respects, but never renouncing the use of the old, time-tested methods: blackmail, intimidation, graft, and even such extreme measures as murder (for example, in Turkmenia). The first to sound the alarm were the journalists. Obviously, they relied not so much upon their own observations as upon materials provided by the court trials and by conversations with the public, with party, soviet, and economic workers, investigators, procurators, and MVD employees. Items were published in various newspapers—PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

The situation actually does evoke serious alarm. Corruption, protectionism, mutual guarantee, bribery, graft, brazen robbing of the state, and other malfeasances have reached frightening proportions and have become extremely dangerous for the state and for society as a whole. The cancer has spread, as has already been mentioned, to entire regions of the country and to entire departments. According to A. Vlasov, USSR minister of internal affairs, it is not simply small pockets that have formed, but an entire system of plundering and bribery (KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1988, p 52). Urgent, time-responsive interference is required. It is obvious that this problem cannot be resolved simply by the means afforded by criminal law, since organized crime is not a phenomenon of criminal law, but rather is a complicated

social phenomenon. We need the joint efforts of all the state and monitoring agencies, the mass information media, and the public as a whole.

An absolutely mandatory requirement for uniting the efforts and means of waging this fight must be party leadership, party monitoring at the highest level.

One cannot fail to consider the fact that the situation today is being aggravated by the fact that "in the ranks of the aggressive forces" (the investigators, procurators, MVD employees, and judges) there has unfortunately been some confusion, and certain workers have been showing apathy and distrust. This is promoted by a rather large number of factors. These include the sharp and, we may as well admit, sometimes critical statements that, frankly speaking, were unexpected for many of our workers, and that appeared in the press, directed at the law-enforcement agencies, primarily the procuracy. No, we are not against criticism, but the criticism must be well-substantiated, convincing, and, very importantly, competent (and it is this last component that is most often lacking in many published items). Nor shall we conceal the fact that several of our workers perceive in an extremely morbid manner any criticism, even just criticism, and feel that sins should not be publicized too broadly. These are backward views and steps must be taken to eliminate them. We must learn to work under the conditions of glasnost and democratization. People will always understand and support any measures, even the strictest ones, in the fight against crime if those measures conform to the requirements of legality, justice, and humanitarianism.

Another situation that exerts a negative effect on the moods of the workers in the law-enforcement agencies is the fact that there have appeared "desires," "hints," and "appeals" to turn the crime around, and that has allegedly "got enough of them to move on." This pertains, in particular, to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, although there is still a tremendous amount of work to be done there. At a meeting of the party aktiv of Chimkent Oblast, for example, speakers clothed in power made statements containing mostly declarative appeals, but retreated from any specific measures for combatting corruption and protectionism. Moreover, offended voices were heard, asking how long we will have to chafe under the inspections. And yet in the oblast the number of official and other crimes has not decreased, but, rather, has increased. Administrators who have committed thefts and who have compromised themselves are being transferred to other assignments, and several of them have even received higher positions. It is not surprising that the population of the oblast (97.9 percent of the persons surveyed) consider the work of eradicating negative situations to be ineffective (IZVESTIYA, 7 April 1988). This situation also exists in other parts of the country.

Paradoxical as it sounds, the reduction in the aggressiveness of the investigators, procurators, and MVD workers was promoted by the increase in demandingness, exactingness with respect to the quality of investigation on the

part of the courts. There was a noticeable increase in the number of cases returned for additional investigation after being stopped at various stages. Many of them, as the expression goes, just "fall to pieces." I shall not discuss in detail the reasons for this. That is a separate topic of discussion. In the overwhelming majority of instances the returning of cases, their discontinuance, and the giving of verdicts of not guilty was justified and was the result of errors made in investigation, its poor quality, official sloppiness, and sometimes, unfortunately, direct malfeasance. But there have also been instances of the unjustified giving of a verdict of not guilty or the discontinuance and returning of cases by the courts. There has begun to manifest itself in a few places what I could call the possible danger of a not-guilty bias that is based on the fear of assuming the responsibility for accusing the criminals. Those are the kinds of instances that cause distrust and apathy, and that develop in people the attitude, "Am I really the person who is needed more than anyone else?" Moreover, this pertains primarily to persons linked precisely with organized crime (bribery, corruption, large-scale systematic thefts).

But probably the most dangerous thing is the onslaught of organized crime itself. In a number of instances, organized crime is not even squeamish about the direct falsification of materials that compromise conscientious workers, primarily investigators, procurators, MVD employees, and judges, as well as witnesses, journalists, and activists who have joined the fight against crime. We shall not repeat the examples, which have been reported in sufficient detail in the press.

The aggressive zeal that certain investigators used to have has fallen sharply. They are not always supported by the procurators. Here, in the "second echelon," a few people have also wavered, have failed to stand firm, and have begun to retreat from well-principled positions, having decided that it is simpler to hear reproaches about not having caught any bribers and about not having been able to turn up and substantiate proof of thefts and other illicit schemes, than to engage in the risky fight against criminals, to seek stubbornly for them, and to spend an awful lot of time collecting proof of their crimes.

We have also begun noticing these tendencies in our courts. Sometimes the judges attempt not to burden themselves with the establishment of the truth. They give in to the temptation of failing to make a responsible decision and instead of returning the case for additional investigation, that is, they occupy a passive, neutral position, as though the tasks of criminal legal proceedings do not pertain to them. And yet the law defines among those tasks the unmasking of the guilty individuals and the guaranteeing of the correct application of the law, to ensure that everyone who has committed a crime is given just punishment and not a single innocent person is brought to criminal responsibility and sentenced (Article 2 of the Principles of Criminal Legal

Proceedings); but certain judges have begun limiting their tasks only to the latter principle and have been refraining from unmasking the guilty individuals. But the readers should not consider this to be an appeal to give a bias toward guilty verdicts. That is not what we are dealing with.

In a word, the current situation requires the urgent introduction of order in the aggressive echelons, the mobilizing of all efforts, the thorough preparation for dealing a crushing blow at organized crime, since that also predetermines the aggressiveness of the struggle against crime as a whole.

The time has come to assign the major task (and I would take the risk of calling it a strategic one): the undermining of the roots of organized crime, the destruction of the links between criminal groupings (the task of its complete elimination would probably be unrealistic at the present time). The reader should not be confused by high-sounding words. We are dealing with very serious matters. What is recommended to be done first of all? Where should we begin?

First of all, we ought to carry out thorough preparations and then conduct an all-union conference on scientific practice, which would be devoted to problems of fighting organized crime, and to which sociologists, journalists, and party workers would be invited. It would also be desirable to discuss these questions at a coordination conference of administrators of law-enforcement agencies.

It would possibly be desirable to reinforce substantially the special structural subdivisions or groups to study this problem at the scientific-research institutes or similar departments in the central apparatuses of USSR MVD and USSR Procuracy.

The All-Union Institute of USSR Procuracy is already conducting the appropriate research. A collection of scientific works has been prepared, but this is obviously insufficient. Obviously, it is necessary to create a mobile group of scientists who are capable within the near future, without dragging out their research for five-year periods, of presenting an objective picture of that phenomenon, a thorough description of it, and to develop recommendations for practical life. Inasmuch as this is a comprehensive, complicated problem, the persons who are asked to take part in this work should possibly include not only criminologists, but also sociologists and economists.

In Soviet criminology, unfortunately, there currently exist a very small number of theoretical elaborations dealing with problems of organized crime.

In the science of criminal law, questions of complicity as a whole, and its forms and types, have been studied rather thoroughly. In particular, the concepts and

attributes of a criminal group and a criminal organization have been defined. But the criminological aspects of these problems have been almost unstudied. A criminal group, if it has existed for a long period of time and if it has well-established ties, is obviously nothing else but the primary, lowest form of organized crime (for example, bandit groups, gangs of plunderers, bribers, and speculators). In the theory of criminal law, an anti-Soviet organization is usually called a criminal organization. Perhaps this principle should also be reconsidered from criminological positions.

It is also necessary to study the regional peculiarities of organized crime. Obviously, it is not accidental that the most dangerous centers of organized crimes have proven to be in the Central Asian republics, in the Caucasus, and also in the areas where gold and other valuable metals are mined. Because organized crime has not caught on very well in the Nonchernozem Region, with its half-empty villages.

It will be necessary to carry out a very careful study of the peculiarities of the interdepartmental spread of organized crime, of the interdepartmental ties, routes, and methods of involving morally degenerate workers in the party and soviet apparatuses in criminal activity.

It is necessary to describe organized crime not only as a whole. It will obviously be necessary to subdivide its separate types. Even with the most superficial consideration, it is probably possible to isolate first of all the organized crime in the sphere of the national economy (official-economic crime). It will be necessary to study the ties in the world of the wheelers and dealers, the "shop men," the people in supply, and to ascertain the channels through which they derive profit. It is precisely here that the "fixed capital," the "economic base," is created, where the reserves of funds for graft, bribes, blackmail, etc. are created. And until that base is destroyed and until decisive steps are taken to eliminate moral degenerates from the ranks of economic managers, officials, and the soviet and party apparatus, it is useless to hope for any success in the fight against organized crime.

An independent type, but one that is closely linked with the previous one, is organized crime in the criminal world itself, among the criminals engaged not in "business," but in thefts, robberies, and banditry, and who do not feel squeamish about murders. This is essentially the most real Mafia (although in principle I am opposed to borrowing terms from bourgeois criminology concerning crime among the "white-collar criminals" and the Mafia, but in this instance there are quite a few outwardly similar features). The press has cited the example of the funeral of one of the leaders of the criminal world in Ashkhabad, which was attended by approximately 400 persons representing other criminal groups. In what respect was he not a "godfather" or were these not Mafia "families"?

It would be desirable also to study seriously the formation of criminal groupings in places of incarceration. For too long, nothing has been said about this topic. We learn of individual facts only from movies or from fiction. But the influence of these groupings, with the cult of criminal elements with their unlimited power, which is traditional for places of incarceration, surely extends not only to the criminal world. I will take the risk of being reproached for lacking the proof of my thesis, but it seems to me that it was not without the influence of prison mores that the so-called nonregulation relations formed in the army, as well as the "grandfather system" and similar phenomena at PTU.

And finally, the improvement of legislation. Would it not be desirable to introduce new norms concerning responsibility for corruption and protectionism, and to reconsider the norms concerning speculation and private entrepreneurship?

In a word, there are quite a few very acute and very pertinent problems linked with organized crime. And they must be resolved urgently.

Editor's note: We welcome replies to the questions raised in this letter, and also welcome concrete recommendations.

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Kirghiz MVD Restructures Investigation Apparatus

18000606 *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian* 7 Jun 8 p 3

[Interview with Police Colonel Vyachesla. Periklovich Chilikidi, chief, Investigative Division, Kirghiz SSR MVD by SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondents: "A Guarantee of Justice"; date and place not given; first four paragraphs in boldface comprise SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA introduction]

[Text] The line aimed at expanding democratization also presupposes a further strengthening of socialist legality. As noted at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the power of the people entails the complete and indivisible triumph of the laws which express their will.

Nevertheless, legal nihilism, which expressed itself with particular clarity during the years of stagnation, led to serious lapses in the juridical field. It is not by chance that the instances where socialist legality is violated are still fairly frequent. Moreover, at times they are not merely the result of incompetence or non-conscientiousness on the part of certain employees of the law-enforcement organs, but also the lack of improvement in the legal system per se.

Therefore, an active quest is now being engaged in for new forms and operating methods for the investigatory organs and law courts, for working out such organizational structures as would guarantee the firm observance of socialist legality. Today the questions posed by our correspondents are answered by the chief of the Investigative Division, Kirghiz MVD, Police Colonel Vyacheslav Periklovich Chilikidi.

[Question] In February of this year the collegium of the Kirghiz SSR MVD adopted a decision to transfer the MVD's investigative apparatus to experimental operating conditions. We'd like to know what brought this about, and what the essence of the experiment is.

The problem of restructuring the MVD's investigative apparatus, moreover, not only in Kirghizia but throughout the entire country, arose a long time ago. From the very beginning of the formation of the preliminary investigative organs within the MVD system, and this occurred in 1963, a number of fundamental errors were permitted. The principal error was that the investigative apparatus turned out to be subordinate to the inquest organs in the persons of the GROVD-UVD chiefs. In the normative documents, although the procedural independence of the investigators was stipulated, it actually boiled down to nothing, since on matters of financial, material, and technical provisions, as well as opportunities for advancement in the service, complete authority belonged to the chiefs of the internal affairs organs. They enjoyed the right of hiring and firing, as well as of providing incentives and punishments. Willy-nilly, therefore, the investigators' independence was suppressed, which contradicted the requirements of Art. 30 of the Fundamentals of the Criminal Court Procedures of the USSR, where it is stated directly that "all decisions concerning the direction to be taken by an investigation and the investigative actions to be followed shall be undertaken by the investigator independently, with the exception of cases where the law provides for approval to be obtained from the procurator, and the investigator shall bear complete responsibility for their lawful and timely promulgation." As a result, a unique, scissors-like "discrepancy" was formed between an investigator's rights, as confirmed by the law, and the possibility of implementing them. Therefore, the reform which is being conducted these days, so far by way of an experiment, is supposed to eliminate this "discrepancy" and bring preliminary investigations into full accordance with the basis of law. For this purpose the GROVD-UVD investigative apparatus has been completely taken out from under the chiefs of the internal affairs organs and made subordinate only vertically to the chiefs of the higher-ranking investigative subdivisions and the investigative administration of the Kirghiz SSR MVD. This organizational measure is supposed to specifically ensure the independence and self-sufficiency of the preliminary investigative organs. Furthermore, agreement has been reached with the republic's procurator concerning the inclusion of the chiefs of the investigative subdivisions in the coordination councils of the law-enforcement organs,

and this will also enhance the significance of the investigative organs. The essence of the reform consists in strengthening the citizens' guarantees of their rights and interests, as well as to exclude any instances of deviations from the norms of socialist legality.

[Question] Can it be stated that the new structure is free of flaws?

[Answer] I would also like to emphasize that the experiment now being conducted encompasses more than 35 percent of the country's investigative apparatus. In certain regions, specifically in Belorussia, Estonia, as well as in Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, and a number of other oblasts of the RSFSR, it began in August of last year. Already now we can draw some preliminary conclusions to the effect that the new structure of the investigative apparatus is more improved. Nevertheless, it needs to be said straight out that not everything is yet proceeding smoothly. Certain difficulties have arisen in overcoming the psychological barrier in the mutual relations between the GROVD-UVD chiefs and their opposite numbers among the leading officials of the investigative subdivisions. Some have difficulty get rid of the habit of issuing commands, while others have trouble losing the habit of being excessively subordinate. There are complications in matters of material and technical supply, which still remain in the hands of the chiefs of the internal-affairs organs. Nevertheless, all these difficulties can be overcome, inasmuch as the experiment is characterized by the fact that there is no turning back. It will be completed by the adoption of normative documents which, by a legislative procedure, will strengthen the reorganization of the investigative apparatus on those basic foundations about which we have already spoken.

[Question] On more than one occasion we've had occasion to hear or to read in the periodical press that the principle of the law-enforcement organs is observed more on paper than in practice. Is that really so? Moreover, distrust is sometimes uttered in the very principle of the presumption of innocence in Soviet legal practice.

[Answer] Before answering that question, I must, albeit briefly, state what the presumption of innocence is. Too often in recent times reproaches have been made that this principle has been violated. Moreover, there has quite frequently been a unique kind of substitution of concepts, i.e., the principle of presumption of interest is connected with matters which have absolutely nothing to do with it. But just what is the presumption of innocence from the viewpoint of criminal-procedural law?

It is, above all, a constitutional principle which consists of the concept that no person can be deemed guilty until this is proven in a procedure established by law. Moreover, as the jurists say, the "burden of proof" lies on the appropriate organs. Art. 14 of the Fundamentals of USSR Court Procedure directly states as follows on this score. "Neither the court, the procurator, the investigator, nor the person conducting the inquest have the right to shift

the burden of proof onto the accused." Is this principle observed in legal-investigatory practice? I can say with complete certitude that it is observed in the overwhelming majority of cases. As proof of this, all I have to do is cite the fact that the basic mass of criminal cases are investigated in full accordance with the law. Moreover, virtually every case proceeds through multiple checks both from the leading officials of the investigative organs, as well as by the procurator's office and the court. At the same time, we must recognize that errors do occur, and sometimes direct deviations from the requirements of the law. Both kinds of errors are utterly inadmissible, and, therefore, that criticism which is nowadays being leveled at the law-enforcement organs in the pages of the press brings only benefits, inasmuch as it compels us once again to evaluate and weigh the evidence in order to avoid any possible juridical errors. I would only wish that this criticism be reliable and creditable in all instances, that it be based on facts and not on rumors, on objective assessments, rather than on subjective opinions.

Somehow it came about that everybody considers themselves to be specialists in the field of jurisprudence, although this work requires at least as much, if not more, than any precise science. It also turns out, therefore, that on the basis of certain isolated facts, general conclusions are drawn, or one concept is substitute for others. Sometimes you read this or that published piece, written by a talented but insufficiently competent author; you put yourself in the shoes of a reader who is far from juridical life. And you think the following: What a bunch of bad guys have gotten together in these law-enforcement organs! All they think about is condemning an innocent person for the benefit of their own self-seeking interests. Such published pieces, in my opinion inflict harm. In addition to the fact that they undermine the authority of our employees, who, for the most part, are honest and dedicated people, they create a patently tendentious idea of the very essence of our work. I'd like to be correctly understood here. I'm not against criticism; I'm for it. But criticism ought to be constructive and objective, based not on facts garnered in the pursuit of sensation, when "for the sake of a hot story, one wouldn't spare even one's own father." On this score it would obviously be appropriate to recall again the words of CPSU Central Committee Secretary A.N. Yakovlev: "Accuracy is not just a good deed but a duty for a journalist. Knowledge of the facts and of the matter about which you're writing is the corner-stone of any presentation."

[Question] Now, during the course of the discussion of the new criminal-procedural legislation, people are coming out with the opinion that we need a change in the mechanism of preliminary investigation. In particular, it is proposed that we allow the investigated person's lawyer to be present during this process. How would this influence the course and quality of the investigation?

[Answer] This question can be answered simply. Expanding the participation by a defense attorney at the stage of a preliminary investigation would bring only benefits. The apprehensions which certain jurists state in this regard seem excessive. By the way, we already have considerable experience in the present criminal process. For the moment when charges are presented, defense attorneys are permitted to take part in cases of crimes committed by juveniles, as well as persons who, because of physical or mental handicaps cannot exercise their own rights to defend themselves. Upon the procurator's discretion, a defense attorney can be admitted to a case from the moment when the charges are presented and in certain other cases. Therefore, there are no problems here. From allowing a defense attorney to participate, the quality of an investigation can only gain and acquire a more objective nature.

[Question] Vyacheslav Periklovich, we'd like to find out how people become investigators; what requirements are needed for this most prestigious profession.

[Answer] The profession of investigator is not so prestigious as it is difficult, requiring a complete devotion of strength and nerves. Those persons are profoundly mistaken who conceive this profession in terms of detective novels and films. In real life everything is considerably more complex and not so attractive as it is in motion pictures. At our level of organizational technology and the clumsy, awkward nature of the criminal process, the main weapon of an investigator, just as many years ago, remains the fountain pen. It can be stated with assurance that there is no place in investigative work for those who do not possess perseverance or who do not write well. To these qualities we must add many others: a penetrating quality, resourcefulness, the ability to compete and survice, spiritual sensitivity, the ability to communicate, and endurance.

Unfortunately, there are not many such investigators. There are also shortcomings in the professional training, and the fact is that sometimes people simply "fall into" investigative work.

We still meet to share our knowledge with students all too rarely, although we understand that we lose many prospects because of this shortcoming. To be sure, a definite shift has now been noted. An agreement has been prepared between the university and the MVD on the procedure for recruiting and training future specialists; measures are being taken to discover students who are capable of investigative work at the very beginning of their instruction.

**Nationality Issues in Latvia from 1960 to 1980
Examined**

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[Article by B. Ya. Pudels: "National Relations in Latvian SSR in the 1960's Through 1980's: Achievements and Problems"]

[Text] At the February 1988 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it was noted that "at the present stage it is necessary to engage very thoroughly in national policy. This must proceed along all lines—both in theory and in practice. This is a fundamental, vitally important question for our society."¹ As one of the basic tasks of social policy and the activation of the human factor, the party promotes the improvement of national relations, the reinforcement of the friendship among all the nations and nationalities in our country. The period that has passed since the 27th CPSU Congress is characterized by the increased participation rate in spiritual matters among the members of our society, by the public's lively interest in events of the past and the present, and by sharp and fixed attention to problems pertaining to one's political outlook and to morality and ethics, as is attested by statements in the press, radio, and television. In published items and statements devoted to the development of nations and national relations, light has been thrown on a number of negative phenomena in implementing into social practice the principles of the Leninist national policy and of proletarian internationalism and a number of acute questions pertaining to the cultivation of communication among nationalities which, until recently, were not generally discussed. However, under the guise of glasnost and the expanding democratization of Soviet society, we not infrequently encounter a tendentious, over-simplified explanation of the existing problems in relations among nationalities, and the conscious or unconscious striving to belittle or even to forget those achievements in the area of the development of the Soviet nations and nationalities which today are generally accepted and self-explanatory. As was noted in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, "the principles of resolving the national question in our country were laid by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Relying upon the teaching of V. I. Lenin and the gains of socialism, the Communist Party has carried out a gigantic amount of reform work in this area. Its results constitute an outstanding gain of socialism, a gain that has enriched world civilization. National oppression and national inequality in all its forms and manifestations have been eliminated once and for all. The indissoluble friendship of peoples, respect for the national culture and national dignity of all peoples, have been firmly established and have entered the awareness of tens of millions of people. The Soviet nation acts as a qualitatively new social and international commonality, which has been welded together by the unity of economic interests, ideology, and political

goals"². It is indisputable that the concepts of "equality," "sovereignty," "trust among nations and nationalities," "cooperation among peoples," "the friendship of peoples," and "respect for national dignity" have been converted into convictions and the behavioral norm for millions of Soviet citizens, including the inhabitants of Soviet Latvia, and they are proud of the republic's development during the years of the Soviet authority, while being completely aware at the same time that the improvement of what has been achieved is a civic duty that every member of our society shares in common. And although the analysis of national relations today should not be approached with old yardsticks, in accordance with the principle of "propagandizing the successes," one also should not engage in the artificial blackening either of the past or of the present. We need the objective, honest, and complete truth.

Today one also should not forget that the unification of all the peoples living on the territory of the Soviet Union, in a single union state, occurred voluntarily, on the basis of the Leninist principle of self-determination. Moreover, V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized precisely the right to separate, considering, however, that separation is not mandatory, but the right to separate is indeed mandatory. In his work "The Question of National Policy," V. I. Lenin wrote, "We are convinced that, all other conditions being equal, the major states can resolve much more successfully than the small ones the tasks of economic progress and the tasks of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But we value a bond that is only voluntary, and one that is never coercive... without in any way preaching invariably the separation of every nation, we defend unconditionally and decisively the right of every nation to its political self-determination, that is, to separate. Defending, preaching, acknowledging that right means defending the legal equality of nations..."³ The right of nations to self-determination is the very core of Leninist theory concerning the national question, the core that provides the key to the understanding of the historical-economic and political prerequisites for the arising of the sovereign republics of the Soviet Union, and the natural laws that underlie their development. Moreover, the meaning of the creation of the USSR consisted, while soliciously preserving the language, culture, and traditions of every people, in putting an end to national feuds and the attempts of one people to prove its superiority over others. It was precisely the development within the confines of the union state that contributed to the unprecedented national development of each nation and nationality, and to the upsurge of its national self-awareness. Today peoples that are practically equal under the law, that are economically, socially, and culturally developed, cooperate with one another and exert an influence upon one another. And this requires a substantial psychological perestroika both on the part of those who previously helped and on the part of those who were helped. Today, to use the words of V. I. Lenin, "precisely that historic moment has come when theory is being converted into practice, when it is being enlivened

by practice, corrected by practice, and checked by practice,"⁴ when, by common efforts, the ideals of socialism are being purified of everything that is extraneous, that has been inhibiting the further development of socialist society.

For almost 48 years Soviet Latvia has been traveling along the path of socialist development. It has been converted into an industrially developed republic with a powerful detachment of industrial workers and its own highly qualified national intellectual class. During all these years the development of Latvian SSR was characterized by the clearly expressed action of the basic law of the development of socialist nations and national relations—the dynamic unity of two tendencies: the flourishing and rapprochement of nations. On the one hand, there has been a flourishing of the national economy and culture, and on the other hand, the flourishing was carried out as a result of the constantly developing and constantly deepening ties, that is, by the rapprochement of the nations and nationalities on the basis of the country's single national-economic complex. Moreover, that process occurred by means of the specialization and comprehensive development of the union republic, with a consideration of the existence of highly qualified cadres, its natural and economic peculiarities, and the interests of the entire country.

According to Marxist-Leninist theory of national relations, the flourishing of nations means, first, the achievement of a high level of development of its economy, political life, and spiritual culture; secondly, the fact that all the material and spiritual achievements of the nation go to satisfy the needs and demands of the workers themselves.⁵ Flourishing is the consistent, complete realization of the opportunities of the nation's economy and culture and of scientific progress, and the reinforcement of the socialist national state principle and the growth of national self-awareness. Flourishing is primarily the qualitative description of national life under conditions of socialism, a description that is not reduced only to quantitative parameters, although it is precisely the latter which indicate most graphically the real achievements of the particular republic. Real flourishing can be achieved only in the event that the nation takes from others that which is the most progressive, the most internationally valuable, and uses it in its own specific conditions. The flourishing of a nation means not only a new, higher level of economic, social, cultural, and spiritual development, but also the degree of the nation's ability to take from the progressive traditions and achievements of other peoples, and the ability to enrich international experience with its own national specifics, experience which has received acknowledgement in view of its economic, cultural, and scientific significance.

But the tendency toward the rapprochement of nations manifests itself in the constant communication among the Soviet nations and nationalities, in cooperation, and in the reciprocal exchange of advanced experience and

the best achievements in various spheres of life, progressive traditions, features of spiritual life, etc.⁶ Because in the multinational Soviet country, peoples are in a colossally broad and deep process of interaction. They are in contact on an economic, social, and cultural level, and favorable conditions have been created in order to bring them closer together, in order to overcome national narrowmindedness, exclusivity, national arrogance, and chauvinism. But rapprochement should not be reduced only to the simple exchange of material or spiritual values. Chiefly it is the creation of qualitatively new overall features in the economy, cultural life, and everyday life, and the confirmation of the awareness of international unity and friendship in people's awareness.

The action both of the tendency of flourishing and the tendency of rapprochement is of an objective nature and neither the artificial nudging nor the restraining of the objective tendencies of development that have matured is admissible. But objective laws are implemented not in and of themselves, but through people's purposeful actions. However, when we attempted to do something more rapidly, we have sometimes done worse, representing that what we wanted is what we had achieved, and this led to serious mistakes made in the area of national relations.

Soviet Latvia, like all the other national-state formations in the USSR, is an organic component of the union-wide national-economic and political complex, and this guarantees the high steady rates of its economic growth. Cooperative action among nationalities, and various forms of economic interrelationships between Latvian SSR and other republics in the Soviet Union, are widely developed here.

On the territory of Soviet Latvia large-scale specialized enterprises have been operating successfully. Those enterprises are able to produce complicated output that has a demand in the domestic market of the Soviet Union—Latvian enterprises produce all the cars for electric and diesel trains, every sixth diesel engine and diesel generator and motor bus, every fifth streetcar and radio receiver, every seventh washing machine, 60 percent of all the telephone sets, 27 percent of automatic telephone switchboards, and many other products. Ninety-five percent of the shipments handled in the ports of Latvian SSR are through shipments; the commodity turnover in the port of Ventspils constitutes half the total commodity turnover in the ports of the USSR Baltic Basin.⁷ Enterprises with 1000 or more workers employ more than two-thirds of all the workers in industry, and produce approximately 70 percent of the industrial output.⁸ In Latvian SSR the per-capita production of meat and fish products, butter, eggs, as well as woolen and linen fabrics, stockings, chinaware, furniture, and other kinds of other is considerably greater than for the country as a whole, and this reflects on the standard of living of the republic's population.

At the present time, when the equalization of the levels of the republics' economic development has been achieved and there has been an increase in the volume of ties among the republics, the economy of each of the republics is not only inseparable from the economic progress of the country's entire national economy, but is also determined by the latter. This natural law is becoming more and more intensified and predetermines the need to take into consideration both the national and the international interests of each nation and nationality, and the dialectical unity of the national and the international. Under these conditions a factor that takes on special importance is the cultivation of communication among peoples in the labor sphere, a cultivation which, in particular, is expressed in fraternal cooperation, the observance of contractual pledges among the union republics, in the discipline of reciprocal shipments, and in guaranteeing the proper contribution by each republic to the country's single national-economic complex. Violations of the cultivation of communication in the labor sphere lead not only to serious economic problems under conditions of the action of the new economic mechanism, but also demonstrate examples of the manifestation of disdain for the needs and wants of the country's peoples. In this regard the CPSU Program states that "the CPSU will continue to fight consistently against any manifestations of local or national narrowmindedness, and simultaneously to show constant concern for further increasing the role of the republics... in the resolution of nationwide tasks..."⁹

Despite the fact that Latvian SSR during the postwar period developed at rather high rates, during the 1970's and 1980's one began to see in the development of its economy the manifestation of negative tendencies, especially in the area of the occupational training of cadres, in the lack of the necessary initiative, in shortcomings in administering the economy, etc. In addition, during all the postwar years the republic developed extensively—the number of persons employed in industry in the 8th Five-Year Plan increased by 14.4 percent; the 9th, 2 percent; the 10th, 2.2 percent; and the 11th, 0.5 percent. The factors of extensive development in the economy of Latvian SSR proved to be completely exhausted¹⁰. The prolonged extensive development resulted in the maturation of social tension, and this could not fail to reflect upon the national relations, where there had been a hidden accumulation, over the decades, of unresolved social, cultural, and ecological problems, and distortions in the economic and moral spheres, since, in a multinational environment, any dissatisfaction that people have transfers over to national relations. It is generally known that national relations have never, nowhere, in any society, existed in "pure" form. They manifest themselves in a diverse complex of relations among nations and nationalities, and particularly in the political, economic, territorial, legal, ideological, cultural, linguistic, and other relations as one of the aspects of the dialectical unity of form and content. At the same time national

relations are typified by a relative independence, and they themselves can exert a substantial influence upon social relations, upon the ideological atmosphere of the multinational society.

Under the direct influence of the objective process of internationalism, which is one of the most important natural laws underlying the development of socialist society, the economic commonality of the indigenous population is converted into the economic commonality of the multinational population residing within the confines of the particular national-state formation, or, in our instance, the territory of Soviet Latvia. This is a completely natural consequence of the process of the internationalization of economic and sociopolitical life and the result of the commonality of the economic interests of the indigenous population and the population of other nationalities who are residing on the territory of the republic. The growth of the multinational nature of the population is a process that is completely natural and progressive, and that intensifies the socioethnic rapprochement and the unification of the nationalities, so long as the correct cadre policy, ideological work, international education of the entire population, and the observance of the principles of Leninist national policy are carried out.

A considerable influence on the development of nations and national relations in a multinational republic is exerted by the relations among the classes and social groups of society. They depend upon the ideological-moral internationalistic qualities of the cadres, and upon their efficiency in communication among nationalities. According to data from the 1979 population census, the working class in Latvian SSR constituted 58.6 percent; intellectual class, 27.8; kolkhoz peasantry, 13.5; and 13.5 percent of the able-bodied population. Individual peasants and entrepreneurs who were not participants in cooperatives constituted 0.1 percent.¹¹ In the 1970's, the industrial branches and the communications system employed 65.9 percent; agriculture, 11.4; and the services sphere, 22.7 percent of all the workers in the republic.¹² The indigenous population also has a high percentage in the industrial working class—in 1948 it constituted 55.8 percent; in 1949, 58.1 percent; and in 1950, 58.6 percent. Subsequently, as a result of the extensive development of the republic's economy, the percentage of the indigenous population in the working class decreased, but at the same time completely corresponded to the percentage of Latvians in the makeup of urban population: in 1959 that share was 56.3 percent; in 1963, 44; in 1967, 46; in 1970, 56.8; and in 1979, 53.7 percent.¹³ Thus, in the formation of the republic's working class one can see two tendencies. On the one hand, there has been an increase in the number of workers of indigenous nationality; and, on the other hand, there has been a rapid process of internationalization of the working class of Soviet Latvia—the "social intelligence and social heart" of society, according to K. Marx's definition. It is a generally accepted truth that the industrial

working class is the true carrier of the ideas of proletarian internationalism. Historically, the working class of Latvia was multinational, just as it is at the present-day stage. In 1913, 43.7 percent of the industrial workers in Riga were Latvians, and 24.8 percent were Russians¹⁴, and among the workers of industry, transportation, and construction as a whole in Riga, 53 percent were Latvians; 25 percent, Russians; 8 percent, Poles; 7 percent Lithuanians and others.¹⁵ The quantitative and qualitative changes in the working class in the environment of the indigenous nationality of the Latvian SSR, a working class that was linked by close social and production ties with the workers of other nationalities, were directed during the 1960's and 1970's toward the resolution of a dual task—national development proper, the growth and development of the Latvian socialist nation, and its rapprochement with the other nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union, the reinforcement of the friendship among the peoples of our country. The republic's *kolkhoz* peasantry and intellectual class are also international in their spirit and composition.

In the republic much attention is devoted to questions linked with raising the public's educational level, with training highly qualified specialists, and with developing science and technology and the public's spiritual culture. In particular, in 1959, 43.1 percent of the public had secondary or higher education; in 1970, 51.7; and in 1984, 69.8 percent; and their share among all the workers increased during the period from 1959 through 1979 from 50.2 percent to 79.5 percent, or by a factor of 1.6. By the beginning of 1984 out of every 1000 persons employed in the national economy in the republic, 855 had higher or secondary education. However, with regard to the educational level of the employed population, Latvian SSR occupies a relatively low place among the union republics, and the educational level has a tendency toward constant reduction. Thus, whereas in 1959 the republic occupied second place (after Armenian SSR), in 1970 it occupied seventh and in 1979 ninth place among the union republics, and for the first time the educational level of the employed population of Latvian SSR was below the average nationwide level. By 1984 Soviet Latvia already occupied the eleventh place among the union republics¹⁶. And although serious research is necessary, one can assume that this tendency is linked with the intensification of the migratory processes, which occurred especially intensively during the 1960's through the 1980's. At the present time Latvian SSR was chosen as the place of residence by 46.3 percent of the population of other nationalities, a definite number of whom have a low level of general and labor culture. As a result of the voluntary change in the place of residence of representatives of the fraternal nations and nationalities, from 1951 through 1984 the size of the population of Soviet Latvia increased by 364,000 persons. During the past 15 the mechanical increase has constituted two-thirds of the increase in the population of Latvian SSR. The extraordinarily high level of migration was also promoted by the immoderate development, along the extensive path, of a number of new industrial

areas in the 1960's and 1970's, their lack of provision with local manpower and resources, as well as the intensified tendency of migration from individual rayons of neighboring republics, particularly from RSFSR (Pskov Oblast) and Belorussian SSR (Vitebsk Oblast), as a result of the fact that their economy was catastrophically ruined during the years of Hitlerite occupation. As a result of the action of the factors that were mentioned, the number of Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, taken together, in the population of Latvian SSR by 1979 quintupled as compared with the prewar period.¹⁷ It is well known that the migratory processes are the basic factor that determines changes in national composition. In the opinion of sociologists in our country, they lend themselves poorly to regulatory action. Migration in such volumes as occurred in Latvian SSR and Estonian SSR during the stagnant years, and migration that does not lend itself to state control, led to a rather large number of complicated problems on a social and inter-ethnic nature (lack of provision with housing, unsatisfactory urban transportation, shortage of commodities). In particular, both in Estonian SSR and Latvian SSR there arose a qualitatively new ethnic situation that differs from that in the other union republics, when there is a change in the national composition of the population in the direction of a reduction in the share of the indigenous nation, and that is the result of demographic processes that are typical not only of the Baltic republics. For example, in 1959 in the national composition of the population of Latvian SSR, the share of Latvians constituted 62 percent; in 1970, 56.8 percent; and in 1979, 53.7 percent. Correspondingly the share of Russians increased from 26.6 percent in 1959 to 29.8 percent in 1970 and 32.8 percent in 1979; Belorussians, from 2.9 percent to 4 percent and 4.5 percent; Ukrainians, from 1.4 percent to 2.3 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. The share of other nationalities that traditionally lived on the territory of Latvian SSR has had a tendency to decrease: Poles, respectively, from 2.9 percent to 2.7 percent and 2.5 percent; Lithuanians, from 1.5 percent to 1.7 percent and 1.5 percent; Jews, from 1.8 percent to 1.6 percent and 1.1 percent¹⁸. The number of Latvians living in other union republics constituted, in 1959, 102,000 persons; and in 1979, 95,000 persons. In 1979, 93.4 percent of the Latvians lived in Latvian SSR. Only among the Georgians and Lithuanians is the indicator of compactness of residency higher than among the Latvians¹⁹. The new ethnic situation that was created in Latvian SSR requires sociological research and interpretation, how even today one can conclude that, apart from the problems linked with the creation of conditions to allow the migrants to adapt to the new environment of environment of a different nationality, one also begins to become aware of problems linked with the life of the indigenous nation, the national interests of which have proved to be, to a large extent, infringed upon.

Under conditions of the universal euphoria and complacency that prevailed in our society in the 1960's and 1970's with regard to the thesis of the final resolution of the national question in the USSR, insufficient attention

was devoted to the national processes that were occurring in the republic, and that were worsening the quality of the population, or to those social, psychological, and ideological consequences that were engendered by the excessive influx of people from outside the confines of the republic. Those problems confronted our society as a whole and the population of Soviet Latvia with particular clarity during the 1980's.

However, the multinational composition of the population does not have simply a negative function. With the observance of the Leninist principles of national policy, it exerts a positive influence upon national development, and promotes the spread and development of such ethnic processes as interethnic integration, that is, the arising of general features of culture and self-awareness among several nationalities with the preservation of the previous ethnic identity.²⁰ The most typical forms of the development of these processes is the formation of families of different nationalities and the development of bilingualism. Historically, the internationalistic traditions of the multinational population of Latvian SSR and the commonality of the ideals and goals of the representatives of the majority of various nationalities contributed to a situation in which, as compared with other republics, Latvian SSR has the largest percentage of families of different nationalities. Their share in the total number of families increased from 15.8 percent in 1959 to 21 percent in 1970. By the early 1980's every fourth family in the republic consisted of representatives of different nationalities. However, among the most numerous nationalities in the republic—Latvians and Russians—approximately 80 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of the marriages that are concluded are nationally homogeneous, thus guaranteeing ethnic stability.²¹ It is symptomatic that, in families in which one of the spouses is a Latvian and the other is a Russian, according to data provided by special research that was carried out, approximately half the adolescents identify themselves as Russians, and half consider themselves to be Latvians.²² This attests to the approximately identical prestige rating of the Latvian and Russian nationalities among the adolescents in one of the most widespread types of nationally mixed families in Latvian SSR.

In addition to the ethnic problems linked with nationally mixed marriages, the ethnic linguistic processes are of great importance. One of the basic principles of Leninist national policy is the guaranteeing of the free development and completely equal use by all citizens of the USSR of their national languages, together with the mastery of the Russian language, which in our society fulfills the function of a language for communication among nationalities. The question of bilingualism has not only international, but also national significance, since the knowledge of Russian expands a person's access to the achievements of native and world culture, science, and technology, and promotes the strengthening of our country's national-economic complex and the internationalization of state and public life. Knowing Russian is beneficial to the majority in the interests of

economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual development. Bilingualism, as a norm of life in a national republic, has been confirming itself more and more in Latvian SSR. A sociological study that was carried out in the republic in the 1970's indicated that 98.7 percent of the Belorussians surveyed in Latvia, 98 percent of the Jews, 96 percent of the Ukrainians, 84 percent of the Poles, 78 percent of the Latvians, 62 percent of the Estonians, and 57.5 percent of the Lithuanians are fluent in Russian. The Latvian language was named as the native language by 11 percent of the Lithuanians, 10 percent of the Poles, 7 percent of the Belorussians, 5 percent of the Ukrainians, 2 percent of the Jews, and 1.3 percent of the Russians. Russian was named as the native language by 46 percent of the surveyed Ukrainians, 45 percent of the Jews, 32 percent of the Belorussians, 11 percent of the Poles, 11 percent of the Estonians, 9 percent of the Lithuanians, and 2 percent of the Latvians.²³ Thus, three-fourths of the republic's population is fluent in Russian, whereas only one-fourth of the republic's population of other nationalities know the Latvian language. On the whole, young Latvians who have been inducted into the ranks of the Soviet Army also have a good mastery of Russian.²⁴ An idea of the sociolinguistic situation in the 1980's is provided by a survey that was conducted among workers at enterprises and collectives in 1983 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia. The data provided by the questionnaires indicates that 8.6 percent of the non-Latvians are completely fluent in Latvian; 23.7 percent do not know the Latvian language; 0.5 percent of the Latvians do not know Russian; and 43.4 percent of the Latvians are completely fluent in Russian. The largest number of persons who do not know Latvian occurs among workers at industrial enterprises and among construction workers (29.4 percent); but 22 percent of the specialists and 18.5 percent of the workers in the service sphere also do not know it. The largest number among Latvians who do not know Russian also occurs among workers in industry and construction (8 percent), and there are no specialists who do not know Russian.²⁵ Among Latvians, 58.3 percent are completely fluent in Russian, and among the non-Latvian population of Soviet Latvia, 19.1 percent are completely fluent in Latvian. As compared with certain other union republics, the level of Latvian-Russian bilingualism in the republic is relatively high. This can be explained by the public's educational level, the intensive processes of urbanization and industrialization, and also by the historical traditions of bilingualism and even trilingualism in Latvia. However, until recently insufficient attention was devoted to a second aspect of bilingualism—Russian-national bilingualism. As a consequence of the incorrectly understood implementation of the ideas of internationalism, when it was considered that society, in and of itself, moves ahead automatically to a greater and greater brotherhood of nations and the multinational collective necessarily is also an internationalistically mature collective and, in and of itself, creates a conflict-free situation with respect to relations among nationalities, there was, factually speaking, a complete ignoring of many of the real needs

and wants of the peoples, and there was a dogmatic and oversimplified understanding of the national relations under socialism. In particular, during the years of stagnation, under conditions when there was an intensification of the migratory influxes into the republic, the published works both of writers and of journalists specializing in social affairs, and of social scientists, rarely mentioned the need for purposeful, convincing, and well-argued propaganda for studying the language of the indigenous nationality. Published items of this kind did not begin to appear until after the 27th CPSU Congress. A. Ya. B.akena, a linguist who is well known in the republic and beyond its confines, correctly remarks that "for a long time we simply did not think about the effect that this has on national relations, on the psychological climate in this sphere, did not take into consideration the new factors arising here, which, if they remain unnoticed for a long period of time, have the risk of becoming acute ones. It is also necessary to keep in mind the fact that, in the eyes of the indigenous nationality, every problem—the demographic problem, the housing problem, the ecological problem that has become so acute in the republic—is frequently painted in national tones."²⁶

Under the conditions of objectively existing bilingualism that serves as a means for uniting people of different nationalities, it is important for a person to be aware not only of the value of his own native language, but also to be able to evaluate the importance of any other language in raising his own cultural level, in expanding his horizon. During recent years, questions linked with Russian-national bilingualism have begun to be raised also on the pages of nationwide scientific publications. In particular, M. N. Guboglo in the journal *ISTORIYA SSSR* notes that "as soon as work is carried out to create favorable conditions for bringing people closer to the Russian language, the question begins in an equally valid way to be raised about the creation of the corresponding conditions for representatives of the nonindigenous nationalities, including the Russian, to become proficient in the language of the nation that has given its name to the union republic."²⁷ Yu. V. Bromley, in *KOMMUNIST* magazine, emphasizes that one of the components of modern national processes is the bringing of the Russian-language population closer to the language of the indigenous nation in the union republics. This improves the interpersonal relations and promotes the process of adaptation to the environment of another nationality.²⁸ In published items it is correctly emphasized that "the knowledge of the language of the indigenous nation is of great importance, and acts as a manifestation of respect for the particular people, its culture, language, traditions, and customs,"²⁹ and at the same expands people's cultural and educational horizon and promotes the rise in the social and occupational status of the migrant who has lost the roots to the nationality to which he belongs. If people of various nationalities have decided and want to live together, if they have common interests, then they must invariably resolve the problem of the linguistic barrier, since "it is precisely on linguistic soil that

conflicts in communication among nationalities flare up most frequently, if a representative of a particular nation conducts himself superciliously or disdainfully with regard to another, emphasizing not his own inability to communicate in another language, but his lack of desire to assimilate it or even to recognize that it is worthy of study."³⁰ As the basis of the further development of national relations in the republic, it is necessary to raise bilingualism to a higher level, thus serving to form the culture of communication among nationalities, and to implement in practice the total equality of languages and nations. But in practice one frequently encounters here both the completely justified requirements placed upon representatives of a number of occupations where the knowledge both of the language of the union republic and the language of communication among nationalities is absolutely necessary (jurisprudence, medicine, personal-services sphere, trade), and the deliberate—especially among writers—dramatization of linguistic processes. As has been demonstrated in practice, the poor study of the Latvian language, together with an indifferent attitude toward it or an obvious lack of desire to study it on the part of the republic's population of other nationalities, also has a number of objective causes—the lack of experience in organizing effectively operating courses, the lack of self-interested instructor cadres, and poorly thought-out curricula and textbooks for the Latvian language. Cultural figures and intellectuals in the creative field, both of the indigenous nationality and of other national groups, will have to do a large amount of work to imbue in people the culture of communication, and to search for forms of truly reciprocal rapprochement of the cultural streams that would seem to exist in parallel in the republic, in order not to insult one another, in order not to harm the spiritual development of the individual, but in order to find factors in the republic's life that unite, rather than divide, people.

At the new stage in the country's development, when the blunders and mistakes of the past are being corrected in a Leninist manner and when the national self-awareness of our country's nations and nationalities has been manifesting itself in an unusually brilliant way, there has been a considerable increase in the interest shown by the Latvian nation to questions of preserving and developing their language, their national cultural values. It has become possible to pose the question of the need to acquaint the republic's broad public with the cultural heritage from the past of the Latvian people. One organization that has been working successfully in this area is the special scientific council attached to LaSSR Academy of Sciences, under the direction of which, relying upon scientifically substantiated criteria, many works of literature and art of the past, which are of value for the national culture of the Latvian people, have been resurrected. The Culture Fund of Latvian SSR, which was created by the efforts of the creative intellectuals, began operating actively in 1987. Its members' actions are directed toward criticizing the phenomena of stagnation in the republic's cultural life in the 1960's and 1970's, and in drawing the public's attention to the unfavorable

ecological situation that was created in Riga as a result of the excessive development of industry, and in the nationally important resort of Yurmala, where negative resort factors have arisen instead of positive ones. The solution of these and other questions is identically a matter of close concern for all the inhabitants of the republic, regardless of which language is their native one. Under conditions of democratization and glasnost, it is important for the outer manifestations of the national factor (language, territory, history, etc.), for all their importance, not to eclipse the resolution of the overall economic, social, ecological, and other tasks in the spirit of perestroika, or for national self-awareness not to eclipse people's class consciousness. The only true approach to national problems is the observance of the Leninist principles of national policy, consistent internationalism, and true friendship, which are possible only when there is profound respect for the dignity, honor, culture, language, and history of every people.

At the present time the republic has planned a broad program of measures to improve relations among nationalities, the implementation of which is being worked out by the Committee on Questions of National Relations and Relations Among Nationalities, which was created at the Latvian CP Central Committee on 19 May 1987 and which is under the leadership of B. K. Pugo, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee. Special attention at this time is being devoted to such questions as 1) the improvement of the teaching and study of the Russian and Latvian languages in educational institutions; 2) the creation of favorable opportunities for the study of Russian and Latvian by the republic's population (preparation of conversational guides, teaching aids, and dictionaries, paid and unpaid courses, lessons on television, etc.); and 3) the guaranteeing of the principle of the complete equality of languages in various spheres of life, the balanced interaction of the social functions of the Latvian and Russian languages, an interaction that corresponds to people's real needs. On 15 April 1988 the LaSSR Supreme Soviet's Commission on Questions of Relations Among Nationalities was created.

The problems that our society has encountered in the 1980's in the area of national relations are apparently not so much ethnic ones, as they are socioeconomic, political, and spiritual-ideological.

Footnotes

1. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1988, p 16.
2. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 53.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 25, p 70.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol 35, p 202.
5. Tsameryan, I. P., "Natsionalnyye otnosheniya v SSSR" [National Relations in the USSR], Moscow, 1987, p 60.
6. *Ibid.*, p 63.
7. CINA, 3 March 1988.
8. "Socialie procesi un naciolalas attiecibas Padomju Latvija," Riga, 1987, p 112.
9. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS," p 156.
10. CINA, 3 March 1988.
11. "Socialie procesi un nacionalas attiecibas Padomju Latvija," p 164.
12. "Latvijas PSR stradnieku skira 1940—1980," Riga, 1985, p 531.
13. *Ibid.*, p 135.
14. "Riga 1860—1917," Riga, 1978, p 29.
15. Mezgalis, B. Zvidrins, P., "Padomju Latvijas iedzivotaji," Riga, 1973, p 37.
16. "Naseleniye Sovetskoy Latvii" [Population of Soviet Latvia], Riga, 1986, pp 62-63.
17. *Ibid.*, p 69.
18. "Naseleniye Sovetskoy Latvii," p 69.
19. Kozlov, V. I., "Natsionalnosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskiy obzor" [Nationalities of the USSR: Ethnodemographic Survey], Moscow, 1982, pp 136-139.
20. Bronley, Yu. V., "Ethnic Processes in the USSR," KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1983, p 58.
21. "Naseleniye Sovetskoy Latvii," p 71.
22. KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1983, p 60.
23. Kholmogorov, A. I., "Internatsionalnye cherty sovetskoy natsii" [International Features of the Soviet Nations], Moscow 1970, pp 146-147; Kholmogorov, A. I., "Yedinyi mnogonatsionalnyy" [Single and Multinational], Riga, 1970, p 119.
24. SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 7 Aug 1987.
25. "Latvija un Krievija: vesturiskie un kulturas sakari," Riga, 1987, pp 31-32.
26. KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII, No 2, 1988, p 92.
27. ISTORIYA SSSR, No 2, 1987, p 43.

28. KOMMUNIST, No 8, 1986, p 84.

29. "Aktualnyye problemy natsionalnogo i internatsionalnogo v dukhovnom mire sovetskogo cheloveka" [Vitally Important Problems of the National and International in the Spiritual World of Soviet Man]. Baku, 1984, p 199.

30. KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVIJ, No 2, 1988, p 93.

31. SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 7 AUG 1987

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Uzbek Officials Hold Roundtable on Nationalities Issues

18300303 Tashkent KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 62-83

[Report on roundtable held at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History, in the magazine's "Ideology and Culture" section: "Important Current Problems in Internationality Relations and the Internationalist Upbringing of the Masses"; first two paragraphs are unattributed source introduction]

[Text] Under the conditions of the restructuring and acceleration of socioeconomic development that have been launched on a broad scale in the country since the CPSU Central Committee's April (1985) Plenum and the 27th Party Congress, the issues of internationality relations and the patriotic and internationalist upbringing of the masses have assumed a timely importance. According great importance to the improvement of internationality relations and enhancement of Soviet people's upbringing in the spirit of patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism as one of the most important factors in successfully accomplishing the tasks of restructuring, the CPSU Central Committee is planning to devote one of its upcoming plenums specially to these matters. The issues of internationality relations and the enhancement of internationalist upbringing in the republic were examined in March 1988 at a regular session of the Bureau of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. They were also the subject of a roundtable at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History that was conducted in January and February 1988 by the Uzbekistan Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Interdepartmental Council for the Study of Nationality Processes, together with the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History, with the participation of the editors of the magazine UZBEKISTON KOMMUNISTI-KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTAN. The republic's leading social scientists, as well as officials of the Uzbek

Communist Party Central Committee's ideological departments, took part in it. The roundtable was chaired by Central Committee Secretary M. Kh. Khalmukhamedov.

(The speeches of roundtable participants are published below in abridged form.)

M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov

The purpose of our meeting is to exchange views on questions pertaining to the theory and practice of the development of internationality relations in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Central Committee's January (1987) Plenum.

As we know, the stagnation-related phenomena of the recent past encompassed this sphere of the social sciences, as well as others. In the study of internationality relations, including those in Uzbekistan, a certain stereotype developed that was divorced from the actual situation. In the area of internationality relations in Uzbekistan, as in other regions of the country, there are a good many problems, but over the course of 15-20 years it was simply not the practice to talk and right about them.

Today, under conditions of the restructuring of all spheres of life and the glasnost and democratization that have been launched, certain factors that have accumulated in internationality relations are making themselves felt; these factors stem from the ignoring of objective processes and the unwillingness to see them behind a pallisade of high-flown words intended for outward show. This often leads to negative consequences. Elements of parochialism, national restrictiveness and arrogance occur, for example, among a certain part of the republic's creative intelligentsia.

It should be noted that the reasons for the negative phenomena that have manifested themselves recently and that contradict the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalist principles go back to the years of stagnation and bureaucratic distortions, and the animation, under those conditions, of antisocial elements. To bypass such unhealthy attitudes and close one's eyes to them is impermissible. In short, internationality relations and internationalist upbringing require new approaches and profound changes. "Nationalities policy at the present stage must be taken up in a very thorough fashion," M. S. Gorbachev stressed at the CPSU Central Committee's February (1983) Plenum. "Along all lines—in both theory and practice. That is an extremely fundamental, vital issue for our society."

Existing problems require an in-depth, carefully considered and competent analysis. That places special responsibility on the social scientists who are concerned with this set of problems. We expect them to provide substantiated scientific generalizations based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and the principles of historicism and

Bolshevik truth. Their research should also address such issues as the correlation of the national and the internationalist, the national and the religious, national consciousness and national psychology, and many others. I would like to emphasize that in this connection we should invariably proceed from the highest interests of our multinational socialist state.

In the course of discussion I would like to hear the opinions of the social scientists participating in it, and their specific proposals and recommendations for improving the theory and practice of internationality relations and internationalist upbringing in the republic.

E.Ya. Yusupov, vice-president of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

The session that is being held today has special significance for us. For many years we did not meet to discuss the issues of nationality relations, issues which were complex in the historical past and have not lost their acuteness today, either.

The development of a nation means the development of nationality relations, national psychology and national feelings, as well. This is especially evident under the conditions of Central Asia, where this process has noticeably grown stronger in recent years. Therefore, these problems of nationality relations are of great scientific and practical significance for us. Their in-depth study will help us to identify contradictions that arise in this area in a timely fashion and define forms and methods of resolving them.

First of all, in our view, a comprehensive council on the study of nationality relations should be set up to coordinate all social-science research on this problem as a whole, and individual aspects of it. It should work in close contact with scientists from Moscow and other of the country's scientific centers. It must be admitted that so far in our republic the study of nationality relations has been engaged in by scientists from various research institutes and higher-school social-science departments, but there is no scientific school or, I would say, center, to coordinate research on this subject on the scale of the republic as a whole.

Today we have a good many books and dissertations, but when we look at their content, it turns out that they in many respects duplicate one another. In our scholarly literature there is no originality, bold posing of questions, or independent creative analysis of the urgent problems of internationality relations.

At the present time it is important to give priority attention to such problems that have been inadequately treated in science as the dialectical unity of national and Soviet pride, and national pride in connection with national psychology and national consciousness, where in addition to positive tendencies, negative tendencies

have also manifested themselves—national arrogance and restrictiveness, and the idealization of specific national features. We must provide scientific criteria and evaluations of the essence of national pride and Soviet pride, and of the differences between them. The former, for example, may not always coincide with the second, but it should not contradict it.

Manifestations among certain people of national arrogance, national restrictiveness and national conceit are incompatible with internationalism. Granted, they are not yet nationalism, but they constitute a basis for it and may turn into nationalism if an uncompromising struggle is not waged against them. Today it is necessary to study in depth the experience the party accumulated in the struggle against nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, the knowledge of which will help us wage this struggle more effectively under present-day conditions.

The problem of national psychology needs in-depth treatment. National feeling will always exist as long as there is a nation. With the development of national consciousness, it manifests itself more and more distinctly. This must be taken into account in both theoretical and practical work.

Our republic is multinational. Therefore, we should take into account the interests of all the nations and nationalities living in it. We must keep in mind that the national feelings of the peoples who constitute minorities of the population in the republic were and continue to be keen. Therefore, attention given to them should be especially sensitive. In treating questions of internationalist upbringing and the improvement of internationality relations that pertain to the republic as a whole, we should also take into account the problems that affect individual national groups living in it.

A fairly acute demographic situation has developed in Uzbekistan that is closely bound up with internationality relations and the characteristic features of the development of the Uzbek people and other Central Asian peoples. We should not only establish what is taking place in our republic in this sphere, but also provide scientifically substantiated recommendations for regulating this process in light of society's potential.

It must be said that nationality problems do not exist in pure form. They are closely interwoven with economic, personnel and moral problems, and the resolution of complex social questions.

The time has passed when we were afraid to speak openly. Taking advantage of expanding democracy and glasnost, we should hold discussions on the problems of internationality relations more often.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.M. Yunusov, senior scientific associate at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law.

A good many books and articles on interethnic relations are published in the republic, but as E. Yu. Yusupov correctly said, there is no single center to coordinate studies of fundamental theoretical problems in interethnic relations.

In order to concert the creative efforts of social scientists who treat these problems, it is necessary to carry out a number of research-organization measures: to create a coordination council for the study of problems in internationality relations (best of all, under the Uzbek Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law), and to draw up a comprehensive plan for their treatment. Emphasis should be placed on such theoretical problems as the Soviet people as a new historical community of people, the dialectics of the national and the internationalist, and the culture of internationality relations.

We talk a lot about internationalist upbringing, the struggle against national arrogance, etc. But they will not be implemented in practice until we teach people the culture of internationality relations. It is no accident that the need to study the problem of the culture of internationality relations as an important theoretical and practical task was set forth in party documents back in 1982—on the eve of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR.

Doctor of Historical Sciences S.I. Gitlin, professor in the Department of the History of the CPSU, History Division, Tashkent State University imeni V. I. Lenin.

Under the conditions of restructuring, the correct understanding of the correlation between the internationalist and the national is assuming particular importance. The lesson of truth that was given by the 27th CPSU Congress provides a key to studying the development of interethnic relations. We must resolutely abandon descriptiveness, which has been one of the main shortcomings of research in recent years. It is necessary to erect a barrier to such works.

At the same time, it is important to note all that is positive in research done in the period of stagnation, remembering in this connection that what was published, of course, in many respects reflected the state of society at that time. That is why it is interesting today, for it makes it possible to interpret the stage that has been passed on the basis of a new reading of archival materials, and identify the processes in interethnic relations that have been little studied or not researched at all.

Of course, interethnic relations at the present stage are a difficult subject for the researcher. That, in turn, makes it possible for social scientists to make specific proposals.

Unfortunately, there are no fundamental works illuminating the essence of present-day internationalization processes. Individual articles continue to focus attention only on quantitative indices, leaving many urgent problems aside.

There is an erroneous notion that the problems of interethnic relations in the economy have been solved, and that attention should be concentrated on the spiritual aspect of the matter as the most complex. Such a superficial approach is fraught with great complications, for as practice has shown, the economy was and still is the main sphere of activity of the party and the Soviet people. A good many problems have accumulated there on the solution of which the social and cultural development of peoples, to a certain extent, depends. They include such problems as the siting of productive forces, changes in structural and investment policies, the problem of the rational utilization of resources, etc., etc.

Under the conditions of Uzbekistan, where negative phenomena have manifested themselves in the most deformed fashion, it is important to objectively analyze unsolved problems in the development of the economy, social sphere and culture. Can we, for example, consider justifiable the desire of certain ministries and departments to build industrial enterprises in big cities without taking into account migration conditions in the region and the conditions of the training of personnel? It is impossible to overlook existing great differences in levels of industrial development of the republic's oblasts, differences in the work and life of city and rural residents, etc. Unresolved social and economic issues may lead, and often do lead, to manifestations of nationalism in everyday life. That must be talked about in an informed, well-reasoned and tactful fashion.

It is necessary also to take a new look at the problem of making the economic and cultural level of the Uzbek SSR equal in comparison with certain of the country's republics. It is known that this problem has, by and large, been solved. However, it must not be removed from the agenda either in theory or in practice. The absence of a thoroughly considered and scientifically substantiated program for the development of Uzbekistan's economy has resulted in a situation wherein the republic occupies one of the last places in the union in terms of many indices. It seems that in illuminating the reasons for the existing situation, the social and epistemological roots of "Sharaf-Rashidovshchina" should be disclosed from party and class positions.

One can cite a number of other examples indicating the urgent need for an in-depth scientific investigation of problems and a search for effective paths of development for individual nations and nationalities and for the most correct way of combining the interests of each one with the general interests of the Soviet people. Evidently, coordination of the research on nationality processes in the republic should be organized. Along these lines, a comprehensive program for the study of interethnic

relations in the USSR (based on materials from Uzbekistan) has been drawn up at Tashkent State University, and scholars from five divisions and many social science departments have been enlisted in carrying it out.

Candidate of Historical Sciences F.B. Iskhakov, senior scientific associate at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

The fact that since the CPSU Central Committee's January (1987) Plenum the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee has concerned itself so consistently with studying the state and problems in the development of the nations and interethnic relations in the republic manifests the republic party organization's profound understanding of the special significance at the present stage of Marxist-Leninist propositions regarding the nationalities question and the CPSU's nationalities policy. This is also dictated by the need to evaluate both the achievements and the problems in this sphere in the context of the party's implementation of the policy of restructuring and renewing all aspects of the life of Soviet society.

Therefore, it seems extremely important and methodologically correct for the problems of interethnic relations to be examined with a view to the dialectical interconnection of questions pertaining to the economic, social and spiritual progress of each nation and nationality, and to the combination of the national and internationalist interests of all the country's peoples. It is no less important, in my view, to take into account not just the subjective reasons (they are what is spoken and written about most of all) but also the objective reasons for negative phenomena and difficulties in the development of certain nations and nationalities, particularly those that have bypassed the capitalist stage, as well as in the improvement of interethnic relations. Here it is appropriate to recall V. I. Lenin's statement to the effect that "the legitimate requirements and progressive aspirations of the working masses of *each* nationality will be satisfied first in their internationalist unity...." (*Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 40). Keeping this in mind, one may say that not only the accomplishments but also the shortcomings and problems in the development of nations and interethnic relations should be regarded as phenomena belonging to the multinational environment, as results connected with all aspects of the activity of society and of all nations and nationalities.

Of course, distortions and clear anomalies must be regarded as isolated cases. But it is impossible to deem correct, from a scientific standpoint, attempts by certain scientists to "diagnose" given negative phenomena in a cavalier fashion. For example, I believe that it is erroneous to link "Adylovshchina" to certain national aspects. The attempt on the part of certain researchers to reduce the whole problem of interethnic relations with regard to Uzbekistan's indigenous population solely to the existence of nationalist prejudices among part of it seems

equally harmful to the study and solution of the multi-fold problems in the sphere of interethnic relations. I believe that sometimes propositions and recommendations that are clearly one-sided are also propagandized in the sphere of language policy, and the classic proposition that what is genuinely national is always international, as well, is consigned to oblivion or ignored.

I am convinced that scholars and the republic's ideological aktiv are capable of utilizing the considerable potential that we have in patriotic and internationalist values for the good of the internationalist cohesion of all the country's nations and nationalities.

**Doctor of Historical Sciences R.A. Nurullin, editor in chief of the journal UZBEKISTON
KOMMUNISTI-KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA:**

The magazine's editors have given a great deal of attention to illuminating important current problems in interethnic relations and the patriotic and internationalist upbringing of the masses. This matter, for example, was the subject of the lead editorial in the magazine's first issue for 1988. It gave a principled appraisal of the state of this very important sphere of social relations and the communist upbringing of the masses, and raised in a trenchant fashion questions of improving interethnic relations and enhancing the internationalist and patriotic upbringing of the working people in the spirit of present-day demands. In order not to repeat the editorial's propositions, with which the roundtable's participants may already be familiar, I shall dwell only on several points.

We know fairly well how matters stand in the republic with regard to the study of interethnic relations and patriotic and internationalist upbringing. Articles the editors receive, as well as books that we review, provide grounds for drawing the conclusion that restructuring in the treatment of these problems is taking place very, very slowly in the scientific world.

Yet everyone knows quite well that in the sphere of interethnic relations there still remain a good many acute problems, to which, with the passage of time, more and more new problems requiring their own timely identification and solution are being added. Although contradictions in the sphere of interethnic relations are not antagonistic in nature, the blurring and dragging out of their examination—their examination, moreover, on the only correct, internationalist basis—does great harm to the cause of the unity and solidarity of the country's peoples and causes undesirable nationalistic outbursts. Nationalism under present-day conditions may become one of the main obstacles to the practical implementation of restructuring. Therefore, it is necessary to decisively expose the nationalistic essence of the extremists who, abusing glasnost and democracy and resorting to unbridled social demagoguery, attempt to present themselves as the spokesmen for public opinion and defenders of national dignity.

In recent years a great deal has been written and said about the evening out of the levels of development of the country's nations and nationalities, as though it were an indisputable fact. At the same time, experience indicates that a great gap remains among individual republics in the development of productive forces, the raising of real per capita income, the availability of food products and trade and consumer services, etc. Therefore, in studying the problems of interethnic relations, the social justice factor should also be taken into account, which is very important for both theory and practice.

Finally, we would like for the coordination council on national relations, if it is established, to maintain close creative ties with our magazine's editors, provide them practical assistance in defining topics and selecting authors, especially from among talented young people, whose work is genuinely distinguished by trenchancy and innovativeness and has theoretical and practical significance.

Doctor of Historical Sciences V.G. Chebotarev, deputy director of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

Under the conditions of restructuring, when the CPSU is following a course of improving economic management and democratizing public life, it is legitimate to ask whether a mechanism exists for regulating nationality relations in our multinational country. The answer can only be negative.

During the 1920s and 1930s an integral system was established for managing nationality processes with corresponding supervision over the implementation of nationalities policy in relation not just to the indigenous nationalities of republics but also to all national and ethnic groups. With the establishment of Stalin's personality cult, this system was eliminated, and only now is the party's valuable historical experience beginning to be studied and revived.

The second question to which I would like to call attention is the organizational bases of the study of nationality problems. It has been correctly said here that so far the study of interethnic relations is superficial in nature, and that coordination of specialists' creative efforts has not been organized. Granted, there have been some successes. Two years ago the USSR Academy of Sciences' Council on Nationality Problems established a section in our republic that, in cooperation with Moscow scientists, held a conference on nationality relations. The materials from that conference were generalized in three monographs: two volumes came out in Moscow and one in Tashkent. Thus, the first steps have been taken.

The forms of management are also changing—a scientific center for the study of nationality relations has been set up in Moscow. In Uzbekistan this work, it seems to me, should be concentrated under the republic Academy of Sciences.

In order to identify the social causes of the distortions and negative phenomena in interethnic relations (nationalism, chauvinism), it is necessary to study the actual state of affairs and not build proposals on the basis of abstractions. We will not have any clear notion of the actual situation in nationality relations until we obtain the possibility of conducting sociological research. Thus, we need a sociological service, which we have been talking about for many years now at every conference, yet the question has still not been resolved.

Statistics is an extremely important constituent part of the organizational bases of the management of interethnic relations. Up until the present time, despite candid criticism in the press, the State Statistics Committee and its local agencies have not supplied scientists with the necessary data and, what is especially distressing, have produced no reports from the nationality standpoint. Yet such a thing did exist in the 1920s and 1930s, and that helped the party to implement nationalities policy in a purposeful fashion, even on the rayon level.

Many distortions in national consciousness and national psychology stem from concepts in historical scholarship that are not always correct. One of them is the joining of Central Asia to Russia. The very word "joining" does not fully reflect the historical situation. It is known, for example, that the population in certain places showed no resistance to tsarist troops, but in other places the people defended its land. I believe that this concept should be revised from the standpoint of historical truth.

A third question concerns the attitude toward the literary legacy. It is necessary, relying on Marxist-Leninist dialectics, to study the works of undeservedly forgotten writers of the 1920s and to publish, accompanied by scholarly commentaries, the best works that reflect the life of the people and its aspirations and hopes.

Candidate of Historical Sciences B.F. Musayev, senior scientific associate at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law:

The question that has been raised here concerning sociological research on nationality processes and the tasks of internationalist upbringing is of fundamental significance. The time has come to shift from the selective studies of local significance to the systematic and complete study of these processes. This will eliminate the consequences of the illusion that existed until the mid-1980s concerning the absence of problems in the development of interethnic relations.

Indeed, during the period of stagnation internationalization was frequently spoken of as the unification of everything, as a result of which this multifaceted process was portrayed abstractly. In that respect one means of the scientific and practical solution of important current problems and evaluation of the real state of nationality processes and internationalist upbringing is precisely up-to-date sociological research.

In order not simply to be offering unsupported opinions, let me share the experience that exists at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law. In 1987, in the course of research at the industrial enterprises and in the higher schools, secondary schools and vocational-technical schools of Tashkent and Samarkand Oblast, it was found out, in particular, that the present state of interethnic contacts and of the culture of interethnic intercourse confronts party organizations with the need to work out constructive ideological and political upbringing methods for shaping and strengthening the internationalist awareness of the working people. Sociological data indicate that under the conditions of the production environment and the social, cultural and ideological situation in the region, it is becoming important to surmount nonantagonistic contradictions between growing internationalism, on the one hand, and parochialism and national isolation, on the other; between internationalist ideology, on the one hand, and prejudices, stereotypes and elements of ethnocentrism in national consciousness, on the other; between the dynamism of the Uzbek nation, clear evidence of which is its effective internationalism, on the one hand, and the making of fetishes out of the values of the "vanishing" traditional culture, archaic traditions and customs, and elements of communal attitudes and stereotypes of thought and behavior, on the other; between demands that the work of ideological institutions be restructured and the real possibilities of bringing it into accord with the tasks of accelerating the republic's socioeconomic development, on the one hand, and the actual practice of local party and soviet agencies and public organizations, with their characteristic inertia, stagnant thinking, and divorce from life, as an expression of the costs of the spirit of stagnation, on the other.

In the context of what has been set forth, it is proper to raise the question of the need for close attention to studies of the determinants that define the nature and persistence of national prejudices, and for a thorough empirical investigation of them. This approach will not only bring to light layers of past systems of social relations and "Sharaf-Rashidovshchina," and "sore spots" in the work of ideological institutions, but will also make it possible to utilize in socialist construction certain traditional forms of the culture and activities of the indigenous population, and to organically incorporate them into the rhythm of present-day life and the process of restructuring.

Sh.B. Mukhamedov, instructor at the Bukhara Pedagogical Institute and intern at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

I shall discuss two points. It is impossible to be an internationalist without knowing the history of one's own people and own region. Is the history of the Uzbek SSR being studied at the proper level in our schools? While working in a rural school and, then, as a higher school instructor, I continually encountered absolute

ignorance of the region's history. Granted, until recently there was a justification for this situation: the fact that schoolchildren and higher school students worked in the fields for two or three months. I may be told that such a situation has come to exist not just in history but also in other disciplines studied in school. But I would like to dwell precisely on the knowledge of the history of one's own people. Of course, it is important to know the history of the USSR and foreign countries, but at the present time it has become essential to have an in-depth knowledge of the history of the Uzbek SSR.

We will not get rid of nationalism without introducing new ceremonies and customs in both the city and the countryside among the indigenous nationalities. It is necessary, in my opinion, to carefully study many excellent ceremonies and customs and cleanse off their religious patina. In most of the republic's oblasts weddings and funerals are being organized in the same way they were held 50 or 60 years ago. After all, it is usually the representatives of the older generation, people advanced in years, who organize these activities. In my view, instruction should be carried out under the soviet ispolkoms in order to propagandize the very best of the Soviet way of life and national traditions.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.K. Valiyev, head of the History of Materialism Section at the Uzbek Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law:

The problems of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing demand constant and close attention and in-depth treatment. First and foremost, they are closely bound up with such a phenomenon as national awareness and consciousness. According to the 1979 census, from 25.4 to 50 percent of the representatives of Central Asia's indigenous nationalities had a fluent command of Russian (49.3 percent of the Uzbeks). Among Russians living in the region's territories, only 3.5 percent had a fluent command of the language of the indigenous nationality. Until recently, a great deal of attention was given to the study by representatives of the nonindigenous nationality of the language of a republic's local population. Moreover, they themselves attempted to study at least the conversational language, which is something one cannot say about the present day. A person may be born here and work here his entire life without knowing a single word of Uzbek. For some reason that has become routine. The party justifiably is setting the task of the studying by representatives of other nationalities of the language of the indigenous population of the republic in which they live. And we scholars should give this matter a great deal of attention.

With the announcement that 49.3 percent of Uzbeks have a fluent command of Russian, it was decided in our republic that everything was fine with regard to this matter. In actuality, these figures were substantially overstated. At the present time, special attention must be given to the teaching of Russian in Uzbekistan, especially in the countryside. There are not enough Russian

teachers in rural schools. Many representatives of the indigenous nationality have an inadequate command of Russian language, even though they have graduated from departments of Russian language and literature at pedagogical institutes. It is necessary to improve the training of Russian language instructors. In addition, it is evidently necessary to invite Russian teachers from other republics to rural schools more often.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Sh.S. Ziyamov, director of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of History and Law, and a branch of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism:

Success in the matter of internationalist and patriotic upbringing and overcoming manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism depends to a significant degree on the selection of effective means, forms and methods of work.

Various sorts of mistakes in the activities of certain party, soviet and economic executives, and deviations from the principles of Marxism-Leninism also have a negative impact on interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing. These mistakes, even if they are not of an intentional nature, frequently give rise to a feeling of discontent and offense. Among them one may cite violations of the principles of personnel work, when the representatives of one nationality are mainly advanced to executive work in multinational regions, and situations in which insufficient attention is given to improving the living conditions of the population where there is a predominance of certain national groups.

It must be noted that the republic's social scientists, including those concerned with problems of party history, are not taking an active part in the improvement of curriculums and creation of textbooks for schools, secondary specialized institutions, and higher school.

Overcoming shortcomings in the organization of internationalist upbringing presupposes the development of a comprehensive program for improving nationality relations and the activities of party and soviet organizations in the internationalist upbringing of various categories of the population; the supplying of Communists, through various forms of instruction, with a knowledge of the theory of the nation and interethnic relations, and of the party's nationality policy; the creation of maps showing the distribution of nations and national groups in the republic in order that the correct management decisions may be taken with respect to them; the establishment of research groups for studying the experience of the party's struggle to combat manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism and to affirm the principles of internationalism; the establishment of a sociological service to study the level of development of internationalist awareness in various social, vocational and demographic groups, labor collectives, educational institutions, etc., which will make it possible to predict trends in the further

development of national and internationalist awareness, and to draw up programs of systematic and consistent work in internationalist upbringing.

I would like to support the proposals that have been expressed regarding the need to coordinate the efforts of social scientists, including party historians, in treating the problems of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing.

Doctor of Historical Sciences P.G. Kim, head of the Party History Section at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

The further improvement of nationality relations is inconceivable without an in-depth analysis of the experience of the Communist Party in dealing with the nationalities question. In this connection, I would like to call attention to the documents of the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). We have established, for example, that in the drafting of the congress's resolution "The Party's Next Tasks With Respect to the Nationalities Question," a great contribution was made by delegates from the Turkestan Communist Party. On 10 February 1921, the party Central Committee published in the newspaper PRAVDA "Comrade Stalin's Theses, Approved by the Party Central Committee, Concerning the Report on the Party's Next Tasks With Respect to the Nationalities Question," and on 10 March the same newspaper carried amendments and additions to those theses proposed by the Turkestan delegation. They came down to the following: elimination of the de facto national inequality, especially economic inequality, through the planned resiting of factories to place them near the sources of raw materials; the economic organization of the working people of the indigenous population through consumers' cooperatives, the inclusion of cottage industries and other individual enterprise in a plan-governed, economic-management organization, and the establishment of industry with regard for local conditions; and abandonment of the mechanistic transfer to eastern regions of the activities of central Russian regions suitable only for a higher degree of economic development. All three of these points were incorporated in the 10th Congress's resolution on "The Party's Next Tasks With Respect to the Nationalities Question." But insufficient attention was subsequently given to implementing them, and therefore even today the problem of employment among the population and the development of national working-class personnel still occupies the foreground.

I would also like to touch on certain unaccomplished tasks in the area of social policy. Lately a great deal has been written about saving the Aral, as well as about environmental protection. These questions are both national and regional. At the same time, their resolution has all-union, interethnic significance and requires a scientifically substantiated, competent approach. Further, concerning the protection of women's rights (I am deeply convinced that a woman who picks up to 10,000

kg of cotton in a single season is not physically able to become a fully capable mother; there is also direct connection here with the high level of infant mortality and the comparative lack of longevity among the region's women); I would like to note the need to protect the rights of students in schools and other educational institutions (if students work in the cotton fields all summer and in the autumn, too, or if a student whose participation in cotton campaigns reduces the length of his studies by a year and a half to two years, where will skilled specialists come from?). These questions require discussion at the all-union level.

M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov

The problems you have noted (concerning the state of rural workers, high infant mortality, the enlistment of schoolchildren and older students for long periods in farm work, and others) really do exist in our republic; they represent unfinished work on the part of our party and soviet agencies, and we ourselves should solve them.

**Doctor of Historical Sciences R.Ya. Radzhapova,
director of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences' Institute of
History:**

We must think through practical ways of solving the problems that have been discussed. In this respect, the experience of the 1920s and 1930s may help, which has already been mentioned. That which is positive should be taken from it. Why, for example, did the republic's working people, under conditions of the exacerbation of class struggle, when nationalism was supported economically, manage to overcome that trend? Because the party's ideological measures were backed up by broad economic and social transformations. Special decisions were taken concerning the struggle against the reactionary clergy. At the present time, certain representatives of the intelligentsia are flirting with religion, and we are afraid to talk about the need to wage a decisive offensive against the clergy.

The experience of the past shows that the problem of interethnic relations must be solved in close unity with socioeconomic questions. More attention, for example, should be given to the makhalla, where old, obsolete customs, ceremonies and traditions are frequently preserved. Often that occurs because the makhalla committees sometimes are headed by inadequately educated people. The membership of certain women's councils also needs to be renewed; more women who are familiar with the new ceremonies and customs and who actively propagandize them should be advanced to the councils.

Lately we scholars have been afraid to use the word "nationalism" and have started to look for some sort of new words. Social scientists should provide a substantiated answer to the question: why is it necessary today to return to problems that were, on the whole, solved in the 1920s and 1930s? Why did the years of stagnation revive nationalism?

**Candidate of Historical Sciences G.Sh. Shirmatova,
senior scientific associate at the Uzbek Communist
Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:**

In the process of working out the scientific principles for the management of interethnic relations, it seems necessary to take into account the surmounting of various mechanisms that serve as brakes on the process of developing internationalist awareness. First and foremost, this pertains to researchers' thinking: it was somehow unacceptable to talk about mistakes, omissions and contradictions in the sphere of interethnic relations, but they became implanted at the level of ordinary attitudes and public opinion, where they were frequently interpreted in an exaggerated, unobjective fashion; a vacuum formed because of the lack of objective scientific information and explanations of complex processes taking place in the socioeconomic and cultural spheres of interethnic relations was filled.

The nature of the social-psychology mechanisms retarding the formation of internationalist attitudes is relatively uninvestigated. This has often resulted in management decisions that rapidly produced an "opposite reaction" that went against what was expected. Voluntaristic and command-administrative methods are especially unacceptable in the spiritual sphere. That dictates the need for a scientific analysis of the theoretical bases of mistakes and excesses in ideological work that have occurred.

What follows from this?

First of all, an oversimplified understanding of internationalization as the mechanistic growth of the general and uniform, which has resulted in the confusion of it with cosmopolitanism and national nihilism, to the benefit of the bourgeois theory of the "denationalization of cultures in the USSR." Internationalization is being carried out not through a leveling of the national and a reduction of the forms of manifestation of specific national features to a minimum, but through the increasingly full utilization of everything that is positive in nations' cultural legacy and present-day accomplishments in the improvement of socialist society. V. I. Lenin specially stressed: "Unity in what is basic, fundamental and essential is not violated but ensured by diversity...." (*Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy*, Vol 35, p 203).

Another mistake of a theoretical nature that results in the adoption of wrong management decisions is confusion of the essence and social functions of national consciousness with those of nationalism. Indeed, under certain conditions the growth of national consciousness and weakening of internationalist upbringing can result in the development of nationalistic tendencies. However, with the capable organization of ideological work, the social and cultural factors that affect the development of national consciousness can be effectively utilized to develop the positive content of national cultures and to

combat the parochialism and narrow regional loyalty that interfere with the realization of general national interests, as well as other negative phenomena in social and spiritual life. The growth of national consciousness also has a certain importance in the struggle against religious prejudices and backward customs and traditions.

In short, both in theory and in accomplishment of the practical tasks of managing nationality relations and internationalist upbringing, it is necessary to proceed from the premise that it is not the specifically national but the nationalistic and religious that are the mechanism retarding the processes of forming internationalist awareness.

Effective influence on the social-psychology sphere of interethnic relations can be exercised through the organization of appropriate work at people's places of residence, in tea houses, in field camps, in clubs, etc. It is necessary to do everything possible to "revive" the work of cultural and enlightenment institutions. Many of them, especially in rural localities, are idle and located in makeshift facilities. Gradually, new elements must be introduced into the ceremonies and traditions devoted to important milestones in a person's life (birth, marriage, etc.), while preserving elements of the national (ethnographers have proved that this is precisely the condition that makes it easy to inculcate the new). Religion is based on the desire for social contact and for gathering in large groups to carry out joint actions, and on the collectivist principles of community. That phenomenon of social psychology can and should be utilized by ideological workers, for example, by more widely propagandizing "khashar" for building facilities intended for joint recreation and cultural activities. In short, religion must be displaced by filling the cultural and spiritual vacuum in the people's way of life. I think that it would be possible to set up groups under the rayon soviet executive committees that would function on a cooperative basis to organize funerals, weddings and various family celebrations.

Something else must be mentioned here. Ignorance of the language of the indigenous nationalities, including Uzbek, by a certain number of ideological workers reduces the effectiveness of propaganda work and its role in the internationalist upbringing of the working people. It is obvious that courses for the study of the languages of the indigenous nationalities need to be set up, for example, under rayon organizations of the Society for Knowledge and at Political Education Houses, especially for those who have come to Uzbekistan in recent years to strengthen the republic party organization. Many of them express a desire to study the languages of the republic's indigenous nationalities, and they should receive every possible assistance in doing so.

The most urgent and difficult question at present is the introduction of scientific recommendations into everyday life, and the changing of traditions and customs and,

through them, of people's psychology. I think that a scientific and practical conference ought to be convened by the end of this year to discuss new ceremonies and traditions and mechanisms for introducing them, and the effective utilization of the traditional forms of national culture and their positive content in enriching the republic's spiritual life.

M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov

I would like to call attention to two very important questions that have not yet been touched on in the presentations.

As you know, the indigenous nations and nationalities of the Central Asian region arrived at socialism by bypassing capitalism. And many of our shortcomings that have assumed such distorted forms—the persistence of Islamic ideology and vestiges of reactionary social and everyday customs and traditions, the social passiveness of women, and others—are rooted in the recent feudal past of the Central Asian peoples. Therefore, we should always take this circumstance into account in analyzing the reasons for the negative phenomena in socioeconomic and public life, and in studying and generalizing questions pertaining to the theory and practice of interethnic relations and the internationalist upbringing of the masses.

Another question pertains to contradictions in the area of interethnic relations. As repeatedly noted in party documents, they do happen in Soviet society. In the course of building socialism, national antagonism has been ended, yet certain contradictions in the nationalities sphere remain and exercise substantial influence on the development of nationality relations. We should clearly recognize that the results of the transforming work done by the Communist Party in the sphere of interethnic relations should not create the idea that they are without problems.

Wherein, exactly, lies the essence of the present contradictions? How do they manifest themselves concretely, and how should nationality processes be managed? I would like to hear your ideas on these questions, which are of both scientific and theoretical and practical significance.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Z.Kh. Arifkhanova, head of the Department of Ethnography and Ethnosocial Problems at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of History.

I would like to dwell first of all on certain questions raised by Mutal Khashimovich Khalmukhamedov.

First, the question of the noncapitalist path of the development of our republic and the whole Central Asian region since October. In the literature that has been written on this subject a great deal is said about the specific features of the transitional period and the accomplishment of various social, economic and

national tasks connected precisely with the noncapitalist path. Demonstrating that socialism has been built in the region, historians and other social scientists have ended the matter at that, and the problem in question, like specific national features in the resolution of many issues, has ceased to exist for them. Indisputably, in following the noncapitalist path, the region's peoples have taken a great step forward. That is a significant historical accomplishment. But at the same time it has affected a number of extremely important factors, such as the formation and sociopolitical nature of the national working class.

Further, the Uzbek socialist nation and its socialist consciousness were formed at accelerated rates. And that could not fail to negatively affect, in a certain way, the national consciousness, including ethnic awareness, which, as you know, generally lags behind social development and is its conservative element. That conservatism manifests itself especially strongly in social conduct, everyday life, and the social sphere (for example, in the mentality of parochialism). And scientists have not established that fact and not studied it thoroughly in a single work.

Close attention should also be given to the ethnic history of the region's, including the republic's, peoples. It is correct that the question has now been raised of the in-depth treatment of the problems of ethnogenesis. The people's of Central Asia were formed almost from the same ethnic components. We have very many common sources and common roots. Ethnic history as a scientific discipline should confirm that. Its conclusions will serve the idea of internationalism.

Lately the demographic question has become acute. In the ethnodemographic process three areas can be singled out: migration, urbanization and the planning of the birth rate. The migration of the republic's population is based, as is known, on the ethnic factor, as the result of which the mobility of our population is low. As for urbanization—the decisive factor in relieving the existing situation—it seems to me that the most acceptable course would be a process of establishing industrial enterprises that is understood as both the resettlement of people to cities and the transfer of industrial enterprises and the standards of the urban way of life to the countryside.

Finally, the planning of the birth rate. It is true that this is a very timely question, but it is a very complex and delicate question that rests on national tradition. If a responsible approach is to be taken to this problem, first of all the cultural and living conditions of the population must be raised, and health-education and political-upbringing work must be launched on a broad basis, making the maximum use of the makhalla for this purpose.

Candidate of Historical Sciences A.M. Kasymov, head of the Party Construction Section at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

The imperialist countries have resorted regularly to nationalism and the kindling of distrust among our country's peoples, especially during complex historical periods: after the victory of October, during the Great Patriotic War, and in the first postwar years. The West's ideological sabotage centers are giving great attention to this at the present time, as well.

In recent times our ideological adversaries have stepped up anti-Soviet efforts to capitalize on the nationalities question, turning ethnic factors in the life of society into absolutes and inflating them, and pitting them against socioeconomic and class factors; they have been defending obsolete forms of culture and life under the flag of "preserving" national traditions, and they have been trying for all they are worth to seek out cases of the idealization of patriarchal ways and outmoded mores, customs and ceremonies. In recent times various "Sociological" centers in the West have published numerous "scientific" studies on these questions.

The Voice of America and Ozodlik radio stations have been showing special activeness. They disseminate provocative fabrications concerning the exacerbation of the struggle in Soviet society among nations and nationalities. Our ideological adversaries are also attempting to capitalize on relapses of a disrespectful attitude toward other nations. The falsifiers' favorite device is to spread lies about the "Russification" of the population of the union and autonomous republics, as well as to attempt to distort the accomplishments of the socialist culture of the USSR's peoples and present it as a phenomenon that is alien to the national spirit and the traditions of those peoples.

In this connection the need arises for an in-depth, qualified study of the various falsification devices of our ideological adversaries, devices which are aimed, in part, directly against our republic. The urgent need has arisen to train appropriate specialists with a knowledge of foreign languages. It would be a good idea to focus the attention of individual social scientists working in the area of interethnic relations specially on exposing the falsifications of our ideological adversaries, and to set up a problem group in these areas.

Doctor of Historical Sciences V.S. Ten, head of the History Department at the Tashkent Highway Institute:

I would like to call attention first of all to the fact that the growth in national consciousness, which indisputably is of positive, progressive significance, can also influence the development of national arrogance and the increasing frequency of manifestations of nationalism, which is

leading, for example, to attempts by certain representatives of the higher intelligentsia to parasitically feed on the natural desire of peoples to better and more deeply comprehend their place in the world historical process.

M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov

Who are you assigning to the "higher intelligentsia"?

V.S. Ten

I assign to it, first of all, scholars, writers and cultural figures, in whose milieu, unfortunately, one still encounters a good many politically and ideologically and theoretically immature people who kindle nationalist passions. We must seriously reflect on the question: why is it that among the most educated part of the population—the intelligentsia—attempts still manifest themselves from time to time to idealize the bloody conquerer Timur, and to portray Timur's descendant Babur as a good ruler, forgetting in the process that he instigated internecine wars and defended the interests of feudal lords?

The question of the role of the national intelligentsia requires thorough investigation, for it plays a decisive role in the formation of public opinion. There is no doubt that the persistence of obsolete national traditions connected with the Muslim "science of life" is in many respects attributable to the fact that a certain element of the republic's intelligentsia has not yet set an example of decisively breaking with obsolete traditions. Incidentally, this was already discussed at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Ninth Plenum, as well.

A good many nonindigenous peoples and national groups are living in Uzbekistan today. The study of their contribution to the region's economy and culture deserves the closest attention from historians and would play an important role in strengthening internationalist friendship among the peoples of Uzbekistan and the USSR as a whole.

Doctor of Philological Sciences E.A. Karimov, head of the Department of the Theory of Literature and Literary Relations at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Language and Literature

In Uzbekistan, the same objective regularities in the development of socialism are operative, and the internationalization of the forms of social life and the people's consciousness is taking place just as in the USSR as a whole.

The new historical community, the Soviet people, is a reality. People of the country's various nationalities are united, at their foundation, in terms of their type of thinking. An intensive process of the mutual enrichment and drawing together of cultures and nations is under way. For many Uzbeks Russian is becoming not only the language of interethnic communication, but also their native language, especially under conditions of the

republic's big cities, which are multinational in their makeup. And here it is necessary to distinguish precisely between the national and the nationalistic, and not confuse them and mix them up, which sometimes occurs in our social science.

The negative phenomena of the period of stagnation were social, and not national, in their genesis. It has been said here, for example, that in the 1930s people were not afraid to call things by their proper names: to call nationalism nationalism and religion a drug. The 1930s were also years of serious violations of the socialist rule of law, when, among others, a group of poets and writers accused of counterrevolutionary activities and nationalism were subjected to repressions. After the 20th Party Congress they were rehabilitated.

The accusation of bourgeois nationalism was an ordinary phenomenon in the 1930s. It was made against the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of People's Commissars, and other party and military personnel and members of the intelligentsia, who were subjected to repressions in 1937-1938.

At the July (1987) meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with executives of the mass media and creative unions, M. S. Gorbachev said: "I think that we cannot and should not ever forgive or justify what happened in 1937-1938. Never...." It is our scholars' duty not to support the groundless accusations of the 1930s, but to give them an objective, party appraisal. They must analyze the events of 1930, 1937-1938 and 1948 in depth, thoroughly and completely, from the standpoint of glasnost, democracy and social justice, as the country's leading scholars have done and are doing.

Works on the nationalities question should give special attention to facts and events that bring the peoples together and strengthen their friendship. In the Uzbek people's revolutionary history there are many lofty examples of manifestation of internationalism and internationalist cooperation with the great Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union. Positive examples will only strengthen the friendship, which is sacred to us, among the peoples of the Land of Soviets.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences T.S. Saidbayev, director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law

It seems to me that the questions of internationalist upbringing and the development of interethnic relations can be examined in two aspects. In the first case, there is the strategy of the problem, i.e., the strategy of internationalist upbringing and the development of national relations. In the second case, there are the tactical tasks of the present day.

To speak of strategy, it seems to me that in order to organize internationalist upbringing correctly and correctly forecast and study interethnic relations, we must honestly and objectively determine the present level of the development of peoples, and must, specifically, answer: what are we today? I fully support the statements of comrades that we should analyze thoroughly the level of the social, economic and spiritual state of the Uzbek people with a view to its noncapitalist past.

As for social problems, today one can speak of the existence of the Uzbek SSR's considerable lag in this area in comparison to other republics of the Soviet Union. And what does a gap in social development mean when accompanied by a rising level of national consciousness? First of all, it gives rise to a sense of national offense and national nihilism. That is, a great many questions arise here when a nation recognizes that it is lagging behind and continues to lag behind in its socioeconomic development. These social indices and the tasks of bringing them to an equal level with all-union indices should genuinely concern us.

We know people's psychology very poorly. Today, evidently, it is necessary to work with such concepts as life values, life guidelines, and the people's life plans. And here, unfortunately, one can say that these values in 1988 do not always coincide with the demands of the times. In brief, we need a strict scientific concept of the socioeconomic and spiritual development of the Uzbek nation. And proceeding from that, we must determine what, in the final analysis, must be done. That will make it possible to place internationalist upbringing on a serious scientific foundation.

Another criterion that we should be guided by in analyzing the level of socioeconomic and spiritual development, and defining guidelines. I have in mind the 21st century.

Today's children will be actively working during the whole first half of the 21st century. But are they ready to live under the conditions of the 21st century, the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution? We have conducted studies of draftees from four oblasts. Their physical and spiritual development, of course, leaves something to be desired. We looked at these 18-year-old youngsters who in the future will have to undertake the management of public affairs and take their place at machine tools, and we realized that there are very many problems here, as well.

Without a scientifically substantiated concept, it is difficult to organize internationalist upbringing and develop national relations. We in our institute are doing something to study interethnic relations. It is proposed over the course of this year to study and scientifically generalize those bits of experience in internationalist upbringing that do exist in the republic.

A few words about the study of historical experience. We should answer the question, why were there many more Uzbek workers, including women, before the war than there are today? Evidently there are certain bits of experience here in developing national working-class personnel that we should find and widely utilize. Unfortunately, the Uzbek people has no profound historical traditions of introducing people to work in industry. But, as experience shows, at certain industrial enterprises a poor job is done of working with young Uzbeks who come to take jobs at them. I think that all these problems must be studied, because increasing the number of national working-class personnel is a big philosophical problem connected with people's attitudes and a change in the attitude toward working in the industrial sphere.

Ye.Ye. Berezikov, first deputy chairman of the Board of the Uzbek SSR Writers' Union:

The fact that we today are broadly discussing problems connected with the nationalities question, about which we previously spoke only in the superlative degree, is evidence of a restructuring of minds. But, evidently this is only a beginning.

V. S. Ten used the expression "higher intelligentsia" here. I cannot accept that: there is neither a higher nor a lower intelligentsia. There are the qualities that characterize the intelligentsia in the full meaning of that word; they may exist in every person, regardless of whether he has a diploma or not.

Under the conditions of restructuring, we must work with the intelligentsia in a special way, since it represents that stratum of the population that demands the closest attention, because it exerts great influence on the formation of thinking, if one is to speak of the region or the republic. So far we in the republic have not aroused public opinion as we should in favor of a healthy life, culture and progressive customs; we have not aroused the whole people to struggle for preservation of their cultural property. In our national culture one must seek not the weak but the strong aspects and develop them.

Doctor of Philological Sciences B.A. Nazarov, director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Language and Literature

The lead editorial of the magazine *KOMMUNIST*, No 15, 1987, titled "The Mission of Socialist Culture," particularly noted the usefulness of the ideological and moral searching and artistic experience of Soviet literature of the 1920s and 1930s for the further development of culture.

In this connection, I would like to touch also on the problems of Soviet Uzbek literature of the 1920s and 1930s. One must say bluntly that this period needs to be studied more deeply and thoroughly. Diverse, sometimes contradictory opinions exist, for example, about

Chulpan and Fitrat. Some people claim that their works should not be studied and published, while others claim that their work is free of errors.

Now I would like to say a few words about family planning. This question is rightly being raised. Indeed, social conditions in the countryside leave something to be desired. Hospitals are poorly equipped, do not have enough beds, and sometimes even lack hot water. Medical personnel are poorly trained. Infant mortality is the highest in the union. Our women's health is poor. Most suffer from anemia. Children lag behind in their physical development. The above-normative use of chemical herbicides and pesticides and mineral fertilizers in agriculture has caused epidemics of hepatitis and gastrointestinal and other illnesses, which is also creating a tense situation. Under these conditions, of course, it is better to have three healthy children than six sick ones. All that is true. At the same time, our country's population is not all that great. Work is being done in the union to increase the birth rate, so that every family will have four or five children. Will the Uzbek people, under these circumstances, understand the steps that are being taken to regulate the family?

Candidate of Philosophy A.S. Chamkin, senior scientific associate at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History:

I would like to ask those present which social group of the population is most inclined to the manifestation of nationalistic traits. And which social groups are internationally steadfast, for which that is the dominant value?

I think that it is impossible to speak of a nation or a people as a whole as potentially capable of the manifestation of nationalism or prepared to immediately become internationalists. Our society is differentiated, and every stratum and every group requires a definite approach, otherwise all talk will remain fruitless.

In order to work in a differentiated fashion, identify certain specific social strata, and be able to exert a substantial influence on them, one must also know for what they live.

It seems to me that when we speak about such phenomena as nationalism and religiousness, it is necessary always to keep in mind that they cannot exist independently; they are carried by a given person. Therefore, the problem of the human being and the problem of the personality should be central in our scientific searches. We already need a serious organization to concern itself only with the study of the human being. For these reasons it is necessary to establish a republic center for study of the problem of "The Human Being." It could be worked on by economists, philosophers, sociologists, historians and writers, in order to look at the person as an integral personality with all its contradictions.

Now concerning questions connected with those phenomena, those past roots of ours that have suddenly come to light today. What would I like to say about this? We received old communal traditions as a legacy from the prerevolutionary past. They are what must be utilized as tools in today's struggle for the economy and the solution of social problems.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M.A. Akhmedova, head of the Department of the International Communist Movement at Tashkent Higher Party School:

In our research we must take into account the specific features of the transition to socialism by bypassing capitalism in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Great October opened to Russia's former colonial outlying territories the prospect of accelerated socioeconomic and cultural progress.

Scholars in the republic have been giving a good deal of attention to the study of this historical experience and its international significance. Together with such prominent research centers as the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Africa and Institute of Oriental Studies, they have held all-union and international conferences and seminars on this set of problems.

However, in studies of the experience of that development, there are frequently shortcomings, and a one-sided approach is often taken. In our research priority has been given to the positive results of the noncapitalist development of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the contradictions and complexities stemming from the initial level of the region's socioeconomic condition, and the specific features of the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet State for overcoming them have been left without attention. This is the reason for the "blank spots" in the illumination of the historical experience of the peoples of the republics of the Soviet East in building socialism.

Under these conditions, today it is especially necessary to produce a new reading of the history of the development of socialism in the region with the use of new archival sources. Unfortunately, for many years the very same factual figures have migrated from one published work and study to another. I think that it would be correct to establish not only a problem council for the study of the noncapitalist path of development of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan under the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, but also a special section in the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History.

Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Akramov, professor in the Department of Scientific Communism at the Tashkent Institute of Engineering for Irrigation and the Mechanization of Agriculture

In speaking of our attitude toward internationalist, all-union and national traditions and customs, I would like to note that we devote little attention to propagandizing

what is positive in national traditions. For example, following the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's 16th Plenum (1984), the republic press mainly treated negative traditions and customs of the people, and the revival of religiousness.

What is positive in the traditions and customs of every people took shape over the course of millenia. Such traditions, for example, that belong to any nation, including the Uzbek nation, as industriousness, honesty, modesty, truthfulness, respect for one's elders, concern for people, longing for peace, hospitality, rejection of the use of alcoholic beverages, a solicitous attitude toward bread and water, joint labor (the *khashar*), etc., are not bound up with religion and must not be identified with Islam, just as one must not confuse the Muslim religion with national culture.

Outstanding successes have been made in raising the cultural level of the Uzbek people during the Soviet period. But even here there are still very many unsolved problems. Thus, for example, our republic lags considerably behind the all-union level in terms of the number of doctors of sciences, the percentage of women of indigenous nationality studying in higher schools, and certain other indices.

Now a word about proportional representation in soviet agencies. More than 100 nations and nationalities live in the republic, each of which should have its own representatives on elective bodies, taking into account, of course, the size of a given nation or given people. In forming the deputy corps, the principle of proportionality is observed, but in other organizations—say, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations—it is not yet always observed to the proper extent.

To continue: today life confronts us with the task of carrying out internationalist upbringing on the basis of utilizing the traditions of the party and people. It should be noted that from the first days that Bolshevism arose and throughout the entire history of the Soviet period, Russian workers and Russian Bolsheviks consistently defended the rights of Central Asia's working people, treated their culture and customs with respect, and provided them with invaluable assistance. It is necessary to preserve and augment that tradition.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.A. Makatov, deputy director of the Interrepublic branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences

"We live in a multinational state, where any socio-economic, cultural and legal decisions always directly and immediately touch on the nationalities question." That was stated in M. S. Gorbachev's report at ceremonies devoted to the 70th anniversary of Great October.

Indeed, there is no single sphere of life where we do not encounter the nationalities phenomenon in one form or another and in some proportions or other. We also know that that phenomenon closely adjoins and even merges with the religious phenomenon among a certain part of the population. The dialectics of the relationship between the national and the religious is a special question. But here I would like to dwell on the problems of interethnic relations, the failure to solve which often leads to an intensification of the integration of the national and the religious.

It is known that one specific feature of the spiritual development of the Soviet nations and nationalities is the growth of their national consciousness. That, as was noted at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee's Ninth Plenum, is a natural and progressive, but at the same time, complex and contradictory process. A person comes to know his national characteristics through comparison: only in that case does he develop an appropriate appraisal and active attitude toward the values of his nationality. But comparison also contains in it the potential for drawing contrasts between "us and them," between "what we have and what they have," etc. Distinctions, if they are not philosophically recognized, necessarily lead to drawing contrasts.

Hence one of the main problems—the correct development of national consciousness. However, we have not worked out either a system or methods for international upbringing and the development of people's national awareness and consciousness. One reason for the revival of nationalistic attitudes and intensification of religious forms of behavior is rooted precisely in the lack of such a system.

As we know, one of the basic ideas of nationalism is the idea of drawing contrasts. That is also characteristic of religion. Therefore, the joining of nationalism and, for example, Islam, or Christianity, or Judaism, objectively becomes a force separating people according to national and religious features.

Of course, we have no grounds to consider everyone who manifests religious and national elements of consciousness to be a nationalist. But neither should we rule out the fact that such a thing is possible. Under the conditions of socialism it is hard to find a classic manifestation of nationalism. In our view, it has, by and large, become displaced into social and everyday relations. In addition, it manifests itself uniquely among various categories of the population. Lately nationalistic attitudes have also found grounding in archaic and patriarchal manifestations, including the revival of clan and tribal ties and relations.

In order to actively resist these and other nationalistic and religious tendencies, it is necessary, in our view, to carefully investigate the underlying layers of national relations, especially on the level of everyday attitudes

and social psychology; the mass information and propaganda media should give more attention to the common element that draws nations together than to what distinguishes and separates them. Internationalist upbringing should be extended to all nations and nationalities.

The growth of national consciousness is evoking legitimate interest, especially among young people, in history and the historical personalities of one's people. We must provide an objective appraisal of events of past years. And here, as experience shows, scholars have many extreme viewpoints.

Finally, taking into account the diversity of national manifestations, it is necessary to overcome narrow professionalism in research and to unite and coordinate efforts in creating fundamental works in the social sciences.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences K.N. Irisbayev,
head of the Sociology Section at the Uzbek SSR
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law:

Comprehensiveness in the internationalist upbringing of the republic's population presupposes a restructuring of the very approach to this problem. One way to accomplish this, in our view, would be to establish a center for the study, forecasting and shaping of public opinion. The experience of certain union republics persuasively confirms the advisability of such a research institution in the republic.

A comprehensive approach to the human factor is possible only on the condition of coordination of the activities of administrative and planning agencies, scholars in the natural, technical and social sciences and humanities, and cultural, education and public-health workers. I am referring to the establishment of an Institute of the Human Being, as A. S. Chamkin proposed in his remarks, on the basis of a number of functioning academy and branch research institutes (without additional financial outlays, by transferring individual sections, groups, associates, etc. to the proposed institute). Such an institute could ensure comprehensiveness in the study of the multifaceted activities of the human being. The analysis of all aspects of them and forecasting, in our view, are a task that has never before confronted science so urgently.

In the republic not enough informational materials are published for ideological personnel—propagandists, lecturers, agitators, and the givers of political reports. What the republic Society for Knowledge prepares is insufficient and also leaves a lot to be desired in terms of quality. In this connection, we need a volunteer council that could provide for the publication of informational materials on socioeconomic and ideological problems.

M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov

I would like to express certain ideas concerning the exchange of opinions that has taken place here.

We live in a multinational state. Although the nationalities question, in the form in which it was left over from the prerevolutionary past, has been resolved, we do have nationalities problems, insofar as there exist nations and differences among them that have been preserved for a long time. V. I. Lenin pointed out that national and state differences would be retained for a long time, and that they could not be removed or destroyed, and that it was necessary to apply nationalities policy skilfully and correctly "to national and national-state differences" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 41, p. 77).

We know that interethnic relations in our country contain, as already noted, certain contradictions that are not antagonistic in nature. But if certain of them are not removed in a timely fashion, they may lead to a conflict situation. We must unfailingly take this into account and take a particular approach to them in each specific case.

No matter what studies we do, we must proceed first and foremost from the fact that we should strengthen the multinational state. National state formations will develop; they have not exhausted their potential. Nonetheless, the first place belongs to our union state as the chief tool of communist creation. Therefore, we must absolutely keep this point in mind.

The language problem has been raised here. For our country, bilingualism is characteristic, i.e., the knowledge of one's native language and a second language, which is to say Russian, which has voluntarily been adopted by all the country's peoples as the language of interethnic intercourse. Bilingualism lies at the basis of the language policy of the party and Soviet state.

Is there any need to speak, under the conditions of socialist society, of the notion that a person who shifts to another language loses his national identity? I think not. National psychology is much deeper than language. At present a huge number of representatives of the country's different nationalities consider Russian to be their native language. And if one talks with them, they exhibit national psychology and national consciousness. I consider it wrong to suppose that if a person does not speak or write in his native language, he lacks national consciousness. To oppose the national language to Russian is methodologically, politically and theoretically incorrect. We will do everything we can to help representatives of an indigenous nationality study Russian in greater depth, and to help comrades of other nationalities study Uzbek. Phrase books will make the accomplishment of this task easier. Uzbek-Russian and Russian-Uzbek phrase books recently came out in a print run of 100,000.

Problems in the area of interethnic relations long ago outgrew republic dimensions. Take, for example, the following fact: Every year from 14 to 16 million people migrate throughout the country. This wave of the resettlement and mixing of nations and nationalities is becoming a general phenomenon. Interstate contacts between the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community are becoming a special sphere of national relations. This process also must be studied and analyzed, in treatment of the problems of internationalist upbringing, among other instances.

Now it is impossible to create works in a purely national form. Why? Because we live on an internationalist basis. Take any problem, and it is necessarily internationalist in its content. It is on the basis of these considerations that the problems of internationalist and patriotic upbringing must be solved at the present time.

I would like to touch on one more problem. Today it has been correctly stated here that we carry out work in internationalist upbringing without the necessary differentiation, without taking into account the specific features of various categories of the working people and the population. In our everyday work we should give greater consideration to these factors.

In our republic there has been a certain, if not revival, at least stabilization of the observance of religious ceremonies and customs. They are not declining, and young people, Komsomol members, and even certain Communists take part in them. We should actively work to introduce modern ceremonies and traditions into Soviet people's minds and lives; otherwise we will not save people from the harmful vestiges of the past, which are burdensome in both material and moral senses. I am speaking here not about combating believers, but about liberating their minds from the religious drug, which is frequently pushed by the clergy in a national wrapping.

In speaking about internationalist upbringing, we often fail to take into account the close connection between it and patriotic upbringing. We should instill in people, especially young people, patriotism, a sense of love for their homeland and republic, and pride in belonging to the multinational Soviet people. We must seriously think about the further development of the theoretical foundations of internationalist and patriotic upbringing under present-day conditions. Utilizing the positive experience of the past, we must work out the scientific foundations of internationalist patriotic upbringing for the present and the future. In doing so, we must unflinchingly keep in mind that each generation should pass through its own school of internationalism. There is an endless amount of work to be done here by scholars. The party apparatus, propagandists and lecturers, and the ideological aktiv are experiencing a great need for in-depth, scientifically substantiated works on the improvement of internationalist upbringing under present-day conditions, and on the culture of interethnic relations and other problems.

I think that, on the basis of our discussion, it is necessary to deal with specific problems in scientific research, including popular-science works, on the theory and practice of the development of interethnic relations, and on questions of the internationalist and patriotic upbringing of the masses. As for the proposals and recommendations expressed here today, they will be closely studied when subsequent decisions are developed on the topic under discussion.

From the editors.

The participants in the roundtable, of course, could not examine all the problems in interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing.

Therefore, the editors are not closing this topic and are inviting social scientists, party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers, and everyone concerned with the problems of interethnic relations and internationalist upbringing in both theory and practice to continue the discussion on the magazine's pages.

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Uzbek Official Explains Use of Medical Services Aid from Other Republics

18300376a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Jul 88 p 2

[Interview with D. Kabulovaya, UzSSR deputy minister of health, by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent O. Lukyanichikov: "No-Vacation Season for Pediatricians"]

[Text] Just as they did last summer, medical brigades from fraternal union republics are gathering in Uzbekistan to render assistance in protecting the health of mothers and children. Our correspondent asked the republic's deputy minister of health, D. Kabulova, several questions in this regard.

[Question] Please tell us who is coming this time.

[Answer] There are about 400 physicians from Moscow, the RSFSR and Georgia. They are mainly pediatricians and obstetrician-gynecologists, workers from medical scientific research institutions, practical physicians with at least 5 years of service, and instructors from the First Moscow Medical Institute.

[Question] How will their work be organized?

[Answer] We have decided to concentrate efforts in the most difficult areas. For example, specialists from the All-Union Center for Health Protection of Mothers and Children will work in Karakalpak; specialists from the First Medical Institute will work in Bukhara Oblast;

physicians from Georgia will work in Dzhizak Oblast. By the way, at our request, they are bringing with them certain medicines and equipment.

[Question] The republic is being given special aid, and this imposes a great responsibility on us ourselves...

[Answer] Just like last year, the Uzbek Ministry of Health has formed its own medical brigades. These are also workers from medical scientific research institutes, VUZes, and medical institutions of Tashkent—about 1,000 people.

In addition, more than 2,000 students from junior courses of medical VUZes will travel to feldsher-obstetrician stations and will provide public health care service for children in their first year of life and pregnant women.

The republic's physicians will work in close contact with their colleagues from the fraternal republics. And this is a good opportunity to learn something.

Take, for example, the pediatric resuscitation brigades set up at oblast children's hospitals and at rayon children's hospitals in Dzhizak Oblast. We will certainly include our physicians in the touring brigades so they can adopt the methods.

[Question] What did the period between last summer and this summer involve for the mother and child care service of Uzbekistan? After all, the medical "assault forces" can be only an element of the united, purposeful work.

[Answer] First of all, I would like to say that, finally, there is taking place an appreciable change on the part of party and soviet bodies toward our needs. Children's institutions are already in operation in the several dozen administrative buildings transferred to public health and modernized to take into account our requirements.

Last year, our service also received 70 percent of all newly created hospital beds.

The republic's Council of Ministers has adopted a long-term program of converting child nutrition to an industrial basis. Two child nutrition shops are already in operation at dairy combines in Tashkent and Namangan. Coupons for free receipt of child food products by prescription are being introduced.

Last year we, in turn, sent more than 500 young pediatric specialists and 140 obstetrician-gynecologists to the rural areas. Groups of specialists from Tashkent have been traveling in shifts in the oblast since last year.

The example of Chirakchinskiy Rayon, Kashka-Darya Oblast, is significant. During the year 16 buildings were repaired and transferred to public health. A children's infectious diseases hospital was set up, and a children's

polyclinic and prenatal care dispensary were given a housewarming. A infant feeding center has been created which provides 5,000 portions per day.

At the same time, local physicians "changed" places with their Tashkent colleagues, and prophylactic medical examinations of women and children of the area were conducted by specialists in the capital.

As a result, infant mortality has decreased by more than half here.

On the whole, a trend of decreasing infant mortality has been noted throughout the republic since last September.

[Question] How can this trend be consolidated?

[Answer] A comprehensive scientific and practical program to improve health care of expectant mothers and children and reduce infant mortality has been developed and is now being approved. Its basis was the example proposed to us by the Moscow Institute for Organizing Public Health Services imeni N.A. Semashko.

We learned much from the bitter experience of the outburst of infectious diseases at maternity hospitals. We now try to close the maternity wards on the first signals from the sanitary and epidemiological service and regularly conduct preventive maintenance. It is difficult, since there is a shortage of facilities. But with the understanding and support of local authorities, as we were convinced, a solution is sometimes found.

We also count heavily on sanitary educational work among the population, particularly in rural areas. We persistently talk about the basic characteristics of sanitation standards in the newspapers, on television and even from the lips of heroes in animated cartoons, which are now being made for us.

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Lake Onega Pollution Linked to Kondopoga Paper Mill

18300376b Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Yu. Goncharov, paper-making machine operator and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, V. Gerasimov, party committee secretary of the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine, and S. Mamzelev, assistant chief environmental engineer of the combine, Karelian ASSR: "Lake Onega Is in Trouble"]

[Text] In a scenic corner of Karelia on the very shores of Lake Onega is located one of the first-born of Soviet industry—the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine. During its nearly 70-year history it has evolved from a small paper mill to one of the largest enterprises in our country. Here they produce 40 percent of the newsprint

produced in the USSR. The combine's product is well known and highly valued by the printers of many publishing houses. It can be said that our collective has a pretty good calling card.

The destructive role with respect to the environment, inseparably linked to the combine's activities, is less known. Old-timers in these parts still remember when Kondopoga Bay on Lake Onega was one of the richest in fish. Not far at all from the city you could catch silver whitefish, plump bream cast with a copper color, pike, or pike perch for chowder or aspic. Now fishermen go hundreds of kilometers out to other areas of the Onega. If you do catch some big fish next to Kondopoga, it is not likely you will eat it because of the specific odor. And you also will not scoop out water from the lake for chowder—you cannot drink it.

The cause of such significant ecological changes, which have taken place during the life of just one generation, are the industrial run-off from our combine. As we know, pulp and paper production requires a great amount of water consumption for production needs and is among the biggest and most hazardous polluters of rivers and lakes.

The combine is continually working to reduce consumption of fresh water. Its consumption per unit of production has been cut by one-fourth in the last two 5-year periods, and the utilization factor in recycling is 82 percent. The steps taken make it possible to extract and utilize a number of substances from the industrial run-off which are of considerable value to the national economy. The fiber that is caught is sent to be made into wrapping paper.

At the same time, unfortunately, so far it is impossible to use all the substances contained in the run-off at the current level of production. Taking this into account, in 1983 the combine built biological water treatment works designed by the sectorial Giprobum [State Institute for the Planning of Establishments of the Pulp, Paper and Hydrolysis Industries] which has a capacity of 180,000 cubic meters per day. It would seem that the problem has been solved. But why is the combine still the largest polluter of Lake Onega?

The planning assignment for expansion and technical re-equipping of the combine, developed in 1977 by Giprobum, called for the production of 112,000 tons of pulp per year at Kondopoga. The rest of the 88,000 tons needed for paper production was to be supplied by other enterprises of the sector. The purification works were intended for these capacities. Later on, however, the USSR Ministry of the Lumber Industry (Minlesprom) violated this procedure. The plan established from above for pulp production exceeded the planned level by 15,000 tons per year. This adversely affected the operation of the purification works, since they were given an additional load.

The heads of the sector forgot that they had declared our combine a base enterprise operating on a waste-free production process. It was proposed to use the activated sludge as an additive for livestock feed as after purification of the run-off. A drying shop costing millions of rubles was built in the purification complex. Individual batches of the activated sludge were tested in livestock breeding. The livestock gained weight, and consumption of traditional feed was reduced. But it was possible to obtain consistently a high-quality sludge suitable for livestock only under design load conditions for the purification works. Such a product could not be obtained if the works were overloaded. That is why the expensive shop is running idle today. What is more, a tank truck of fuel oil had to be burned in order to dry 1 ton of sludge. Then we were forced to haul the dry sludge to a dumping ground instead of to farms. There, it would be out in the rain and give off such an "aroma" throughout the whole neighborhood that you had to plug your nose. People work in four shifts. Electrical power and fuel are used up, transport vehicles make runs, and all for nothing. Sisyphean toil!

There is another cause for the overload of the purification works. The Minlesprom did not provide the financing called for by the plan for modernizing the yeast production, which if done would have made it possible to increase the output of protein for agriculture by 2,500 tons per year. This means that tons of organic compounds are being turned into a toxic substance for Lake Onega each day instead of being converted to valuable livestock feed.

We should note here that the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, interested in increasing the output of protein nutrient yeasts, offered to share in the financing. But even this has not produced a real effect. The Minlesprom has delayed the construction indefinitely.

The negative side of the activities of the pulp and paper mill is well known to the enterprise collective and causes quite justified concern and alarm. It is precisely this alarm that compelled us over the course of several years to see to it that the Minlesprom established a projected plan for production and delivery of pulp. Finally, at the direction of Minister M. Busygin, an authoritative commission began work at the combine in February 1987. It was made up of workers from the institutes of Giprobum and VNPObumprom [All-Union Scientific Production Association of the Paper Industry], experienced adjusters, managers from the Soyuzbumaga Production Association, and specialists from other enterprises of the sector. Based on the results of their work, the commission submitted to the ministry a voluminous report with two proposal variants.

The Minlesprom did not like either of the variants proposed by the commission. Meanwhile, the pulp production plan for 1988 for the Kondopoga Combine

remains much higher than the planned level. Capital investments to expand yeast production and purification works have not been allocated.

At the same time, in response to a letter from the Karelian ASSR Committee of People's Control on the unsatisfactory operation of the purification works of the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine, Deputy Minister Yu. Guskov guarantees that by 1990 the planned run-off will be ensured. There is no real basis for such optimism. According to the plan which was developed 10 years ago, the combine should dump 3 tons of organic pollutants per day. But we are discharging into the lake 10 times as much toxic waste. The plan itself is outdated.

Much is written in the newspapers about the bureaucratic work style of ministries. The Minlesprom is no exception. We will cite a graphic example which pertains directly to this. In a letter dated 13 July 1987, the ispolkom of the Kondopoga Rayon Soviet informed the Minlesprom and the Karelian ASSR Council of Ministers of complaints from residents of the city and the rayon about the unsatisfactory state of environmental protection at the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine because of the poor operation of the purification works. Deputy Minister V. Chuyko sent a letter to the chief of the Administration of Protection and Water Management, Ye. Sizov. He sends it to the chief of the Karellesprom Association, I. Sankin, who throws it over to his assistant, I. Gendel. In the end a resolution emerges: "Jointly with the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine, prepare proposals and coordinate them with the ispolkom." The circle is closed.

The Kondopoga paper mill workers are famous for their initiative in solving many problems. In this situation of environmental protection matters as well, they are not waiting around doing nothing. During the 3 years of operation of the purification works, innovators have

submitted and introduced more than 100 proposals aimed at improving the run-off purification equipment, incorporating automation and using new process solutions. They have made it possible to reduce the discharge of pollutants into the lake by one-fourth.

Nevertheless, despite these efforts, tons of harmful substances are fed into the lake each day with the run-off from the combine, greatly exceeding the established standards. To wait for the combine to perform a miracle and everything to be resolved by itself, as the Minlesprom is doing so far, means to display inexcusable inaction.

The events associated with the Priozersk Pulp Plant are still fresh in everyone's memory. Their sad ending was the closing of the enterprise which was polluting Lake Ladoga for a long time and charges against its managers.

Having before us the graphic example of Priozersk, we would like to add our voice to the dozens, if not hundreds, of requests by the managers of the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine and the demands of controlling bodies and public opinion, and through the newspaper PRAVDA appeal to the leaders of the Minlesprom. Respected comrades, the problem of the pollution of Lake Onega by run-off from the Kondopoga Combine exists! Its solution depends on you. Yes, the Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Combine has switched to self-financing. Now the ministry has the opportunity to turn its back on financing environmental protection measures, alluding to the fact that all funds are in the hands of the enterprise. This would be unfair to the highest degree, since the problems have been building up for years and it is now impossible for one combine to solve them. Therefore, we await concrete and effective measures. We must not forget the saying that you get what you pay for.

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